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In the radius of borders—and beyond
Hans Karl Peterlini, Jasmin Donlic
“Beyond Borders” is the focal topic of this new edition of the “Yearbook 
Migration and Society”. The view goes from the border as a basic figure of 
demarcation to the border area as a potential for overcoming it. Migration 
and borders are conditional on each other. There may also be inner migra-
tion, movements within a state, but even in this case such movements only 
become problematic when at least imaginary border lines are crossed— 
between country and city or vice versa, between north and south, east and 
west, rich and poor, or even between regions of different ethnic or religious 
prevalence in the same state. The yearbook draws in part from an intensive 
scholarly examination of border and migration on two levels, firstly through 
the preparatory work for a Horizon2020 project on narratives of migration, 
and secondly within the program committee of the International Migration 
Conference 2021 in Klagenfurt (Austria) with its focus on “Border Thinking”.
In its geographical dimension, the concept of “border” points to migra-
tion movements as such: migrants leave their previous central place of living 
and livelihood, departing for somewhere else. They do so in order to begin a 
new life there, although it does not by any means have to be the final destina-
tion of their migration. However, bound up with this is a venture, subjective-
ly experienced in very different ways, into a more or less new transnational 
(life)world. In traversing the geographical border, at the same time they must 
grapple, come to terms with—and successfully surmount—political, social, 
linguistic and socio-cultural borders as well.
Border research in migration deals principally with political questions 
in the framework of confronting and dealing with border regimes. The in-
terest there looks at complex, national and supra-national activities and 
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policies of the respective states concerned, the securing of existing borders 
and the constituting of new national-state borders, as well as the political 
and populist discourses accompanying these developments in regard to the 
control and supervision of migration. The main topic of previous investiga-
tion has been the border regimes along the external boundaries of the EU 
and the border between the United States and Mexico. Going beyond such 
political questions and closely associated with them is the broad palette of 
borderland topics, extending from political-geographical practices to social 
and cultural practices, and to practices transcending what is cultural, such 
as in connection with social practices of “bordering” and “border making.” 
Here the prime focus is on questions of the genesis and treatment of group- 
related differences, historical, political, social and cultural forms of border 
making within societies, which can be bound up with structural and per-
sonal processes of exclusion and discrimination. The central key words here 
in the context of migration are racism, ethnicization and culturalization. 
Examples of criticism of and resistance to the various forms of exclusion 
and marginalization are the Black Lives Matter Movement, postmigrant dis-
course and also the new post-colonial debates, such as those within Critical 
Whiteness Studies. Forms of negative exclusion are countered by forms of 
self-determined boundary making, such as in the framework and creation of 
forms of cultural, ethnic or religious self-determination by migrants. Cen-
tral to these forms of boundary making are in particular the development 
and establishing of forms of joint action grounded in solidarity and orient-
ed to reciprocity, mutuality, modes of mutual aid. A further form of dealing 
with borders involves practices in life, work and the economy extending over 
and beyond borders, where—beyond political and media discourses on cri-
sis—border regions harbor a wealth of experience for the shaping of transna-
tional exchange and convivial strategies for multi-, inter- and trans-cultural 
forms of living together, synergy and collaboration. However, in regard to 
positively experienced and tangible forms of border making, it is necessary 
to keep in mind that they are variable and mutable. This means that modes 
of border making in social practices are also subject to changes; they can al-
ter their significance and character. Thus, for example, a positive attitude 
toward regional contexts can give rise to narrow-mindedness, dissociation 
and distancing in regard to neighboring regions or persons who have f led or 
who are in need of protection and care.
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Thus, in respect to migration very different forms of borders and border- 
making develop their impact. In the dynamic process, social, political and 
cultural factors and contextual situations become visible, within which 
societal and social structures and specific social practices are manifest. In 
the context of these practices, very individual and diverse forms of dealing 
with migration—and also with borders—arise and crystallize. The Yearbook 
seeks to investigate these aspects, inter alia with reference to the debates 
on decolonizing through critical case studies about borders and migration 
in Europe, between USA and Mexico, in Mideast and in Africa. In line with 
this international radius, this issue is published exclusively in English. It in-
cludes following contributions:
Regina Römhild, Hans Karl Peterlini, Nadja Danglmaier, Jasmin 
Donlic: The Border as research space: Potentials of historical and 
contemporary border narratives for a better understanding and 
addressing of migration
The article proposes a research approach for addressing controversial chal-
lenges through migration by focusing on experiences in border regions. This 
is based on the assumption that narratives of belonging, defence and threat 
have emerged around borders over centuries, which have produced preva- 
lent national identities over the past 150 years. Among these problematic 
and heavily mediatised discourses, the regions on both sides of the border 
are guarding a precious treasure of experiences of border crossing, cultural 
exchange, social and economic transactions. This hidden knowledge and un-
derestimated potential of border regions can be recovered through research 
and used for inclusive processes in migrant and ethnicised societies.
Naif Bezwan: Borders, authoritarian regimes, and migration  
in Kurdistan: An Intersectional Inquiry
This paper examines the interplay between borders, regimes, and migration 
by focusing on the Kurdish case. It explains migration as being causally re-
lated, (a) to the ways in which territorial boundaries of the states were re-
drawn, (b) the processes by which the political regimes have been established 
and (c), to the authoritarian and homogenous state policies and practices 
that followed and continue to exist. To make sense of this interconnected-
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ness, I present the concept of structural migration to explain the phenome-
non of migration as being engineered by and built into the institutional and 
ideological structures of the political regimes ruling over Kurdistan.
Isabel K. Latz: U.S. immigration enforcement policies,  
health care utilization, and community health
Under the Trump administration, immigration policies have become more 
restrictive and immigration enforcement has been strengthened, partic-
ularly at the U.S.-Mexico border. We conducted a survey study examining 
immigration policy perceptions in relation to mental health and health care 
utilization among 211 Hispanic residents with different immigration status-
es in El Paso, County in the Spring of 2019. Findings showed associations 
between deportation fears and increased psychological distress as well as ex-
periences with immigration enforcement and lower health care utilization. 
The COVID-19 pandemic highlights a need to understand how immigration 
policies affect health care utilization and health outcomes to mitigate com-
munity harm.
Emina Osmandzikovic: Lessons learned between Ebola and COVID-19: 
Border politics and securitization of migration f lows in West Africa
Border politics in West Africa is a gravely misunderstood topic. Externally 
securitized in a way that does not necessarily serve the local communities 
and the sustenance of cross-border f lows of people and goods, West Africa 
has persevered through the Ebola outbreak in a rather miraculous way. Given 
the acuteness of the West African socio-economic condition and healthcare 
security, this chapter attempts to explore migration patterns and contextu-
alize viral outbreaks—from Ebola to COVID-19—in the f luid framework of 
border f lows within this Sub-Saharan region, thus invalidating extant prej-
udice against West African migration patterns.
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Hans Karl Peterlini: Particular to time and space: Historical and  
life-world explorations on the Brenner border Austria–Italy
The border at the Brenner Pass crossing the Alps between Austria and Italy is 
politically and emotionally charged: Here, where for millennia there was an 
open transition between North and South and made possible the cross-bor-
der togetherness of the Tyrol region, an arbitrary boundary was drawn in 
1918–1920 and Tyrol was divided. The article explores the historical develop-
ments and lifeworld potentials beyond an exclusively political definition of 
border. Exploration in the two border villages of Brenner and Franzensfeste 
reveals experiences of living together across ruptures and crises, especially 
with regard to migration.
Alexandra Schwell: Imaginaries of sovereignty:  
Visualizing the loss of control
“The night that Germany lost control.” This headline on the cover of the Ger-
man weekly DIE ZEIT was published in fall 2016 on the 2015 border opening 
anniversary when German chancellor Angela Merkel had decided to allow 
Syrian and other refugees into the country. DIE ZEIT situates its visual and 
linguistic narrative within a discursive framework that echoes far-right and 
right-wing populist discourses in the way it instrumentalizes images, meta-
phors, and visual imaginaries of Others and relates them to imaginations of 
control and sovereignty. Drawing upon a closed reading of DIE ZEIT’s title 
page, the article seeks to elaborate on the broader relation of images, imag-
inaries, and emotional practices of border transgression and the invocation 
of the border in media and political discourse on refugees in Germany. It 
explores how the cover epitomizes, alludes to, and at the same time fosters a 
growing unease of large parts of the German liberal middle-class concerning 
the “refugee crisis”.
Tatiana Zhurzhenko: A border on the move: The Ukrainian-Russian 
frontier from the Soviet collapse to the conf lict in Donbas
The border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is the longest in 
Europe. It runs across densely populated territories and is crossed by mil-
lions of people for private visits, business and tourism. The annexation of 
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Crimea by Russia and the military conf lict in Donbas resulted in new divid-
ing lines, caused f lows of refugees and internally displaced persons, affected 
labour migration and disrupted the cross-border cooperation between the 
two countries. This development has significant impact on border crossing 
regimes, transport routes and routines of cross-border movement.
The border as research space 
Potentials of historical and contemporary border 
narratives for a better understanding and  
addressing of migration
Regina Römhild, Hans Karl Peterlini, Nadja Danglmaier, Jasmin Donlic
The article proposes a research approach for addressing controversial challenges 
through migration by focusing on experiences in border regions. This is based on the 
assumption that narratives of belonging, defence and threat have emerged around 
borders over centuries, which have produced prevalent national identities over the 
past 150 years. Among these problematic and heavily mediatised discourses, the re-
gions on both sides of the border are guarding a precious treasure of experiences of 
border crossing, cultural exchange, social and economic transactions. This hidden 
knowledge and underestimated potential of border regions can be recovered through 
research and used for inclusive processes in migrant and ethnicised societies.
Introduction: Between national orders and transnational spaces
In recent years, the power and fragility of borders have emerged, with a par-
ticular intensification from 2015 to 2020, as a key issue for the global shaping 
of the present and future. The increased movement of refugees to Europe 
around 2015 was politically highly problematized, whereas in 2020 the politi-
cal scene appeared almost schizophrenic: After the critique of its military of-
fensive in Syria, Turkey threatened the EU with allowing 3.6 million refugees 
to enter Europe, who were held back there partly with EU funds. While the 
EU states were considering stricter measures to secure their borders against 
Regina Römhild, Hans Karl Peterlini, Nadja Danglmaier, Jasmin Donlic14
refugees, the SARS-CoV-2 virus effortlessly crossed all borders and put the 
world in a state of emergency, causing a global lockdown.
Seldom before has it become so obvious that borders are supposed to 
protect national boundaries as sharp divisions yet fail in the face of global 
challenges which can only be addressed by international and transnation-
al cooperation. Just like viruses and climate change cannot be stopped at 
borders, refugee movements and migration cannot be mastered simply via 
border management if one does not want to abandon all humanity and in-
ternational solidarity. However, exactly this happened when several states 
tended to instrumentalize the Corona pandemic to close down their borders 
and—as in the case of Bosnia—virtually arrested refugees preventing them 
from moving anywhere. To make things even worse, the migrants were left 
alone with no humanitarian support whatsoever. In fact, the recent strug-
gles with the virus strengthened the ongoing renaissance of a ‘new localism’ 
in nationalist and racist terms, rather than promoting the necessary open-
ing up for transnational, ultimately global collaborative efforts to combat the 
pandemic threat.
This article aims at broadening the perspective and allow for a critique 
of the current return to understanding borders in terms of mere geopolit-
ical firewalls. Against this limitation, it deals with the border as an object 
of research from a rather unusual, widely forgotten perspective, namely not 
only as a dividing line, but also as a connecting space (cf. Barth 1969; Dries-
sen 1992). Viewed in this way, borders do not only exercise excluding and 
blocking functions, but also hold potential for cooperation and collaboration 
across borders.1
Particularly in the context of migration, borders are presented in media, 
public, political and also scientific discourses predominantly as threatened 
infrastructures of national—and today also EU-European—sovereignty that 
need specific protection. Just consider the border controls between Austria 
and Germany and the conf licts between Italy and Austria over the Brenner 
1  The research approach discussed here is the basis for a joint research proposal by universi-
ties in Austria (Klagenfurt), Germany (Berlin), Greece (Thessalonik) and Sweden (Malmö) 
as well as NGOs in Austria (Südwind), Romania (Hosman Durabil) and Tunisia (France and 
Tunisia Terre d’Asile): “Border Narratives on Migration as laboratories for inclusion”. In ad-
dition to the authors of this paper, the theoretical and methodological part of the proposal 
was also worked on by Naif Bezwan, Athanasios Marvakis, Veronika Michitsch, Ricarda 
Motschilnig, Bo Petersson, Ioanna Wagner Tsoni, Werner Wintersteiner and others.
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border as a result of the f light movements in 2015. This escalated in 2019 in 
the heated debates about a wall between Italy and Slovenia. At the borders 
with the Eastern European EU countries, the border and migration policies 
led to setbacks in fundamental questions of democracy and European co-
operation. The border issue has thus destabilised the EU’s internal cohesion 
and led to a stronger stance towards the external borders.
But in the shadow of this negative perception of the border also lie un-
rewarded and unexploited potentials of the border regions: Despite massive 
conf licts around the borders, people have repeatedly developed positive 
practices of living together at the border and practised exchange and en-
counters across borders.
From this perspective, especially border regions hold a wealth of expe-
rience in dealing with migration, which lies hidden under the surface of 
mostly negative discourses and is worth to be protected. This should not lead 
to a romanticization of migration (Mezzadra 2004: 83), as this all too easily 
ignores the involuntary nature of migration, conditions of exploitation and 
precarious living conditions. On the contrary, the aim is not only to acknowl-
edge the painful and traumatic historical and, in some cases, current experi-
ences in the struggle for and at borders, but also to study learning processes 
in these areas over generations. This should allow a better addressing the 
issue of migration and lead to a better understanding of migration.
The tension between transnational social spaces and national spaces 
in terms of constitutional law and order is particularly intense in regional 
border areas (Scott 2003) with autochthonous minorities and heterogeneity 
caused by the proximity of the border. The additional complexity is rarely 
noticed, because of mechanisms of social invisibility of autochthonous and 
allochthonous minorities and is only marginally dealt with in educational re-
search (Krüger-Potratz 2006: 124). The assumption of homogeneous national 
spaces thus makes, for example, Frisians or Sorbs disappear in public dis-
courses in Germany just as much as the autochthonous Albanian minority in 
Italy, while contemporary Albanian immigrants are perceived and stigma-
tized as a migration problem.
Here, a further special feature becomes apparent: The overlapping of 
historically conditioned experiences of foreignness with more recent migra-
tion phenomena has not yet been addressed much (Peterlini 2017). This pos-
es a very special challenge for border regions, because narratives from the 
past—some of which are mythically transfigured and difficult to access—
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tend to strengthen tendencies of rejection and demands for the protection 
of autochthonous minorities against new foreign infiltration (ibid.). At the 
same time, the processing of these narratives offers a high, however still lit-
tle used, potential for understanding the foreign expressions of others. In 
areas, where autochthonous minorities and national majority populations 
live together, mono-ethnic narratives and the resulting narrowly defined 
identity concepts contrast with the lived plurality. In the concept of the post- 
migrant society, these distinctions between ‘native’ and ‘migrant’ as well as 
minority are challenged altogether and dismantled as categorical resources 
to construct a fictive culturally homogeneous ‘nation’. Post-migrant narra-
tives deconstruct this notion and replace it by accounts of radical diversities 
constituting a rather different vision of a minoritized majority (Czollek et 
al. 2019; Römhild 2014). This superimposition of historically handed-down 
narratives often standing in the way of an open attitude in the present is not 
exclusive to the border region.
Discourses being inf lamed by border struggles are also effective else-
where, where experiences have not been made in the first place. Neverthe-
less, it is worth investigating to what extent inhabitants of border regions are 
more sympathetic to foreign inf luences than those who live far away from 
borders, as they are more used to such inf luences. In the border region, 
however, this special mixture of excluding discourses and including ways of 
life is given in a condensed form and becomes more visible. Therefore, the 
knowledge generated here is exemplary and can be used for learning pro-
cesses elsewhere.
The border regions in this sense represent a kind of laboratory for the 
study of historical and contemporary narratives about migration and its in-
f luence. The duality of the border as a conf lict-laden condition and the bor-
der region as a transnational social space is here of particular interest (Glick 
Schiller et al. 1992; Green 2012; Pries 1996).
The border space also offers itself as a space in between (Bhabha 1994), in 
which fixed meanings are again exchanged and thus transformed. The po-
litical and media discourses about refugee’s movements, especially those 
about the Mediterranean, have painfully demonstrated how the concept of 
the border is subject to deterritorialisation. This is because virtual borders 
can also be effective elsewhere in contrast to their physically drawn line. This 
can clearly be seen in the logic of extra-territorialized controls or refugee 
camps in accordance with EU border protection policy, as negotiated with 
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states outside the EU dating back to the decision of the European Council in 
November 2002 (Europäischer Rat 2002: 10). In the same way, the border can 
also manifest itself in and around an asylum centre in the region or express 
itself in cities and conurbations as the plurality of the migration society. It is 
partly visibly and partly invisibly, divided by different civil rights and par-
ticipation possibilities (Mezzadra 2003: 112) and accordingly generates dif-
ferent, often contrasting narratives. The zoning of extended “borderlands” 
has become central to European politics of the externalization as well as the 
internalization of EU borders (Cuttitta 2010).
A possible access to this presumed wealth of experience of the border re-
gions are their rich narratives about migration. Narratives play a central role 
in the creation of social and political orders. Generally, they are understood 
as a representation based on a sequence of events in the past that communi-
cates something from the memory of the narrator (Linde 2015: 2). They are 
carriers of imagination of how individuals and collectives recall their past 
(cf. Macdonald 2013), try to understand their present and design their future. 
The basic idea of the research approach proposed in this article is to survey, 
transform and create narratives in a performative and participatory method 
with the various stakeholders in the migration society in order to work on 
them for a better understanding and management of migration. This makes 
it necessary to survey less perceived narratives, paying particular attention 
to discrimination based on origin, ethnicity, language, gender, socioeco-
nomics, culture, religion and others. It is also particularly important that 
research does not stop at the border, but crosses it, by involving the other 
side respectively. Especially in the—historical and contemporary—cultur-
al and social exchange, trade and marriage across the border that people in 
border regions develop a largely unconscious competence in dealing with the 
other. This can be exceptionally rewarding in those border areas that have 
a particular conf lict potential due to the overlapping of historical—mostly 
ethnic-national—experiences of strangeness and more recent migration 
processes.
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Exploring narratives regionally and transnationally
As a method, inquiry narrative analysis is defined by a particular distinction 
and tension between story and discourse—and their respective rules. Story 
is taken to refer to the represented events as opposed to a representation of 
those events, and, as such, tends to follow certain rules of chronological and 
spatial order. Discourses are, in Foucault’s sense, permeated by power rela-
tions that tend to support and produce hegemonic and system-sustaining 
structures, while stories—as narratives—can break these up in life-world 
contexts.
Therein lies one significant aspect of narrative analysis: Narratives are 
radically open-ended in that they can be retold, remade and reconstructed 
in several ways. At the same time, they remain sensitive to changing societal 
needs, perceptions and dynamics. Another aspect, which makes narrative 
inquiry fruitful for this study, is that it focuses on “temporality, sociality and 
place”. As such, it attends to personal and social contexts under which peo-
ple’s experiences and events are unfolding, pays attention to the particular-
ities of the places where inquiry and event take place, to include the ongoing 
temporality of experience (cf. Clandinin and Huber 2010: 436).
Thus, narrative inquiry uses “the power of storytelling as a tool for elicit-
ing people’s local knowledge and understandings of social phenomena and of 
narrative analysis as an instrument for analysing them” (De Fina and Geor-
gakopoulou 2012: 18). This mode of inquiry draws its strengths from giving 
meaning to human experience, focusing on people’s individual experience, 
paying attention both to language and to discourse and to the contexts of 
storytelling (cf. ibid.).
In their totality and complexity, narratives, similar to dreams according 
to Freud, represent a royal road to a better understanding of unconscious 
motives for human actions and attitudes, if they are made conscious and ac-
cessible for ref lection. In myths, historical experiences such as warlike de-
feats (Schivelbusch 2002) and violent conf licts are condensed and changed 
into stories of victims and heroes. On the one hand they offer consolation in 
the face of collective humiliation, on the other hand they ward off guilt and 
shame (Freud 1974 [1921]). According to Schivelbusch such sediment collec-
tive memories, which transfigure grave historical experiences, are very per-
sistent and difficult to change.
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What and how something is remembered and what falls into oblivion 
is fundamental to the formation of collective narratives and thus identity- 
forming narratives. What individuals remember or repress interacts with 
the group. According to Volkan (2006: 209) the bond between the individual 
and the group is woven above all through inner images based on the history 
of large groups such as myths, songs, eating habits, dances, heroes and mar-
tyrs. This is where the psychoanalytic theory of forgetting by suppressing 
meets Jan Assmann’s theory of memory (Assmann J. 2002). Just as collective 
memory has no neuronal network of its own, individual memory is always 
socially co-constituted. Assmann distinguishes communicative collective 
memory from cultural collective memory as the former is still supported by 
contemporary witnesses and can thus date back up to 80–100 years. In con-
trast, cultural memory is fed by fixed points in the past, such as ancestral 
history, exodus, desert migration, land grabbing, war and subjugation. In 
cultural memory, factual history is transformed into remembered history 
and then into myths. These hardly accessible memories are of central impor-
tance for analysing the traditional heritage of societies. However, for their 
opening it is significant to transfer them into what Aleida Assmann (2006) 
called social memory. This means: Making narratives conscious, relating 
them to concrete experiences and life situations, learning to distinguish be-
tween remembered and lived experience, making the fixed f luid again.
For this purpose, it is necessary not to limit the research to the collection 
and analysis of obvious narratives alone, but to work on theme in an action- 
oriented way. Care should be taken to give space and voice to narratives 
that would otherwise not be heard or not be spoken out at all. A particular 
challenge lies in not only making these narratives conscious and opening up 
transformation processes, but also in generating new narratives to imagine 
a better future, in the sense of the (im)possible utopia as Derrida (Assheuer/
Derrida 1998) tries to distinguish the concrete utopia from an unreal dream. 
Thus, narratives are not only understood as storage devices for experiences, 
but they also hold potential to create a new design for the way we want to live 
(together). The concrete utopia consists in the assumption that narratives are 
able to inf luence political, social and economic orders in the sense of a con-
vivial life and society (llich 1973).
By bringing together discursively and structurally divided people in focus 
groups, in the performative and artistic settings, media exchange platforms 
and real encounters, narratives are exchanged, ref lected and changed. This 
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can produce those “communities of sentiment” to which Appadurai (1996: 54) 
ascribes the potential to develop from shared imaginations to common ac-
tions. However, this can also be a very painful and not necessarily successful 
way. Above all, dealing with narratives of rejection and hatred involves risks 
that are difficult to resolve at the level of discourse. It requires a trust in the 
pedagogical space of the narrative (Demetrio 1988), in which hierarchies and 
power relations are lowered in order to be able to face this risk in the sense 
of a weak pedagogy (Peterlini 2011: 169-178). What is meant by this is a ped-
agogical attitude that gives up some of its power in order to f latten hierar-
chies, for example between so-called educationally deprived and educated 
citizens, and thus make exchange possible (ibid.).
When we speak of memory communities, it is important to address the 
right to claim recognition from others. Charles Taylor’s concept of the pol-
itics of recognition shows us that people are dependent on recognition by 
society in their identity and that lack of recognition can have fatal conse-
quences (Taylor 2009). Changes in deadlocked positions can only be initiated 
when subjective experiences of suffering are met with acceptance and un-
derstanding. In this context, the approach of Michael Rothberg and Yasemin 
Yildiz (2011) is relevant that communities do not “have” memories, but that 
communities emerge in dealing with memories.
Selected Examples of Narrative
One example is a narrative project that involved radicalized patriotic youths 
in South Tyrol on the border between Italy and Austria conducted in intervals 
of twelve years. The young people were not only interviewed but also accom-
panied into their life worlds. The topic was how they understand homeland 
(Heimat)—as the innermost core of political identity in South Tyrol—and 
how they experience it in their everyday lives. The results of the study showed 
clear differences between the radical political statements, which were 
strongly inf luenced by discourses, and the much softer life-world narratives, 
which correlated strongly with concrete experiences. In the second survey, 
the young people had become young adults. All of them showed a remarkable 
process of ref lection, which can be explained, above all, by life experience 
and educational biography. All the youths interviewed agreed that the first 
survey twelve years earlier had initiated a permanent process of ref lection in 
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them. The opportunity to talk about their understanding of their homeland 
had encouraged them to further ref lection (Peterlini 2010; 2011).
The memory of a historical event is never uniform, but is composed of 
different perspectives, some of which are even contradictory. However, this 
is also vital on the local scale of (post-)migrant and border regions in which 
diverse narratives of diverse and shared histories coincide. What meant a 
victory for some was a defeat for others. Territory that had been won by some 
had been registered as a loss for others. Avishai Margalit (2002) distinguish-
es between common and divisive/shared memories. Separating memories 
require understanding, they must be discussed, told and heard in order to 
find mutual acceptance. In order to share memories that divide, the dialogue 
between the individual memory communities about the traditional histori-
cal narratives is necessary. This does not automatically lead to agreement but 
at least to a perception and recognition of the diversity of memories. The aim 
is not to take over the narratives of others but to respect their experience and 
recognize their perspective as a legitimate view of things. Thus, the recogni-
tion of the narratives of others is a key element in the resolution of hostilities.
Negotiating memories and building communities around such memo-
ry work can be seen as acts of citizenship (Rothberg/Yildiz 2011). This can 
be observed in the experience with another current research project at Kla-
genfurt University, which aims to bring pupils and teachers from Carinthia 
and Slovenia into exchange about historical narratives. Together they work 
on official and less visible historical narratives of their region and ref lect on 
where their own environment is situated in this process. An empirical study 
on the communities of remembrance in Carinthia from 2016 shows that the 
old narratives in relation to the history of the region are not breaking or dis-
appearing but that new, different ones are progressively appearing alongside 
them, in the sense of a multidirectional memory as observed by Rothberg 
(2009). Voices, that differ to varying degrees, shape the discourse and over 
the last 20 years the conversation has been increasingly co-determined by 
young people (Danglmaier et al. 2017).
Methodologically, border studies require an interdisciplinary approach 
oriented towards the social space to which educational science, cultural an-
thropology, political science, media theory in the context of critical migra-
tion research contribute. Even artistic interventions are not only used, as it 
is often the case, to communicate or prettify the results of research, but art is 
used as a performative part of the research project. Performative elements, 
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like forum theatre (Boal 1993) and exhibitions, should make it possible to 
bring the public’s attention to narratives that have been suppressed and to 
produce new future-oriented accounts.
Perspectives and expectations
The different approaches converge in the common interest in the lifeworld 
(Husserl 1976 [1936]: 4) in the selected border regions. Their historical and 
current migration experiences are made fruitful for future action strategies 
through the analysis, ref lection and transformation of narratives. The fol-
lowing questions need to be addressed: Which narratives guide the percep-
tion of migration in these life worlds and in how far do they provide motives 
for action? How do these narratives interact with political, social and cul-
tural practices? In which way do narratives determine these practices or are, 
what much speaks for it, even always practices.
A scientific potential lies in the intentional renunciation of dissolving the 
ambivalence of modern societies on one side or the other. The complexity and 
tensions of the migration society are perceived and accepted as the special 
potential of border areas and their narratives. The approach is oriented to-
wards migration research as research on migrants and non-migrants. It also 
refers to the research in between as a genuinely educational space (West-
phal 2007), in which reality is not simply accepted but can be shaped perfor-
matively. It directs its epistemological interest to learning and educational 
experiences in overcoming the “dualism between the margins and the he-
gemonic centre” (Castro Varela/Dhawan 2007: 43), from which migration re-
search as a critique of society can lead out (Transit Migration 2007, Römhild 
2014). This should especially be understood in the sense of a de-migranti-
sation of migration research and a migrantisation of society research. The 
broadening of perspectives to include the overlapping of the migration issue 
with the coexistence of autochthonous minorities and nation-state majori-
ties represents a potential third way for research on migration.
The overall and ambitious goal of the research approach in terms of a 
long-term impact is to contribute to changing debates in modern European 
societies and to open up new opportunities for the successful integration of 
migrants. In order to stimulate this process, an analytical view of narratives 
The border as research space 23
of migrants and non-migrants is necessary and, in parallel, an attempt to 
escape this dualism at least partly.
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Borders, authoritarian regimes,  
and migration in Kurdistan 
An intersectional inquiry
Naif Bezwan
This paper examines the interplay between borders, regimes, and migration by fo-
cusing on the Kurdish case. It explains migration as being causally related, (a) to 
the ways in which territorial boundaries of the states were redrawn, (b) the process-
es by which the political regimes have been established and (c), to the authoritarian 
and homogenous state policies and practices that followed and continue to exist. To 
make sense of this interconnectedness, I present the concept of structural migration 
to explain the phenomenon of migration as being engineered by and built into the 
institutional and ideological structures of the political regimes ruling over Kurd-
istan.
Introduction: An overview of the Kurdish case
Migration is a complex phenomenon with multiple forms, causes and out-
comes. It has been, and remains, part and parcel of human history and con-
dition, dating back to the very origins of our species (Crawford/Campbell 
2012: 1) and involves a “multifaceted process with distinct stages and deci-
sion points” (cf. Helms/Leblang 2019: 2). The story of mobility continues to be 
relevant today as “very large f lows of people are on the move in all directions 
within countries and across the world” (Richards 2018: 6). Scholars across di-
verse academic fields have offered a range of explanations as to why individ-
uals, voluntarily and involuntarily, leave their homelands. Search for a de-
cent life, economic, political factors, better living standards, a better future 
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for the next generation, the desire to improve economic well-being and en-
hance the life-chances of offspring have been identified among the universal 
drivers of emigration (cf.Richards 2018: 5; Agnew 2008: 187). At the broadest 
level, two main competing theoretical approaches to migration movements 
can be identified, namely the microeconomic, and the historical-structural 
perspectives. Whilst the former “focuses primarily on the rational calculus 
of the individual actor; the latter stresses the origin of the costs and ben-
efits the potential migrant confronts” (Wood 1982: 300). As such, the mac-
roeconomic perspective considers migrants as utility maximizers who as-
sess opportunity in cost-benefit terms and act accordingly (Wood 1982: 299), 
whereas historical-structural approaches emphasize economic inequalities, 
exploitation, and asymmetries of power relations, and the international di-
vision of labour as the main factors in producing migration movements (cf. 
Wood 1982: 302ff.). Taken together, it is always about ‘push and pull factors’ 
which are considered by many scholars as central to any explanation of the 
phenomenon of migration. As migration is recognised as a multifaceted 
phenomenon generated by an intersectionality of multiple structural factors 
as well as individual motives and choices, an adequate understanding of the 
causes and outcomes of migration should include both individual motiva-
tions as well as structural factors. Keeping that in mind, in what follows, I 
would like to highlight the basic features of the Kurdish case.
The Kurds not only account for the largest territorially concentrated national 
community in the world “without its own nation-state” (Jüde 2017: 847), but 
also one of the largest diasporic communities as well. Over the past decades, 
through a combination of “labour migration, refugee migration, family re-
union and settlement of the second and third generation” the Kurdish dias-
pora has expanded considerably in Europe (Keles 2015: 78). Currently, it is 
estimated that around two million Kurds live in Europe, of which approx-
imately one million reside in Germany alone (cf. Keles 2015: 73ff.; Baser et 
al2015: 133). There are also sizable Kurdish communities in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
More recently, following the Syrian civil war and the resultant refugee 
crisis, new arrivals have increased the size and composition of Kurdish di-
aspora communities in Europe over the past several years. As summarized 
by Eccarius-Kelly, “thousands of Kurdish refugees f led without papers; some 
relied on human smugglers; and many have been forced to remain in the 
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shadows as undocumented laborers across the continent” (Eccarius-Kelly, 
2019, p. 29 see also Ayata 2011: 7). In addition, beyond Europe, Kurds have 
also established communities in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, and elsewhere. It is therefore extremely difficult to fully capture the 
multitude of socio-political nuances which have emerged within and among 
Kurdish communities in all of these countries (Eccarius-Kelly, 2015: 178).
Although a considerable number of Kurds from Turkey migrated to Eu-
rope as ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s, it was only after two coups d’état in 1971 
and 1980, as well as the escalation of military conf lict between Turkey and 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in 1984, that 
the numbers of new arrivals across Europe increased exponentially. Forced 
deportation from some 3,000 villages created thousands of internally dis-
placed people and refugee f lows of more than three million Kurds (cf. Baser 
et al. 2015: 132). The development of the Kurdish diaspora and the formative 
experiences that shape diasporic communities stand and fall by the politics 
of ‘host’ states which are often determined by critical junctures in global and/
or Middle eastern politics, such as the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the 
Arab spring and surge in Kurdish self-determination movements, as such 
‘events’ have fundamental bearings on the states ruling over Kurdistan. The 
Gulf War (2 August 1990–17 January 1991) that followed the Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait, and the subsequent Kurdish uprising marked another critical junc-
ture that caused Kurdish mass migration across international borders.
Finally, the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS have 
generated new f lows of migration and displacement, which have provid-
ed new momentum for transnational diaspora mobilisation, ranging from 
campaigning via social media, fundraising for displaced people to second- 
generation Kurds joining the fight against ISIS. The seizure of Kobanê by ISIS, 
and the internationally acclaimed resistance against it, led to widespread ex-
pressions of solidarity among Kurdish communities in both the homeland 
and the diaspora. The urgency of the suffering of the Kurds in Syria and the 
genocidal assault on the Yezidis in Iraq pushed for wider cooperation among 
the Kurdish forces such as the KRG’s (the Kurdish Regional Government 
in Iraq) peshmerga, Kurds in Syria, and the PKK. This has also strength-
ened a sense of belonging among Kurdish communities in the diaspora 
(cf. Baser et al. 2015: 142). In addition, scholars have shown how the ethno- 
theocratic state of Iran “continues the practices of systematic and steady de-
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mographic engineering and displacement to undermine the distinct ethnic 
profile of Kurdistan” (Mohammadpour/Soleimani 2020: 10).
The lack of demographic data on the Kurdish diaspora and homeland 
communities continues to act as a permanent source of scholarly unease, as 
any estimate of the size and composition of the Kurds is immediately ex-
posed to the test of reliability. But the fact that there are no official records is 
part of the problem and indicative of policies of the states ruling over Kurd-
istan, and indeed “mirrors the condition of statelessness for the Kurds and 
creates a gap in the literature when it comes to research about the specifici-
ties of their life conditions” (Baser et al. 2015: 134).
As the foregoing review makes clear, whatever the actual number of 
Kurds living in the diaspora may be, and however different the individual 
motivations for leaving or f leeing their country of origin are, one thing about 
the formation and development of Kurdish diaspora is certain: its coming 
into existence is essentially attributable to the politics of the ‘host’ states in 
which they live as well as the shifting dynamics of geopolitics in the Middle 
East, that is to say, momentous events which produce particular effects on 
the states ruling over the Kurdish regions, such as the Gulf War, the invasion 
of Iraq and removal of Saddam regime, military putsches and conf licts, the 
Arab spring, and the Syrian civil war etc. Currently, the Kurdish-ruled areas 
in Kurdistan/Iraq and Rojava (in Syria) are under threat because of cross- 
border Turkish military interventions, which have given rise to new f lows of 
forced migration. Indeed, “[o]ne of the three cantons ruled by the Kurds in 
Syria, Afrin, is already back in the hands of Turkey-backed Syrian opposition 
groups. The remaining two areas are under threat from both Turkish attacks 
as well as the expanding control of the Bashar al-Assad regime throughout 
northern Syria” (Yılmaz 2018: 2). This conf lict has had a profound effect on 
the local population with many forced to f lee the region in search of safe-
ty. As stated elsewhere, the Turkish government resorts to a combination of 
security-related, geopolitical, expansionist arguments to justify its cross- 
border aggression against a foreign movement. On the one hand, the mili-
tary expedition is touted as a last-resort action to defend Turkey’s national 
security and territorial integrity against hostile Kurdish forces, whilst on the 
other, the offensive is aimed at expanding Turkey’s geopolitical inf luence in 
Syria, with the intention of ethnic cleansing (Bezwan 2018: 63).
Consider also the recent, and still ongoing, cases of Turkish military in-
cursions into north-eastern Syria in 2018 and 2019. Two cross border military 
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expeditions were conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces and their allies the 
“Free Syrian Army” against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Afrin District 
in north-western Syria, and the Syrian Arab Army in northern Syria. Turkey 
views the Syrian Kurdish organisations, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
and the People’s Protection Units (PYD), “as an extension of the PKK and con-
siders it a terrorist organisation” and justifies its military operations on that 
ground (Kajjo 2020: 283).
The first attack was launched in January 2018, targeting the Kurdish city 
of Afrin, a strategically and economically important area located in the heart 
of the Kurdish region in Syria, while the latest offensive was conducted on 
9 October 2019 when the Turkish Air Force launched airstrikes on Kurdish 
towns and settlements across the Syrian border. This military offensive im-
mediately followed the internationally condemned withdrawal of American 
forces from north-eastern Syria on 6 October 2019 by the Trump administra-
tion1. These Turkish military incursions into Syria have caused the expulsion 
of tens of thousands of refugees and thousands of deaths, including civil-
ians2. The conf lict resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 people and 
has caused the death of more than 70 civilians in Syria and 20 civilians in 
Turkey. Amnesty International stated that it had gathered evidence of war 
crimes and other violations committed by Turkish and Turkey-backed Syrian 
forces who are said to “have displayed a shameful disregard for civilian life, 
carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings 
and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians”3. The explicit aim 
is to dismantle the territorial and societal cohesion of the Kurdish regions 
in Syria and to destroy the self-determining political structures governed 
1  The internationally criticized American withdrawal from the frontline of the most success-
ful alliance in fighting against ISIS has thrown the Kurds into a mortal predicament. The 
critique has been evolved around facilitating the resurgence of ISIS, calling American cred-
ibility into question, strengthening the Russian, Iranian and Syrian axis in the Middle East, 
and not least giving the green light to the Turkish invasion.
2  The conflict resulted in the displacement of over 300,000 people and has caused the death 
of more than 70 civilians in Syria and 20 civilians in Turkey. Amnesty International stated 
that it had gathered evidence of war crimes and other violations committed by Turkish and 
Turkey-backed Syrian forces who are said to “have displayed a shameful disregard for ci-
vilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and 
unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians”
3  https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/amnesty-international-decries-shameful-disregard 
-civilian-life-syrian-of fensive, accessed on 21 February 2021.
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by the PYD. Similarly, as late as 2017 Iran, Iraq and Turkey have jointly un-
dermined the Kurdish quest for independence after the 2017 independence 
referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan.
While itself having caused massive internal and external displacement 
through its politics, Turkey has not shied away from using the refugees 
f leeing from the Syrian civil war to Turkey as an instrument of foreign pol-
icy. In an effort to counteract European critique against Turkey’s military 
cross-border military campaigns, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has on 
different occasions reiterated his threat of ‘opening the gates’. As late as the 
10th of October 2019 Erdoğan declared that if the EU tried “to frame our op-
eration in Syria as an invasion, our task is simple: we will open the doors and 
send 3.6 million migrants to you” (cited in Jennequin 2020: 1).
The continuous instrumentalisation of the refugees provides a textbook 
case of what has been conceptualised as “coercive engineered migration” 
(Greenhill 2010, p. 2). It refers to “those cross-border population movements 
that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, mil-
itary and/or economic concessions from a target state or states” (Greenhill 
2010: 13.). In this sense it denotes “a very particular non-military method of 
applying coercive pressure—the use of migration and refugee crises as in-
struments of persuasion” (Greenhill 2010: 12). The use of migration as a bar-
gaining chip was accompanied by expansionist and aggressive politics that 
has caused tens of thousands of refugees, and both internal and external dis-
placement on a massive scale.
My main argument is that migration in its varieties and shifting dynam-
ics is located precisely at the interface between the establishment of the na-
tion-states model on the Kurdish territories to the exclusion of the Kurds and 
the drawing of the state borders cutting through the predominantly Kurdish 
inhabited territories. In other words, migration is conceived of as result-
ing from the state coercive capacity, the level of collaboration between the 
states ruling over the respective part of Kurdistan, the political expedients 
as provided by the wider geopolitical environment in the Middle East, and 
the Kurdish resistance.
Finally, a thought on the theoretical and empirical focus of the study shall 
be in order. The present study is not intended as an analysis of the Kurdish 
self-determination conf lict as such, nor the associated positions and per-
spectives of the parties to it. While presenting the ways in which political 
regimes and their borders have been installed in the post-Ottoman Middle 
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East as a tool for understanding the pattern of migration, narratives of mi-
gration could not be addressed in a warranted manner, essentially because 
of space constraints. In addition, the empirical focus on the Kurdish example 
was chosen for two principal reasons. First, it presents a paradigmatic case 
of structural migration and yet remains understudied. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, because of the author’s expertise, and familiarity with the 
Kurdish case along with his epistemological interest in interrogating this 
case through the lens of comparative border and migration studies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I will 
consider the interconnectedness of borders, authoritarian regimes, and mi-
gration in relation to the Middle East. The second section is concerned with 
the Kurdish case. By placing migration at the intersection of the reconstitu-
tion of political authorities, the redrawing of territorial boundaries, and the 
restructuring of populations in the post-Ottoman political geography, this 
section is informed by an interest in providing an explanatory framework for 
the Kurdish case of migration. The third section under the heading of “State 
borders as colonial institutions and sites of decolonial resistance” provides 
selected examples of how, and by what means, policies and practices of bor-
dering and the ordering of local populations and territories are imposed by 
the state. Finally, I will conclude by summarizing the main insights drawn 
from the essay and indicating possible avenues for further research.
An overview of the politics of borders, authoritarian regimes 
and migration in the Middle East
Many countries across the Middle East stand out as being among the most 
“critical geographies of migration”—defined “as spatially informed theories 
and practice explicitly directed towards understanding and challenging 
migration as a site of exploitation” (Gilmartin/Kuusisto-Arponen 2019: 18). 
The concept of critical geographies is concerned with the causes of migra-
tion by focusing “on efforts to restrict people’s movements across national 
borders, whether legally or physically”, while emphasizing “the effects of 
migration, particularly through a focus on the experiences of migrants who 
are vulnerable, marginalized or exploited” (ibid.). As these experiences are 
intersectional, “critical geographies of migration are increasingly address-
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ing the relationship between migrant status, race and sexuality, adding to 
a longer-standing interest in migration and gender” (ibid.). After all, the 
scholarly literature on borders, border regions, and migration provides fresh 
insights and opens up new perspectives on the nature of state, sovereignty, 
citizenship, territory and territoriality. One of the main objectives of this es-
say is thus to make use of insights provided by this scholarship to better un-
derstand the causal factors affecting mass migration in the Middle East, by 
focusing on the emergence of political borders and regimes from a historical 
and multidisciplinary perspective. However, referring to the phenomena of 
the past in colonial and/or postcolonial settings to explain the outcomes in 
the present requires mindful methodological considerations and approach-
es. This also holds true of the Middle East. The invocation of history in the 
context of the Middle East is indeed abound with contradictory, anachro-
nistic, often misleading and justificatory arguments. Given the (mis)uses of 
the past, it is therefore of paramount importance to carefully examine, and 
critically ref lect on, the contextual and historical conditions under which the 
phenomena of interest have emerged, changed, eclipsed and yet reenacted 
and reactivated.
Having said that, there is indeed no getting away from the overwhelming 
significance of the historical processes when analysing contemporary phe-
nomena such as state violence, migrations, and refugees in the Middle East. 
The task then, is twofold: first, to forsake the trap of the irrelevance of the 
history as an essential part of as an explanatory framework, and second, to 
overcome the trap of using history for justifying, for example, the policies of 
repression or expansion—both of these tendencies need to be carefully scru-
tinised and deconstructed. What is needed is not the renunciation of history 
altogether, but instead its careful contextualisation and conceptualisation as 
an explanatory variable.
In what follows, I will discuss the interconnectedness of political bor-
ders, regimes and migration in the Middle East drawing on insights derived 
from this critical scholarship outlined above. It is, however, beyond the scope 
of this paper to examine the phenomenon of mass migration across the Mid-
dle East in any length. What I will provide is instead a cursory glance at the 
mechanisms I argue to be responsible for the occurrence, frequency, recur-
rence and intensity of migration movements during the last century.
Paraphrasing the late Charles Tilly’s dictum that “states make wars and 
wars make states”, James Scott indicates that the corollary of Tilly’s adage 
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should be: “States make wars and wars—massively—make migrants” (Scott 
2009: 146). Based on the evidence gleaned from his selected region of inves-
tigation Scott identifies four eras in term of the level of ‘stateness’: “1) a state-
less era [by far the longest], 2) an era of small-scale states encircled by vast 
and easily reached stateless peripheries, 3) a period in which such peripheries 
are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion of state power, and finally, 
4) an era in which virtually the entire globe is ‘administered space’ and the 
periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant” (Scott 2009: 324). This 
classification provides a useful starting point for understanding the state of 
political geographies of the Middle East.
By the turn of the 20th century there was neither ‘state’ nor ‘nation’ in the 
sense as envisioned by the homogenising and plurality-hostile logic of the 
nation-state model. Instead, the vast amount of areas in the wider Middle 
East were under imperial domains with multi-ethnic and multicultural pop-
ulations, and varying degrees of state capacity and penetration into ‘state-
less’ peripheries. This situation, however, came to be radically changed in the 
aftermath of the First World War. If the drawing of modern state borders 
can be dated back to the transformation from feudal to absolutist to territo-
rial nation-states in Europe where territory became foundational to the state 
and sovereignty, the phenomenon of territorially based “nation-states” in the 
specific European sense emerged only after the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire in the wake of First World War in the Middle East. This epoch-mak-
ing event brought about “dramatic and often destructive changes to colo-
nial lands, societies, and economies, including the imposition of European 
norms of sovereignty, territoriality, and borders” in the Middle East (Diener/
Hagen 2012: 46). “Ottoman expansion”, as historian Kasaba puts it, “involved 
the conquest of a series of castles, major towns, and crucial waterways and 
passes”, but it would be difficult to find any indication of where the Ottoman 
lands ended since there “were no border posts or barbed wires that separat-
ed the Ottoman Empire from its neighbours, and one certainly did not need 
a passport to travel to and from the territories of the surrounding states” 
(2004: 29).
The post-war period, however, witnessed the establishment of the “na-
tional state model” and the redrawing of political and social boundaries in 
ways that were indeed unknown to the peoples of the region except for the 
emergent nationalist elites. The Middle East emerged out of this momentous 
historical process as a critical geography where the reordering of political 
Naif Bezwan36
authority, the redrawing of territorial boundaries, the restructuring of pop-
ulations, and the ensuing processes of migration, forced or otherwise, took 
place on a massive scale.
In contrast to the creation of nation-states within the Balkan part of the 
former Ottoman Empire, the emergent nation-state regimes in the Middle 
East “either received a different territory from the one they wanted, or were 
unclear about the territory to which they aspired” (Brandell 2006: 7). Here 
boundaries were all drawn in the aftermath of the First World War, “when 
the principles of the Westphalian sovereign nation-state were dominant, 
with the concept of sovereignty now understood in the double sense of an in-
violable right to a territory and the right of every people to self-determination 
if it so desired” (emphasis in original, ibid.).
As this paper intends to show, there was another variant with far-reach-
ing consequences, namely the use of sovereignty as an instrument of territo-
rial acquisition, land grab, and coercive domination of communities denied 
a state of their own by the imperial powers of the day and the emergent na-
tion-states, all the factors that also created f lows of migration. As insight-
fully stated by Aristide Zolberg, “the adoption of the nation-state model 
by countries with ethnically mixed populations accounts for many refugee 
f lows of the twentieth century” (1983: 30). Taking on the homogenising and 
nationalising nation-state model in a region marked by a sheer diversity of 
peoples and a plurality of national, cultural and religious communities, I ar-
gue, necessitated and produced two interrelated policy paradigms: forced 
assimilation and forced migration. The latter can also be conceptualised as 
the ‘migration of ethnic unmixing’ which was enforced by population ex-
change, deportations and expulsions, whereas the former was aimed at com-
munal destruction of the targeted groups by long-term state-engineered co-
ercive public policies. Locating the phenomena of “ethnic unmixing” within 
the historical context of the dissolution of empires in the wake of First World 
One, Brubaker conceptualises migrations of ethnic unmixing as resulting 
from periods of political expansion, contraction and reconfiguration involv-
ing simultaneously “the reconstitution of political authority, the redrawing 
of territorial boundaries and the restructuring of populations” (Brubaker 
1995: 213). Migrations of ethnic unmixing were thus, as Brubaker observes, 
“engendered not by war as such, but by war in conjunction with the forma-
tion of new nation-states and the ethnic ‘nationalization’ of existing states in 
a region of intermixed population and at a time of supercharged mass ethnic 
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nationalism” (Brubaker 1995: 194). In trying to establish the link between the 
migrations of ethnic unmixing in the past and the present, Brubaker states 
that just as “the great 1989 exodus of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey marked the 
continuation of an intermittent process of unmixing spanning more than a 
century, so too the centripetal migration of ethnic Hungarians resumed, for-
ty years after the last significant episode, in the late 1980s” (ibid.).
Attempts at explaining migration of ethnic unmixing as well as the broad 
question of forced migration go to the very heart of geopolitics as it has been 
applied to Kurdistan, and to the Middle East at large for the past century 
or so. Given that, a brief explanation of the concept of geopolitics, its man-
ifestations and implications should be presented. Geopolitics is commonly 
referred to as the study of the relationship between geographical features 
and international politics, with a focus on the political effects of geography, 
such as climate, topography, arable land, and access to the sea. In his critical 
analysis of geopolitics Ó Tuathail rightly emphasises that “[T]he region of 
knowledge that would later be dubbed ‘geopolitics’ was born in the colonial 
capitals of the rival empires of the late nineteenth century, within the es-
tablished universities, geographical societies, and centers of learning of the 
Great Powers” (Ó Tuathail 2005: 16). So, geopolitics, the politics of “giving 
space power”, as indicated by Dahlman, has its roots in the emerging geo-
graphical conditions of the world order at the end of the nineteenth century 
(2009: 87). While the major paradigms of geopolitics are still essentially de-
termined by strategies of security, domination and expansion, critical schol-
ars “seeking to unveil the manner in which politicians discursively construct 
geopolitical spaces, often by manipulating ‘geographical facts’ for strategic 
purposes” (cf. Dahlman 2009: 98).
As political geographical research gained momentum, questions of bor-
ders, territory, political identity, power, and resistance emerged as central 
to its constitution” (Agnew 2015 et al.: 4). The political geography as a way of 
thinking about (world) politics as constituted through everyday spatial prac-
tice and experiences, with border studies have come to form “an increasingly 
vibrant field” (cf. Agnew et al. 2015: 4). Political geography plays a role “in 
crafting an understanding of the political as not only a product of represen-
tations and representational practices, but also imbued with materiality, the 
non‐human, and the affective” (ibid.). At the heart of political geography lies 
“a recognition that where political processes unfold is central to the nature 
and outcomes of these processes” (Agnew et al. 2015: 7). A critical and an-
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alytical understanding of geopolitical research must therefore expose how 
“the power relations are normalized through the appropriation of the word 
‘geopolitics’, while provid[ing] explanations of how politics and geography 
intersect to make the world the way it is” (Flint/Mamadouh 2015: 2).
One conclusion that can be derived from the foregoing is that geopolitics, 
or political geography for that matter, is not so much about the effects of 
geography on politics as the effects of power relations and politics on ge-
ography. Such a shift in emphasis may provide a more accurate description 
of geopolitics4 than the one that concentrates on properties of geographies. 
Geopolitics then can be defined as power and politics as being applied in their 
combined effects to a given geography in order to establish a political order 
based on the securitarian, economic, ideological interests of the more pow-
erful. On a more general level, the political order that comes into being under 
the logic of geopolitics can be described as a “top-down order, imposed and 
maintained by coercion” (Lebow 2018: 49).
The modern history of the Middle East in general, and that of Kurdis-
tan in particular, is predicated on and defined by geopolitical and territorial 
parameters within which the inherently unequal power relations and power 
politics come together to produce devastating outcomes, ranging from civil 
war to mass migration, and from abysmal regional disparities to external 
and regional military interventions. This has many implications for borders, 
regimes and causal pathways of migration. One major implication is that 
borders are understood both as sacred and violable at the same time. Put dif-
ferently, geopolitics lends itself to a very specific understanding of territory, 
as it implies an extended notion of territoriality5 that is not always equivalent 
to the internationally recognised territory of the state in question. That the 
borders were drawn arbitrarily and unjustly as a result of imperial legacies is 
not taken as a point of departure for an engagement in addressing historical 
injustices and grievances of those affected. In fact, quite the opposite is true: 
4  For a concise summary of dif ferent strands of geopolitical discourse along with leading 
figures involved in “productions of global space”, including Halford John Mackinder (1861–
1947), Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Alfred Mahan (1840–1914), Rudolf Kjellen (1864–1922), 
Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), Nicholas J.Spykman (1893–1943) (see Ó Tuathail 2005: 20–45).
5  In a general sense, territoriality refers to “the activity of defending, controlling, excluding, 
including”, while territory is “the area whose content one seeks to control in these ways” 
(Cox 2002: 1f f.). “Territorial politics is, in turn “about how politics is organized and fought 
out across territory” (Gibson 2012: 15).
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arbitrariness and unjustness are put at the disposal of a geopolitics that cre-
ates and legitimates authoritarian rule, military interventions, expansion, 
thereby generating new injustices.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the conduct of Turkish policies to-
wards Kurdistan. The sacralisation of state borders to all intents and purpos-
es goes hand in hand with periodic military interventions into neighbouring 
countries on the pretext of crushing Kurdish insurgency in the cross-bor-
der regions. More tellingly, Turkey’s extra-territorial expansion as ref lect-
ed in the past and ongoing military incursions and campaigns, is justified 
by a ubiquitous and self-righteous rhetoric, and accompanied by a strategic 
framing of the argument of territorial integrity and national security. As 
Turkish President Erdoğan strikingly put it in a speech made on 10 Novem-
ber 2016: “Turkey is larger than Turkey. We cannot be imprisoned in 780,000 
square kilometres. The borders of our hearts are elsewhere. Our brothers in 
Mosul, Kirkuk, Skopje, may be outside our natural boundaries, but they are 
within the borders of our hearts, at the epicenter of our hearts” (cited in Jen-
nequin 2020: 2).
The preceding account raises a set of questions to be dealt with in this 
study: Why are Kurdish aspirations towards autonomous existence of any 
kind considered a mortal threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria? What explains the politics of the states in question vis-à-vis 
the Kurdish regions and communities? To what degree do the politics and 
policies of these states intersect with, or differ from, each other? And, per-
haps even more importantly for the purposes of the present study, to what 
extent are respective policies and practices of these states towards the Kurds 
are causally responsible for Kurdish migration movements and refugee 
f lows?
Having set the historical stage, the following section then turns to the 
Kurdish case in order to illuminate how the state borders and state struc-
tures which emerged out of the process of the dissolution of the Ottoman 
empire have affected both Kurdish society in general, and the phenomenon 
of Kurdish migration in particular.
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Conceptualising the Kurdish migration
As this paper draws on political geography, critical borders studies and mi-
gration studies, I shall provide a brief review of the relevant literature, be-
fore laying out the conceptual framework adopted in this essay. Scholarship 
on migration and borders offers a variety of conceptual tools and (re)defi-
nitions of the concepts of border, boundary and frontier, boundary-work, 
borderland, borderscape, borderity, networked borders, as well as method-
ological approaches to the study of borders, ranging from relational to inter-
sectional, to the understanding of borders as method, as process or assem-
blages (cf. Lamont/Molnar (2002: 168ff.). Contrary to rather state-centered 
understanding of borders and frontiers, recent scholarship underlines the 
socially constructed nature of boundaries and the importance of relational 
approaches to the study borders and well as their intersectionality with mi-
gration, exclusion and inclusion (cf. Dell’Agnese 2013: 122-123; /Neilson 2013: 
7ff.). Some scholars also highlight the importance of studying borders as a 
process, an idea that should help deconstruct the material and symbolic di-
mensions that is firmly attached to border by including changing dynamics 
over time and space (cf. Meier 2018: 496).
Amilhat Szary and Giraut offer ‘borderity’ as another new term to “help 
develop an analysis that would throw off the constraints of the tautological 
relationship between territory, state and borders” (2015: 3). Building on Fou-
cault’s work on state, territory, sovereignty and governmentality, they define 
borderity as “a principle of intelligibility of what is, but is also what should 
be” and as a technology of power grounded “in the governmentality of ter-
ritorial limits and their access” (Amilhat/Giraut 2015: 7). On that view, the 
spatial characteristics of borders and their functions, “a mobile dimension 
that breaks with its traditional fixity in time and space, [and represents] an 
epistemological shift away from fixed border” (Amilhat/Giraut 2015: 6).
The concept of borderscape is another novel approach offered by Suven-
drini Perera. Based on his analysis of the Australian policy towards refugees, 
Perera uses the concept of borderscape to refer to the making and remaking 
of different forms of border space in the Pacific region (Perera 2007: 206). 
“Like the detainees of the war in Afghanistan held on Guantanamo Bay by 
the United States”, Perera maintains, “the asylum seekers held in Australia’s 
offshore detention camps under the Pacific Solution occupy a legal limbo, a 
deterritorialized space of indeterminate sovereignty”, because under the Pa-
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cific Solution, “asylum seekers are considered out of reach of both Australian 
law [and the international obligations it entails] and the domestic law of the 
states where the camps are located” (Perera 2007: 207). Thus, the conceptual-
isation of the borderscape, it is argued, “allows for the inclusion of different 
temporalities and overlapping emplacements as well as emergent spatial or-
ganizations” (ibid.).
The recent scholarship on borders advances two broad arguments: first, 
it emphasizes the need for new approaches that conceive borders as being 
elastic, moveable and subject to a process of constant formation and trans-
formation, rather than viewing them as unchangeable and fixed. And sec-
ond, it calls for multi-layered and differentiated understandings of space, 
territoriality, sovereignty, and identity.
Having that in mind, this essay relates migration to the imposition of 
territorial boundaries of the states, the authoritarian regimes on these terri-
tories, and to the consequences of nationalising and homogenising policies. 
Methodologically, the paper adopts a relational and intersectional approach 
to the phenomena of state borders, political regimes and migration. The re-
lational, or transactional approach, is a spatio-temporal understanding that 
focuses on “dynamic processes-in-relations” and thus unfolding transac-
tions, and not pre-constituted attributes of some immobile entities (cf. Emir-
bayer 1997: 293ff.). Moreover, this approach “sees relations between terms or 
units as pre-eminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes 
rather than as static ties among inert substances” (Emirbayer 1997: 289). On 
that view, “concepts cannot be defined on their own as single ontological en-
tities; rather, the meaning of one concept can be deciphered only in terms of 
its ‘place’ in relation to the other concepts in its web” (Emirbayer 1997: 300).
While also essentially relational, the intersectional approach brings the 
importance of the interconnected nature of events, structures, or processes 
to the fore. Having first been introduced by Kimberle Crenshaw in a seminal 
article on Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex (Crenshaw 1989: 139), 
the basic argument of intersectionality is that the intersectional experience 
as determined by a combination of equally relevant elements such “racism 
and sexism” is greater than the sum of any single factor in bringing about 
an outcome of interest. Intersectionality emerged as an analytical term to 
go beyond a single-axis framework and to bring into focus the “multiple- 
disadvantaged experiences of Black women that cannot be captured by the 
single-issue framework” (Crenshaw 1989: 139). For example, since race and 
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gender cannot be treated “as mutually exclusive categories of experience and 
analysis”, any approaches which detach racism from sexism would be un-
able to capture the whole spectrum of discrimination, so “any analysis that 
does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the 
particular manner in which Black women are subordinated” (Crenshaw 1989: 
140). Proceeding from this argument Crenshaw points out that “Black wom-
en can experience discrimination in any number of ways and that the contra-
diction arises from our assumptions that their claims of exclusion must be 
unidirectional” (Crenshaw 1989: 149).
Whereas relationality is grounded in a spatio-temporal understanding of 
“dynamic processes-in-relations”, intersectionality holds up the importance 
of overlapping and interdependent effects of social categories and struc-
tures, including those such as state, sovereignty, borders. These, of course, 
are not immobile, static and monolith at all as they are subject to continuous 
processes of power struggle, negotiation, claims, counter claims, adapta-
tion, and change. Nor are they devoid of any causal capacities. As suggested 
by Elder-Vass, the causal powers model views causation as resulting from 
the causal powers of social entities which in turn result from “interactions 
between multiple causal powers” (Elder-Vass 2012: 16). This suggests that 
evidence of empirical regularities does not constitute a causal explanation, 
instead “we only have a causal explanation when we can identify the mecha-
nism responsible [emphasis in original] for a regularity” (Elder-Vass 2012: 17).
To conclude, combining elements of relational and intersectional ap-
proaches with the idea of causal power would help to better identify the 
causal pathways of migration over time and space, while simultaneously 
relating factors behind migration to the nature of state borders, authoritar-
ian regimes, imperial geopolitics and colonial legacies. Drawing on method-
ological considerations presented here, I use the term structural migration to 
provide a framework that explains migration as a phenomenon that is built 
into the ideational and institutional structures of a given political regime, 
and therefore systematically engineered by its policies and practices. For the 
purpose of the present study, structural migration is explained as causal-
ly related to the structures of dominance over Kurdistan, to the nature of 
state borders which cut across economic, cultural, and societal lifelines of 
Kurdish communities and regions, and to the concomitant policies of de- 
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development6 as well as the non-recognition and repression enacted to dif-
fering degrees by the states in question. As such, while specifically focusing 
on the sources of internal and external sources of migration, the concept of 
structural migration is capable of linking colonial legacies to authoritarian 
rule and policies in the present.
Two possible critical questions about the usefulness of this concept spring 
to mind. First, given the multiplicity of motivations and compelling reasons 
behind migration, whether, and to what extent, the making of migration, 
forced or otherwise, can be deferred from abstract entities. As ref lected in 
the introduction, while emphatically embracing a multi-causal explanation 
of migration, my focus here lies on the identification of causal pathways 
of mass migration, its recurrence, frequency and intensity across time and 
space. The second point leads me to link personal and structural dimensions. 
One way to reframe this linkage is to draw on the scholarship of state crimi-
nality, which refers to a type of “criminality organized by the state [and] con-
sists of acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in 
the pursuit of their job as representatives of the state” (cited in Kramer 2016: 
233)7. This definition has laid down the foundation for subsequent framings 
of state-organised crimes of which forced migration, whether internally dis-
placed persons, or refugees are part. According to another inf luential defi-
nition state crime is defined as resulting from “state organisational deviance 
involving the violation of human rights” (Green/Ward 2004: 2). State crimes 
may involve “an act or omission of an action by actors within the state that 
results in violations of domestic and international law, human rights, or sys-
tematic or institutionalized harm of its or another state’s population, done in 
the name of the state regardless of whether there is or is not self-motivation 
or interests at play” (Rothe/Kauzlarich 2016: 102).
While concentrating on state borders, borderlands and the ways in which 
such areas are designated by the state, this essay sees particular merit in an-
6  On the concept of “de-development” see (Roy 1987: 56). Its use in the Kurdish context see 
(Yadirgi 2017:; Mohammadpour/Soleimani 2020: 4).
7  The concept of state crime goes back to Bill Chambliss. In his 1988 Presidential Address 
to the American Society of Criminology, he introduced his speech by emphasizing that: 
‘‘There is form of crime that has heretofore escaped criminological inquiry, yet its per-
sistence and omnipresence raise theoretical and methodological issues crucial to the de-
velopment of criminology as a science. I am referring to what I call ‘state-organized crime.’” 
(cited in Kramer 2016: 232).
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thropological approaches that focus on “the ethnography of the state as em-
bedded in practices, places, and languages considered to be at the margins 
of the nation-state” (Das/Poole 2004: 3, see also Barth 2000). As a mode of 
knowing that privileges experience, ethnography “offers a unique perspec-
tive on the sorts of practices that seem to undo the state at its territorial and 
conceptual margins” (Das/Poole 2004: 4). This is not because “it captures ex-
otic practices, but because it suggests that such margins are a necessary en-
tailment of the state, much as the exception is a necessary component of the 
rule” (Das/Poole 2004: 4). Keeping in mind that the framing of a region as a 
‘margin’ and frontier may posit a prejudgment or entail discursive strategies 
to justify the imposition of rule, order and discipline, the political geography 
of Kurdistan provides a particularly interesting vantage position from which 
to study state functions and the consequences of borders.
Linking personal motivation to the structural logic behind the workings 
of state institutions and policies is crucially important for an enhanced un-
derstanding of the causal pathways of the politics of migration and displace-
ment by authoritarian regimes. It is hoped that the concept of structural 
migration would allow us, first, to ascertain the criminogenic structures put 
into operation which generate mass migration, and second, to focus more 
specifically on the driving forces behind state-engineered migration, that is 
to say, on policies executed by states and perpetrators acting in the interest of 
the state. The concept of de-development presented above is another concept 
that can be fruitful for the inquiry into state-engineered migration—under-
stood here as shorthand for resource extraction and exploitation combined 
with low levels of investment in social and economic infrastructure and hu-
man development—in regions marked by abysmal disparities, inequalities 
and injustices in the use and allocation of vitally important resources and 
infrastructures (Bezwan forthcoming).
To sum up, structural migration may take various forms of migratory 
movements, existing on a continuum from being latent to manifest. In nor-
mal times, it causes less visible migration, whereas in times of crisis, such as 
civil war, resurgence of political opposition, economic crisis of great scale, it 
brings about mass migrations and refugees, mostly in the form of survival 
migration and forced migration. The former refers to people who are outside 
their country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have 
no access to a domestic remedy or resolution. The concept does not focus on 
a particular underlying cause of movement—whether persecution, conf lict, 
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or environment. Instead, as Alexander Betts argues, “it is based on the rec-
ognition that what matters is not privileging particular causes of movement 
but rather clearly identifying a threshold of fundamental rights which, when 
unavailable in a country of origin, requires that the international community 
allow people to cross an international border and receive access to tempo-
rary or permanent sanctuary. Refugees are one type of survival migrant, but 
many people who are not recognized as refugees also fall within the catego-
ry” (Betts 2013: 4–5). The concept of survival migration brings into focus the 
peculiar situation of people whose countries of origin are unable or unwill-
ing to ensure their most fundamental human rights and yet who fall outside 
the framework of the refugee regime (cf. Betts 2013: 5 and 188).
Many cases of mass migration across the region can also be taken as typ-
ical instances of survival migration. For instance, the 5.6 million refugees 
from Syria, and 6.2 million internally displaced created by the Syrian civil 
war which started in March 2011, are but survival migrants. This also holds 
true for the bulk of Kurdish migration from across the four states. By way of 
illustration, tens of thousands of Kurds became displaced and f led the war 
zones following the Kurdish and Iraqi wars in the 1960s and 1970s. Similar-
ly, the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, and 
ensuing uprisings altogether created several million Kurdish refugees and 
forced migration. One of the most significant instances of mass migration 
relates to the coup d’état of September 1980, especially after the escalation of 
military conf lict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in 1984. During this time, the Turkish military en-
gaged in widespread destruction in the Kurdish regions burning over 4000 
villages and forcing as many as two million Kurds to f lee from their homes. 
This displacement of Kurdish citizens “was a deliberate strategy of the state 
with the objectives of establishing territorial control in the Kurdish regions 
and weakening the Kurdish mobilization in Turkey” (Ayata 2011: 4). Through 
displacement “the Kurdish conf lict has become deterritorialized and relo-
cated to urban centers where it reemerges in the guise of socio-economic 
problems such as unemployment, poverty, crime, child labor” (Ayata 2011: 5).
In what follows, I will discuss the major processes and policies by which 
the boundaries were drawn between the Kurdish regions and indicate their 
implications on patterns of state violence and migration.
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State borders as colonial institution
On the whole, despite their tremendous impact on Kurdish societies and 
Kurdish self-determination conf lict over a century, state borders cutting 
across Kurdistan have received scant scholarly attention, as was demon-
strated by the fact that it was not included in the excellent book A Companion 
to Border Studies by Wilson and Donnan (2012). By contrast, in a more re-
cent book, The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Geography (Agnew et al. 
2015), the editors gave the Kurdish case prominence by narrating the battle 
of Kobani in the introduction to their edited collection, and by displaying a 
picture taken during the battle on the front cover. This is a striking example 
of how a forlorn border town can emerge out of the oblivion to which it was 
consigned and become a focus of attention. Before considering the underly-
ing issue of coloniality of border and rule, I shall begin this section by brief ly 
outlining the tale of Kurdish border town Kobani that has been the epicentre 
of an epic resistance recently. The town is located in Syria at the Turkish bor-
der and was home to roughly 50,000 inhabitants before the start of the war 
(cf. Agnew et al. 2015: 1). As Agnew et al. state, Kobani has been part of the 
Syrian state since it was created as a French protectorate under the author-
ity of the League of Nations after the First World War and the dismantling 
of the Ottoman Empire. In an attempt to provide some historical context to 
the event, the authors point to the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) which proposed 
a Kurdish state that would have encompassed most of the region’s Kurds, 
indicating that Kurdistan did not survive the final Peace Treaty signed in 
Lausanne in 1923 since the lands that would have been Kurdistan were ul-
timately divided between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Having said that, 
the authors conclude that “the tragic and highly complex situation of Kobani 
and its connections to historical, regional, and global dynamics illustrate the 
importance of geopolitical literacy and the potential for political geographi-
cal analysis to illuminate the dynamics and contingencies of current affairs” 
(Agnew et al. 2015: 2).
As suggested elsewhere, the break-up of the Ottoman Empire resulted 
in, among other things, the “partition of Ottoman Kurdistan” (McDowall 
2017: 115). This process was then officially completed by the Treaty of Laus-
anne (1923) between Turkey and the victorious powers of the First World War, 
and the ensuing international border agreements. The first border treaty was 
signed between Turkey and the mandatory State of Syria and France in May 
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1926, followed by border agreements between Turkey and the Mandatory 
state of Iraq and Great Britain in June 1926, and between Turkey and Iran in 
January 1932. The agreements not only involved redrawing state boundaries, 
but also security-related arrangements targeting the Kurds as potential de-
structors of the emerging post-war status quo (Bezwan 2008: 270; Bezwan 
2018: 63–64). This essentially meant that regimes hostile towards Kurdish 
national demands became legally entitled to rule over Kurdish communities. 
As the post-war order began to take shape, the Kurds found themselves los-
ing their territorial and societal integrity. Contrary to the promises of equal 
treatment and self-rule, Kurds were exposed to a double exclusion: being 
denied minority rights in the newly established states while simultaneously 
deprived of a state of their own.
As has been argued throughout this paper, structural migration goes 
back to the processes by which empires, in our case the Ottoman empire, were 
transmuted into nation-states. The League of Nations (1920–1946), the first 
worldwide intergovernmental organisation created after World War One, 
granted mandates to France and Great Britain in 1920 to rule over present- 
day Iraq and Syria respectively. This momentous development “fostered the 
penetration of the western territorial sovereignty state system and secured 
the foundations of the implementation of this model in the Middle East 
through elites production and the political control of the new states” (Mei-
er 2018: 498). The international borders drawn up in the aftermath of World 
War One “created formal borders cut across the major Kurdish linguistic and 
cultural groupings in Kurdish society” (Chatty 2010: 233). As a result, “the 
vast Kurdish region was divided, and the Kurds were left under the control 
of Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah in Iran, British-appointed Prince Feisal in 
Iraq, and French politicians in Syria. However, the Kurds did not simply ac-
cept these territorial divisions. Inspired by the concepts of nationalism and 
self-determination, there were various revolts in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq” 
(Culcasi 2010: 113).
Alluding to three cases of partitions after World War I, namely the par-
tition of Ireland in 1920, that of Hungary in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne 
(1923) that partitioned Kurdistan between the novel British mandate Iraq 
and Turkey, Brendan O’Leary characterises these partitions as ‘fresh cuts’ 
(cf. O’Leary 2012: 30). For him, a political partition necessarily involves “a 
new fresh border cut through at least one community’s national homeland, 
creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or 
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authorities”, including some border adjustment “because there must be 
a fresh, novel border” (O’Leary 2012: 29ff.). Yet political partition is always 
executed and maintained by imposing rule on the territories and societies 
involved and drawing the boundaries between them. The partition was man-
ifested in wire mesh fencing, minefields, and air surveillance to make it more 
difficult for people to cross frontiers other than at official border crossings 
(Chatty 2010: 233). Walls and fences were constructed by successive govern-
ments since the late 1920s to close off the Kurdish territories by inter-state 
security regimes8. One of the fundamental consequences of the reordering 
of the Middle East then, was the territorial and societal disintegration of the 
Kurdish communities across four states. The transnational boundaries of the 
states became established as intra-Kurdish borders, with Kurdish commu-
nities living on all sides of the respective state borders. One important and 
enduring implication of that process has been the fact that Kurdish regions 
have become reconstituted by the emergent nation-states ruling over respec-
tive area of Kurdistan as antagonistic ‘tribal’ peripheries at the margins of 
the state boundaries, hostile frontiers and thus unruly “borderlands” that 
should be pacified and incorporated into the respective state territories in 
order to be ruled at any price.
Referring to the arbitrary nature of states and frontiers in Africa, the 
Middle East, Central Asia, and Latin America, the late Fred Halliday has 
offered the concept of “the postcolonial sequestration syndrome” to make 
sense of the predicament of national communities like the Palestinians, Ti-
betans and the Kurds (Halliday 2011: 332). Whilst this category may appear 
somewhat abstract, Halliday maintains that, “the lived experience it denotes 
is real and multiple: that is, the cases where countries or peoples have at a 
decisive moment of international change, amid the retreat of imperial or he-
gemonic powers, failed [through bad timing and/or bad leadership] to estab-
lish their independence” (ibid.). The concept of post-colonial sequestration is 
referred to as explaining the fates of national communities which have been 
unable to form an independent state following periods of momentous histor-
8  Chief among them was the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), originally known as the 
Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) based in Ankara, designed 
as a military alliance of the Cold War. It was formed in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom and dissolved in 1979. The main purpose of the Baghdad Pact was 
to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. It was renamed the 
Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 af ter Iraq pulled out of the Pact.
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ical change, only to find themselves legally possessed by another or “impris-
oned in a state not of their own making” (Owtram 2019: 301).
The peculiarity of state boundaries dividing the Kurdish regions lies in 
the fact that they form nothing less than intra-Kurdish borders, that is to 
say, borders cutting through Kurdish communities inhabiting all sides of the 
borders drawn between them by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To put this into 
perspective, consider the following thought experiment. Imagine the multi-
plication and amplification of the Berlin Wall (1961–1989) over an extended 
period of time. Such an analogy would probably provide a good point of ref-
erence against which one can better assess the impacts of state boundaries 
dividing Kurdish societies.
In early spring 2019, having found myself on a train from Innsbruck to 
Bozen (the capital city of South Tyrol in Italy), I could not resist thinking 
what would happen if citizens belonging to the same Tyrolean community on 
both sides of border would not have had the liberty to cross the border when-
ever they want without fear and restriction. And think of the members of an 
extended Kurdish family living, let say, in Kobani, the above-mentioned bor-
der town in the Kurdish region of Syrian, and Suruç, a Kurdish border town 
on the Turkish side of border—they have to either get passport, if possible at 
all, to take long journey to visit their relatives or risk of going through some 
deadly minefield and being exposed to a bullet of border security.
One particular, and particularly upsetting, outcome of state boundar-
ies across Kurdish regions and communities is the recurrent and continued 
massacres at border crossings. One of the most vulnerable groups among 
those which are subject to state violence and being targeted on an almost 
daily basis, are the people involved in cross-border trade activities. As 
demonstrated by Soleimani and Mohammadpour in their examination of 
what they called “kolberi” (cross-border labour) in Iranian Kurdistan, where 
389 kolbers (cross-borders laborers) have been shot at border crossings since 
2015. In that year alone, 126 kolbers were killed as a result of direct shooting 
by Iranian security forces (Soleimani/Mohammadpour 2020: 11). Kolberi is 
referred to as arising from “the state’s policy of de-development [or inter-
nal colonialisation] of the Kurdish region” (2020: 1). For many Kurds living 
on borderlands, kolberi has become a path to survival, although viewed by 
the participants themselves “as a low-income transient, unreliable, and dan-
gerous work, they desperately stick to it as their only means for economic 
survival” (2020: 14). As an extremely dangerous and precarious cross-border 
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economic undertaking to earn a living, Kolberi is not technically illegal, “but 
it is punishable by death without ever being designated as a crime” (Soleima-
ni/Mohammadpour 2020: 9ff.). As such, kolbers are both inside and outside 
the juridico-political order with no laws criminalizing kolberi and no legal 
mechanism in place “that allows redressing the grievances of those kolbers 
who fall victim to the state violence” (ibid.).
By way of concluding this section I would like to outline two other cases 
of border crossing and their tragic consequences. These cases too bear testi-
mony to how state borders dividing the Kurdish communities have become 
a “landscape of death” with the functional equivalence of a colonial regime, 
that causes durable human suffering and forced migration on the one hand, 
and resilience and non-compliance on the other. To begin with, the first in-
stance involves the extrajudicial execution of 33 Kurds in 1943 in a remote 
town near the Turkish-Iranian state border. On the night of July 30, 1943 
in Özalp, a district of the city of Van, a border town located at the Turkish- 
Iranian border, the thirty-three Kurds were killed accused of smuggling. The 
talk of smuggling and smugglers as it is framed by the official discourse is 
inherently discriminatory and has always produced dehumanising effects. 
It has legitimised the killing of ‘smugglers’ and the banning of cross-border 
trade activities, exchanges that have occurred mostly between the mem-
bers of extended families or groups of families and relatives they happened 
to be on the wrong side of state borders. Such accusations of smuggling or 
‘terrorism’ are telling examples of how state borders across Kurdistan can 
determine issues of life and death. What the states take to be criminal and 
subversive activities can by all accounts be regarded as a natural tendency 
among communities that share historical, cultural and familial bonds and 
geographical vicinity, and yet are fractured by the state borders. This is what 
happened in Özalp in 1943.
The murders at Özalp, euphemistically called “the 33 Bullets Incident”, are 
referred to by the Kurds as the “Seyfo valley massacre”. Some 7 years later, a 
trial was finally opened against the perpetrating General Mustafa Muğlalı, 
then the 3rd Army Inspector in Diyarbakır. Muğlalı was found guilty by Gen-
eral Staff Military Court General on February 3, 1950 and sentenced to death. 
But later a court decided to lower the verdict to 20 years of imprisonment. He 
died in a military hospital in Ankara in November 1951 (for a summary of the 
event cf. Özgen, 2016: 85-88).
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The poet Ahmed Arif (1927–1991), one of the most widely read poets in 
Turkey, created a literary monument to the memories of those who were bru-
tally killed in a poem entitled “Thirty Three Bullets”: In a solitary corner of the 
mountains/ At the hour of morning prayer/ [...]. I have been shot/ My dreams are 
darker than night/ No one can find a good omen in them/ My life gone before its 
time/ I cannot put it into words/ A pasha sends a coded message. And I am shot, 
without inquest, without judgment [...].9
One striking aspect of this poem is the Arif’s use of the singular first per-
son to emphatically embrace the victims’ perspective while simultaneously 
signalling identification with their destiny and dignity. I have chosen this 
poem because it brings to the fore the brutality of borders and the sense of 
resistance under the most life-threatening circumstances one can imagine.
The inf luential Kurdish poet and intellectual Musa Anter (1920–20 Sep-
tember 1992) was among the first authors to publicly criticise this extraju-
dicial killing of 33 innocent people. In one of his pieces published in 16 De-
cember 1948 in Dicle Kaynağı (literally the Source of Tigris), a magazine he 
edited, Anter criticised the government policy towards the Kurds, under-
lining that the killing would not be forgotten, and that the perpetrators 
must be held accountable. Decades later Anter himself was assassinated at 
the age of 72 by Turkish JITEM (Turkish acronym for the Turkish Gendar-
merie’s Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Service) in September 1992 be-
cause of his cultural work and political activism10. While writing an investi-
gative book, entitled Yas Tutan Tarih. 33 Kurşun (A History of Mourning: The 
33-Bullets) published in 1989 in Istanbul, another inf luential Kurdish author 
and journalist Günay Aslan, doubly exiled (in 1994 and 2016), and now lives 
in Cologne, was subjected to a criminal investigation. The book provides a 
well-examined account of the extra-judicial killing and the circumstances 
surrounding it, citing the ordering general Muğlalı as saying that “the Kurds 
cannot be treated by normal laws of the states”11. For his book, Aslan was 
charged and found guilty of “separatism and undermining national unity” by 
9    By Ahmet Arif translated by Murat-Nemet NEJAT.
10  Af ter long delays, cover-ups and systematic attempts by the Turkish authorities to ob-
struct the justice, the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism was finally found 
guilty of Anter’s assassination and Turkey was fined related to his murder in 2006 by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). A Diyarbakır court in 2013 allegedly charged 
four individuals with Anter’s murder of them all of them are fugitives.
11  Confirmed by Aslan in an interview held on 4 August 2020 in Cologne.
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the then State Security Court which sentenced him to 2 years in prison. After 
serving 20 months of his sentence he was released and felt compelled to leave 
his country for Germany.
The state borders, that is to say, the intra-Kurdish borders, have been 
working as a “landscape of death”, to use a striking term coined by Joseph 
Nevins to criticise critical contemporary borders (2002: 120). The border re-
gimes imposed upon Kurdish societies too are “part of longer histories of dis-
placement, segregation and persecution” (Raeymaekers 2019: 61). The states 
ruling over Kurdistan themselves have always characterised the Kurdish re-
gions in terms of states of exception by which life is permanently put into 
question. While deemed as the national and territorial other by the states in 
question, Kurdish areas are disparagingly cast as backward peripheries that 
should either be assimilated into the dominant society and/or eliminated, 
not least by forced migration and depopulation (Bezwan forthcoming). Fol-
lowing the definition of the concept of the margin offered by Das and Poole, 
the Kurdish regions are taken by the states to “form natural containers for 
people considered insufficiently socialized into the law and order” (2004: 9). 
The task then becomes to “manage” or “pacify” these populations “through 
both force and a pedagogy of conversion intended to transform “unruly sub-
jects” into lawful subjects of the state” (ibid.).
This pattern of killing at the border crossings presented here would re-
peat itself periodically, targeting both ordinary citizens, and activists from 
across Kurdish political movements. The most recent example of this was 
the Roboski Massacre, committed in a small, isolated mountain village on 
the Turkish Iraqi border known as Roboski. While once more highlighting 
the role of state borders as a “landscape of death”, the massacre unfolded 
as follows: “On December 28, 2011, an American Predator drone f lying over 
the mountains along the Iraq–Turkey border detected a surge in wireless 
communication. U.S. officials alerted Turkish military officials about the 
crossing of a suspected group of Kurdish armed militants belonging to the 
outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) into Turkish territory. Within a 
matter of hours, Turkish jets and artillery responded by bombing the group. 
The bombardment lasted 45 minutes (cf. Eralp 2015: 450)12. On the night of 
12  As pointed out by Eralp, “members of the PKK identify themselves by wearing identifi-
able uniforms as required by Article Four of the Third Geneva Convention on lawful com-
batants in an armed conflict, be they members of a state’s armed forces or militia. “The 
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December 28, 2011, thirty-four of a party of 38—19 of them children—were 
slaughtered in an aerial bombardment by a Turkish F-16 fighter jet. In their 
report following their visit to the families, Green and Karakaş state that 
those killed were engaging in traditional cross border trade. Roboski is a 
poor village where there is little or no work. Cross border trade provides a 
small and welcome income for the older men and pocket money for the pur-
chase of notebooks, stationery, and pens for the teenagers (2014).
Many villagers who have been killed living near the Iraqi border, had 
been smuggling goods for many years with the knowledge of the Turkish au-
thorities. At the time of the military operation, there was no military activity 
at the border. After the massacre was committed, authorities claimed that 
the operation had been conducted to prevent the passing of the terrorists 
from the border (combatants of the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, PKK), but 
there was “no evidence that proves that the villagers were carrying weapons 
or posed any threat to the security forces. On the contrary, the PKK mem-
bers operating at the border were already known to patrol in much smaller 
groups” (Altiparmak 2020: 2).
Impunity in dealing with the Kurds has been one of the defining fea-
tures of the states ruling over the Kurdish regions. Here too the mass killing 
was typically denied by “state criminals” on the ground that the attack was 
against PKK operatives crossing the border. In fact, “none of those killed had 
any connection with the PKK or any terrorist organisation” (Green/Karak-
as 2014). The Roboski massacre finally led to an investigation undertaken 
by the Military Prosecutor of the General Chief of Staff. On 6 January 2014, 
the court ruled non-prosecution against five suspects, who were members of 
the Turkish Armed Forces. Because of “the frequency of the terrorist attacks 
against the security forces” in that border region, the prosecutor makes clear, 
“the decision of the personnel of the Turkish army to conduct an aerial attack 
on the area in question was the most effective and appropriate method” (Al-
tiparmak 2020: 2). The prosecutor based his justification on the assumption 
of an unavoidable mistake, a line of reasoning that was also confirmed by the 
Military Court of the Air Forces Command on 11 June 2014 (ibid.). Following 
this rejection, the Roboski case was then filed to the Turkish Constitutional 
Court on 18 July 2014. After a preliminary review of the petitions, the appli-
PKK has a clear line of command, and its members wear uniforms and carry guns openly” 
(2015, p. 450).
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cants’ legal representative was notified on 4 August 2014 that the application 
file was incomplete, whereby “the applicants were asked to address the short-
comings, which was done with a 2-day delay accounted for with a medical 
excuse” (Altiparmak 2020: 8).
The Section of the Constitutional Court (the tribunal that passes judg-
ment on the merits of a case) rejected to consider the case. Interestingly, the 
rejection is not set forth as a judicial decision, but regulated as an admin-
istrative decision, issued by the Commission’s Rapporteur in Chief with no 
judicial mandate, a line of action that renders the application invalid from 
the outset. Therefore, Altiparmak concludes, “the Section’s rejection in the 
Roboski application is not only the first decision of its kind, it is the only de-
cision of its kind!” (2020: 8). As the Section has no authority to rule such a 
rejection, the Constitutional Court issued a decision of rejection on 24 Feb-
ruary 2016 contrary to all procedural rules “in an application regarding one 
of the biggest massacres in the history of Turkey, the massacre of Roboski” 
(Altıparmak 2020: 14)13. While the Constitutional Court has been “instru-
mental in creating impunity and injustice”, not seldom have the rulings of 
the ECtHR on Turkey provided a cover up for the grave cases of injustices in 
Turkey (cf. Altiparmak 2020: 15). As strikingly put by Das and Poole draw-
ing on Agamben, “law produces certain bodies as ‘killable’ because they are 
positioned by the law itself as prior to the institution of law” (2004: 12). The 
impunity is the mechanism that puts life in question by producing a category 
of killable lives.
Almost a decade after the massacre, “victims’ families are still being 
denied their basic right to know how and why their family members were 
killed, with the continued denial of truth that “prevents the transformation 
of hurtful memories and robs families of their right to mourn properly for 
their sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers” (Eralp 2015: 454). In December 
2013, two years after the massacre, the Diyarbakir city government unveiled 
a Roboski monument in commemoration of those who lost their lives. “The 
13  As if that were not enough, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) too endorsed 
the logic on which rejection decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court rests and issued 
an “inadmissibility decision” (17 May 2018) concerning the application of the Roboski mas-
sacre “on the grounds that domestic remedies had not been exhausted”. This unwavering 
trust, as Altıparmak concludes, “has resulted in the once-and-for-all burial of the truth 
about one of the gravest massacres in the history of Turkey without a proper examination 
of the allegations of the applicants (2020, p. 1).
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monument”, in the words of Eralp, “depicts a Kurdish mother with raised 
open arms shouting at the sky while sitting in the middle of a circle sur-
rounded by eight missiles dropped that day. The Predator Drone is conspicu-
ously missing in the monument very much like the truth that is being denied 
and made invisible by the Turkish and American governments” (2015: 454).
At this point in time, things seem to have turned full circle. In Octo-
ber 2016, the metropolitan mayor and co-mayor, the well-respected Gülten 
Kışanak (female) and Fırat Anlı (male) respectively, were removed from their 
office and replaced by a state-appointed administrator (Zwangsverwalter or 
Turkish kayyum). Kışanak and Anlı were immediately arrested on charges 
of dissemination of the propaganda of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 
In February 2019, Kışanak was then sentenced to 14 years and 3 months in 
prison entirely on political grounds. Yet, her own political and public engage-
ment can in many respects be seen both as resumption and résumé, as recur-
rence and summary of the recent history of Turkey, including the drivers and 
dynamics of forced migration, nature of state borders and suppression of the 
Kurdish quest for self-rule. To begin with, as a young student of the Faculty 
of Education in Diyarbakir, the very Kurdish metropole that would elect her 
to its metropolitan mayor in 2014, Kısanak was arrested following the mili-
tary putsch of the 12th September 1980 in Turkey. The widespread politics of 
Gleichschaltung conducted by the military regime (1980–1983), among other 
things, caused a f low of Kurdish and Turkish political refugees to Europe 
and elsewhere. As suggested in the introduction, this has indeed played an 
important role in the formation of the Kurdish diaspora across Europe.
After her arrest, Kişanak was then imprisoned in the (in)famous Di-
yarbakir Prison for two years, a prison that according to all accounts of its 
former prisoners and Kisanak herself, has embodied a system of organised 
inhumanity, identical with unimaginable methods of harassment and tor-
ture. Following her release from this prison, Kisanak subsequently took up 
the study of journalism in Izmir, in 1986. On the 16th March 1988, however, 
she was again arrested on the ground of protesting Saddam Hussein’s attack 
on Halabja, a genocidal chemical attack against the Kurdish civilian people 
conducted during the closing days of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), an at-
tack that caused mass migration and f low of refugees across international or 
intra-Kurdish borders for that matter. Kişanak was released one year after-
wards and began to continue with her political and public work in the years 
Naif Bezwan56
to come, including as a member of parliament (elected 2011) on behalf of a 
pro-Kurdish party and as mayor.
On the other hand, the kayyum, the forced administrator, has removed the 
Roboski monument by destructing the marble tables on which the names of 
the deceased were engraved, along with banning all Kurdish linguistic and 
cultural activities supported by the mayoralty. The physical extermination of 
34 of people through an aerial bombardment is followed by the enactment of 
symbolic violence on the memory of the deceased. After all, one of the strik-
ing features of the (re)established Turkish presidential system since 2016 has 
been the widespread use of kayyum. Hundreds of elected Kurdish mayors 
and co-mayors have been dismissed, arrested, and sentenced to years of 
prisons. Perhaps not surprisingly, among 95 mayoralties whose mayors and 
co-mayors were exposed to the kayyum regime by the government, there is 
no single female kayyum. As an instrument to force the elected incumbents 
of public institutions into receivership by arresting, harassing and replacing 
them through state-appointed officials, kayyum emerges as a new colonial 
figure and form of colonial administration. As an emergent entity, however, 
it arises out of coloniality of border and rule imposed on the Kurdish com-
munities. The effects of this development on the upsurge in external and in-
ternal migration cannot be overemphasised.
Concluding remarks
Building on an expanding body of literature on the critical conceptions of 
borders, frontiers, boundaries, borderlands on the one hand, and migration 
studies on the other, this study has established the transformation of empires 
into nation-states by means of ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity as 
the key driver behind the mass migration and refugee f lows of the twentieth 
century. This historical process has taken the form of either forced assimi-
lation or forced migration, both of which have caused large-scale migration 
movements, as well as external and internal displacement. By focusing on 
the Kurdish case within the wider context of the Middle East, this paper has 
tried to deliver a tentative analysis of how state borders, state structures and 
migration have acted together to produce what I have described as structur-
al migration, defined as a phenomenon that is engineered by and built into 
the very structures and policy paradigms of political regimes in the Middle 
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East and elsewhere. As such, structural migration has been generated both 
by “migration of ethnic unmixing” and the politics of forced assimilation, 
that is, the systematic targeting of the communal existence of territorially 
and historically settled communities. The predicament of non-Muslim com-
munities in the Middle East and their forced migration, which has not been 
treated in this paper, is an important case in point (Bezwan forthcoming).
I have argued that the phenomenon of mass migration across the Mid-
dle East, among other things, can be explained by two main factors which 
are intimately related: first, the effects of colonial legacies, and second, more 
importantly, the policies and practices of postcolonial and/or post-imperial 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The former refers to the ways in 
which borders and regimes were imposed on the region, and to the imper-
atives of imperial geopolitics, whereas the latter brings the authoritarian 
and exclusivist institutional and ideological features of the political regimes 
to the fore as they are currently applied and maintained across the Middle 
East. Put differently, the imposition and maintenance of the religious, eth-
nic, linguistic and cultural homogenisation by the states (whether secular, 
theocratic, or a combination thereof) against a background of historical/co-
lonial legacies has been, and still continues to be, the most decisive factor be-
hind mass migration across the Middle East. Moreover, this is compounded 
by the fact that all societies, state and non-state communities alike, in the 
Middle East have been, and are, paradigmatic examples of diverse and plural 
societies, realities that are fiercely denied by the sovereign powers across the 
region. The politics of non-recognition then facilitates homogenisation, both 
of which in turn act as the main source of state coercion and of migration for 
that matter.
As for our understanding of the Kurds’ situation and of Kurdish migra-
tion, the main subject-matter of this essay, it can be concluded that the re-
constitution of political authority, the redrawing of territorial boundaries 
and the restructuring of populations in the post-Ottoman political geogra-
phy laid the foundations of the Kurdistan question along a continuum with 
three dimensions: the territorial and societal disintegration of the Kurdish 
regions, their incorporation into the newly established states to the exclu-
sion of the Kurds, and the politics of non-recognition of Kurdish rights and 
aspirations both by the elites of the emergent nation-states, and the major 
powers leading the international community. Put differently, the territori-
al partition, forced incorporation and non-recognition refer to the primal 
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mechanisms which have not only produced historical injustices, but more 
importantly, continue to shape the parameters of the Kurdish predicament 
and are responsible for migration movements from Kurdish regions across 
the Middle East (Bezwan 2018: 63ff. and forthcoming).
The majority of cases of Kurdish migration throughout modern history, 
as I have argued, have their root cause in the ceding of Kurdish territories to 
the emergent nation-states, to the exclusion of the Kurds, and to the imposi-
tion of direct rule on the Kurdish communities. While splitting the Kurdish 
regions and communities across four states, state borders function as mark-
ers of colonial rule and power execution. In fact, by all appearances these 
borders are not only the longest standing but also the longest boundaries 
that have ever existed in human history which cut through the same national 
communities who inhabit the border regions across four states. This state of 
affairs has had fundamental implications on the pattern of migration in and 
around Kurdistan. First, new state borders brought about border regimes 
that divided Kurdish communities, leading up to their societal and territo-
rial disintegration. Second, it gave rise to the collaboration and joint strate-
gies of containment on the part of the states ruling over Kurdish territories. 
Third, the redrawing of state borders set in motion a long process of margin-
alisation, peripheralisation, de-development and exclusion of Kurdish com-
munities from proper social and economic infrastructure, as well as human 
and societal development. Fourth, the policies and practices of boundary- 
making and domination of the Kurdish communities have produced a spiral 
of repression and resistance, mostly manifested in the recurrent and dura-
ble patterns of state-organised mass violence on the one hand, and Kurdish 
non-compliance, periodic uprisings, including armed resistance, on the oth-
er. And finally, fifth, all of this has led to the use of mass violence and mass 
migrations, f lows of refugees, internal and external displacements, and de-
portations. Which may explain why the borders between the states ruling 
over the respective parts of Kurdistan have been, and remain, as colonial in-
stitutions par excellence, and sites of decolonial contention, producing mass 
migration, state violence and resistance.
As stated by Martin van Bruinessen, one of the leading scholars of Kurd-
ish studies, scholarship on the Kurds “to a considerable extent reproduces 
the division of Kurdistan into four main parts (van Bruinessen 2015: 125). 
Complicated by the nature of the available sources and the multiplicitiy of 
languages, “(T)he relations cutting across the different parts of Kurdistan 
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have for this reason perhaps received less scholarly attention than is war-
ranted. There has been little comparative work, and most of it has been based 
on secondary sources” (van Bruinessen 2015: 126).
I conclude by echoing this statement and uttering a final word concern-
ing research desideratum. There are many studies on Kurdish diaspora(s) 
and aspects of forced migration, but no studies exist that deal with the 
Kurdish case of migration in its entirety from a historical, multidisciplinary, 
and comparative perspective. Works that focus on diaspora typically fail to 
look at the structural conditions and causal pathways of the migration in 
the country of origins, whereas studies that deal with the country of origins 
mostly neglect to consider the phenomenon of migration and its impact on 
the Kurdish communities and receiving societies alike (for a review of lit-
erature on Kurdish diaspora see also Baser et al. 2015: 143ff.). The frequen-
cy, recurrence and intensity of the phenomenon of Kurdish migration in 
particular and the Middle Eastern migration in general, however, call for 
comprehensive studies that focus on the nature of migration in relation to 
geopolitics, borders and authoritarian regimes, by more systematically com-
bining relational, intersectional and structural approaches to ethnographic 
methods and field research.
Bibliography
Agnew, John (2008): “Borders on the mind: Re-framing border thinking”, in: 
Ethics & Global Politics 1 (4), 175–191.
Agnew, John/Mamadouh, Virginie/Secor, Anna J./Sharp, Joanne (eds.) (2015): 
The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Geography, London: Wiley- 
Blackwell.
Altiparmak, Kerem (2020): “Roboski and procedural rules: How the truth 
about a massacre was buried in the pages of history”, in: New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, 1–15.
Amilhat Szary, Anne-Laure/Giraut, Frédéric (eds.) (2015): Introduction, in: 
Borderities and the politics of contemporary mobile borders, New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1–19.
Ayata, Bilgin (2011): Forced migration. Politics of displacement: A transna-
tional analysis of the forced migration of Kurds in Turkey and Europe, 
UMI Dissertation Publishing.
Naif Bezwan60
Barth, Frederik (2000): “Boundaries and connections”, in: Anthony P. Cohen 
(ed.), Anthropological perspectives on boundaries and contested values, 
London/New York: Routledge, 17–34.
Baser, Bahar/Emanuelsson, Ann-Catrin/Toivanen, Mari (2015): “(In)visible 
spaces and tactics of transnational engagement: A multi-dimensional 
approach to the Kurdish diaspora”, in: Kurdish Studies 3 (2), 128–150.
Betts, Alexander (2013): Survival migration: Failed governance and the crisis 
of displacement, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bezwan, Naif (2008): Türkei und Europa: Die Staatsdoktrin der Türkischen 
Republik, ihre Aufnahme in die EU und die kurdische Nationalfrage, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Bezwan, Naif (2018): “Addressing the Kurdish self-determination conf lict: 
Democratic autonomy and authoritarianism”, in: Ephraim Nimni/Elçin 
Aktoprak (eds.), Democratic representation in plurinational states: The 
Kurds in Turkey, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 59–82.
Bezwan, Naif (2021) [forthcoming]: The state and violence in Kurdistan: A 
conceptual framework, in: Kurdish Studies, Special Issue.
Brandell, Inga (ed.) (2006): “Introduction”, in: Borders and boundaries in the 
Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris, 1–29.
Brubaker, Rogers (1995): “Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: 
Historical and comparative perspectives”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 
18 (2), 189-218. doi:10.1080/01419870.1995.9993861
Flint, Colin/ Mamadouh, Virgine (2015): “The multi-disciplinary reclamation 
of geopolitics: New opportunities and challenges”, in: Geopolitics 20 (1), 
13.
Chatty, Dawn (2010): Displacement and dispossession in the modern Middle 
East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Kevin R. (2002): Political geography, territory, state and society, Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Crawford, Michael H./Campbell, Benjamin C. (2012): “Perspectives on hu-
man migration: introduction”, in: Michael H. Crawford/Benjamin C. 
Campbell (eds.), Causes and consequences of human migration: An evo-
lutionary perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–8.
Crenshaw, Kimberle (1989): “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and 
sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist 
theory and antiracist politics”, in: University of Chicago Legal Forum 1, 
139-167.
Borders, authoritarian regimes, and migration in Kurdistan 61
Culcasi, Karen (2010): “Locating Kurdistan: Contextualizing the region’s 
ambiguous boundaries” in: Alexander C. Diener/Joshua Hagen (eds.), 
Borderlines and borderlands: Political oddities at the edge of the nation- 
state, Lanham: Littlefield, 107–120.
Dahlman, Carl T. (2009): “Geopolitics”, in: Carolyn Gallaher/Carl T. Dahl-
man/Mary Gilmartin/Alison Mountz /Peter Shirlow (eds.), Key concepts 
in political geography, London: Sage, 87–98.
Das, Veena/Poole, Deborah (2004): “State and its margins: Comparative eth-
nographies”, in: Veena Das/Deborah Poole (eds.), Anthropology in the 
margins of the state, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 3–34.
Dell’Agnese, Elena (2013): “The political challenge of relational territory”, in: 
David Featherstone /Joe Painter (eds.), Spatial politics: Essays for Doreen 
Massey, Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell, 115–132.
Diener, Alexander/Hagen, Joshua (2012): Borders: A very short introduction, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eccarius-Kelly, Vera (2015): “The imaginary Kurdish museum: Ordinary 
Kurds, narrative nationalisms, and collective memory” in: Kurdish Stud-
ies 3 (2), 172–191.
Eccarius-Kelly, Vera (2019): “Kurdish studies in Europe”, in: Michael M. 
Gunter (ed.), Routledge Handbook on the Kurds, London/New York: 
Routledge, 22–34.
Elder-Vass, Dave (2012): The reality of social construction, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Emirbayer, Mustafa. (1997): “Manifesto for a relational sociology”, in: Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 103 (2), 281–317.
Eralp, Doga U. (2015): “The role of U.S. drones in the Roboski Massacre”, in: 
Peace Review 27 (4), 448–455. doi:10.1080/10402659.2015.1094325
Gibson, Edward L. (2012): Boundary control: Subnational authoritarianism 
in federal democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilmartin, Mary/Kuusisto-Arponen, Anna-Kaisa (2019): “Borders and bodies: 
Siting critical geographies of migration”, in: Katharyne Mitchell/Reece 
Jones/Jennifer L. Fluri (eds), Handbook of critical geographies of migra-
tion, 18-29.
Green, Penny/Ward, Tony (2004): State crime: Government, violence and 
corruption. London: Pluto Press.
Naif Bezwan62
Green, Penny/Karakas, Saniye (2014): State crime in Turkey: The Roboski 
Massacre. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/state-crime-in-turkey- 
roboski-massacre/
Greenhill, Kelly M. (2010): Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, 
coercion and foreign policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Halliday, Fred (2011): “Post-colonial sequestration syndrome: Tibet, Palestine 
and the politics of failure, in: Political journeys, in Hayes, David (ed.), The 
openDemocracy essays, London: Saqi Books, 332–340
Helms, Benjamin/Leblang, David (2019): “Global migration: Causes and con-
sequences”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/ 
9780190228637.013.631
Jennequin, Arthur (2020): Turkey and the weaponization of Syrian refugees, 
Brussels International Center. https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/
inline-files/ME%20Policy%20Report%20-%20Turkey%20and%20the%20
Weaponization%20of%20Syrian%20Refugees%20-%20Jan%202020.pdf
Jüde, Johannes (2017): “Contesting borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdis-
tan’s de facto state”, in: International Affairs 93 (4) 847–863.
Kajjo, Sirwan. (2020): “Syrian Kurds: Rising from the ashes of persecution”, 
in: Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen/Nir T. Boms/Sareta Ashraph (eds.), The 
Syrian War between justice and political reality, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 268–286.
Kasaba, Reşat (2004): “Do states always favor stasis? The changing status of 
tribes in the Ottoman Empire”, in: Joel S. Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and 
belonging States and societies in the struggle to shape identities and lo-
cal practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27–48.
Keles, Janroj. Y. (2015): Media, diaspora and conf lict: Nationalism and identi-
ty amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe. London: I.B.Tauris.
Kramer, Ronald C. (2016): “State-organized crime: International law and 
structural contradictions”, in: Crit Crim 24, 231–245.
Lebow, Richard. N. (2018): Rise and fall of political orders, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
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U.S. immigration enforcement policies, health care 
utilization, and community health
Isabel K. Latz
Under the Trump administration, immigration policies have become more re-
strictive and immigration enforcement has been strengthened, particularly at 
the U.S.-Mexico border. We conducted a survey study examining immigration 
policy perceptions in relation to mental health and health care utilization among 
211 Hispanic residents with dif ferent immigration statuses in El Paso, County in 
the Spring of 2019. Findings showed associations between deportation fears and 
increased psychological distress as well as experiences with immigration enforce-
ment and lower health care utilization. The COVID-19 pandemic highlights a need 
to understand how immigration policies af fect health care utilization and health 
outcomes to mitigate community harm.
Introduction
The United States (U.S.) was once referred to by its federal government as 
“a nation of immigrants” (Gonzales 2018). Under the current federal admin-
istration, this description has been removed from the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services’ mission statement (U.S. Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services 2020), a changing sentiment which is ref lected in the adminis-
tration’s immigration-related policies and political rhetoric.
At this time, the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is exposing 
strengths and weaknesses of U.S. healthcare and social service systems, 
much like in other countries. The crisis has also highlighted existing ethnic 
and racial health disparities, as ref lected in disproportional death rates from 
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the virus among Hispanics and African Americans. For instance, as of April 
6, 2020, Hispanics, who make up 29 percent of the population in New York 
City (NYC), accounted for 33.5 percent of all COVID-19 related deaths. Afri-
can Americans, who represent 22 percent of the NYC community, accounted 
for 27.5 percent of deaths. In contrast, white residents who make up 32 per-
cent of NYC’s population accounted for 27.3 percent of deaths (NYC Health 
2020).
An examination of the underlying causes of disparities in this health cri-
sis are beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, its focus is on recent changes 
to U.S. immigration enforcement policies and the corresponding impact on 
health, healthcare utilization, and community health. While drawing on a 
large body of research and anecdotal evidence from different regions of the 
U.S., part of this chapter highlights observations from the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der city El Paso, Texas and neighboring communities. This chapter will first 
provide a demographic and historic context for key changes to immigration 
enforcement policies under the current federal administration, followed by 
an outline of changes pertaining to the U.S.-Mexico border in particular. 
Subsequently, I will summarize scientific evidence about associations be-
tween immigration enforcement policies and health outcomes from studies 
prior to and since the beginning of the current administration. Following 
this section, I will share observations from research projects on this topic 
as part of my doctoral studies in El Paso, Texas. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations that ref lect the insights from this evidence base for poli-
cymakers and for further study on this topic in the U.S. and globally.
Hispanic and immigrant populations in the U.S.: 
A demographic context
There are approximately 44.7 million immigrants (i.e., foreign-born individ-
uals) in the U.S., constituting 13.7 percent of the total population (Batalova 
et al. 2020). Hispanics or Latinos/Latinas/Latinx, native- and foreign-born 
combined, make up 18 percent of the U.S. population (Flores, 2017). Two-
thirds of Hispanics were born in the U.S. and of the remaining third, approx-
imately 77 percent are lawful immigrants, including naturalized citizens 
(45 %) and permanent (27 %) or temporary (5 %) residents, while the remain-
ing 23 percent are undocumented (Budiman, 2020). About three quarters 
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of foreign-born Latinos have lived in the U.S. for over ten years (Radford/
Krogstad). Thus, most Hispanics in the U.S. are citizens and a smaller group 
comprises residents with a less stable immigration status. Considering all 
ethnicities, one in four children in the U.S. is foreign-born and/or has a foreign- 
born parent (Council on Community Pediatrics 2013). Furthermore, at least 
5.9 million U.S. citizen children are members of mixed-status families, 
meaning they share a household with an undocumented family member 
(Mathema 2017). These statistics highlight the intergenerational and socio- 
biological connections between different immigration status holders. On 
the U.S. side of the border with Mexico, about half of the population is His-
panic and predominantly of Mexican origin (Stepler/Lopez 2016; United 
States-México Border Health Commission 2014).
U.S. immigration enforcement laws and policies: 
A historical context
Since the beginning of the 20th century, immigration-related laws and pol-
icies in the U.S. have typically promoted immigration in some form and 
simultaneously restricted pathways for legal immigration and/or access to 
benefits and services for immigrants (see Figure 1).
In the mid-1990s, two laws introduced notable restrictions to public ben-
efits for legal immigrants in the U.S. and expanded mechanisms to deport 
immigrants from the country. Specifically, the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 rendered legal immi-
grants with less than five-year residence ineligible for federally-funded pub-
lic benefits, including Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP), and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (Hagan/
Rodriguez/Capps 2003). In the same year, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) expanded the list of criminal offenses 
for which immigrants could be deported, authorized federal officers to issue 
removals of non-citizens without a formal court hearing, and increased the 
budget for immigration enforcement (Donato/Rodriguez 2014). Following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal government broad-
ened its capacities for increased surveillance, apprehension, and detention 
of immigrants who were suspected to be part of terrorist groups under the 
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of Homeland Security (DHS) replaced the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to oversee United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
United States Border Patrol (USBP), United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
amongst other departments (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2018a). 
Under DHS leadership, CBP and USBP intensified their border security and 
immigration enforcement operations in U.S. border areas, specifically along 
the border with Mexico (Donato/Rodriguez 2014; Plascencia 2017), while ICE 
gained responsibility for immigration enforcement in the U.S. interior (U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2018).
The impact of strengthened immigration enforcement was ref lected in a 
substantial increase in deportations from 70,000 persons in 1996 to 420,000 
in 2012 (Rosenblum et al. 2014). Despite legal prohibitions of discrimination 
in immigration enforcement, Latinx immigrants have disproportionally 
been targeted by these measures. For instance, Hispanics made up approxi-
mately 75 percent of the undocumented population between the years 2000 
and 2009, but accounted for at least 90 percent of deportees during this pe-
riod and in subsequent years (Passel/Cohn 2009; U.S. Department of Home-
land Security 2009; 2018b). Notably, the number of deportations during the 
first five years of the Obama administration (over 1.9 million) was almost as 
high as deportations during all eight years of the Bush administration (2 mil-
lion) (Rosenblum et al. 2014). However, the Obama administration also ex-
panded access to legal residence for some undocumented immigrants with 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans (DAPA) programs in 2012 and 2014, respectively, 
although the latter was blocked by a federal injunction in 2015. In addition, 
the government shifted its focus on deporting immigrants with a criminal 
record or who had recently crossed the border, in contrast with regulations 
under the current federal administration (ibid.).
Immigration enforcement policy changes under the  
current U.S. federal administration
Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, the administration released 
a series of executive orders focused on strengthening immigration enforce-
ment in the interior of the U.S. (for instance, by considering undocument-
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ed immigrants regardless of criminal background a “priority” for deporta-
tion), intensifying border security measures (such as, by requesting federal 
funding for a wall between the U.S. and Mexico), and prohibiting entry to 
the U.S. for foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries (The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary 2017a; 2017b; 2017c). In September 2017, 
the administration terminated DACA, which currently grants temporary au-
thorization to work or study in the U.S. to approximately 690,000 individ-
uals who came to the U.S. before their 16th birthday1 (U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services 2017).
Another policy change targeting legal immigrants in the U.S. involves 
the so-called “Public Charge” rule, which determines whether an immigrant 
is likely to become dependent on the government for support in legal per-
manent residency and certain visa applications. Previously only cash ben-
efits were considered, however under the new rule (in effect since February 
24, 2020), the use of non-cash benefits (such as, SNAP/food stamps, non- 
emergency Medicaid, and housing benefits) constitutes grounds for inad-
missibility as well (Immigration Legal Resource Center 2019). Health care 
and social service providers have expressed concerns that this policy change 
may create a “chilling effect”, in other words, prevent immigrants from seek-
ing services for themselves or their family members, even if their eligibility 
remains unchanged. In fact, researchers at the Urban Institute found that 
one in seven adults from immigrant families and one in five adults from 
low-income immigrant families did not access government benefits in 2018 
due to concerns about future legal status applications, even prior to imple-
mentation of the new rule (Bernstein et al. 2019). In addition, social service 
providers have observed disenrollment from nutrition assistance and chil-
dren’s health insurance programs among immigrant families, despite their 
continued eligibility for these services after the announcement of the new 
rule (Bottemiller Evich 2018; Jewett et al. 2018). These developments are par-
ticularly worrisome given that immigrant families in the U.S. are more likely 
to live in poverty, lack health insurance, and earn lower incomes compared to 
the general population (Khullar/Chokshi 2019).
1  The DACA termination was initially halted by federal judges and the Supreme Court is ex-
pected to decide about the legality of the administrations’ decision by June 2020 (de Vogue 
2020)
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Additional policy changes have particularly affected migrants and asy-
lum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border. For instance, the administration ad-
opted a “zero-tolerance” policy in May 2018, which involved the criminal pros-
ecution of anyone crossing the border without legal authorization, including 
asylum seekers (Lind 2018). As a consequence, at least 5,400 children were 
separated from their parents and accompanying family members until the 
policy was ceased in June 2018, though the total number of separated chil-
dren is unknown (Spagat 2019; U.S. Department of Health/Human Services 
Office of Inspector General 2019). The “Migrant Protection Protocols” policy 
of January 2019 forces asylum seekers from countries other than Mexico to 
remain on the Mexican side of the border until the date of their court hear-
ing in the U.S. (Lind 2019). An additional policy involved so-called “safe third 
country” agreements with Mexico and Guatemala, amongst other countries, 
which require migrants to first seek asylum in nations they have transited 
through on their way to the U.S., despite unsafe conditions in these countries 
for migrants, including high homicide rates, kidnappings, and extortions 
(Fratzke 2019; Vulliamy 2020).
Apart from these policy changes, the president has continuously engaged 
in anti-immigrant rhetoric, such as the allegation that Mexico was sending 
criminals and rapists to the U.S. An analysis of Trump’s speeches revealed 
the frequent use of the terms “animals”, “invasion”, and “killer” when refer-
ring to immigrants (Fritze 2019). Similar language was included in a man-
ifesto by the shooter who killed twenty-three and injured twenty-five indi-
viduals, specifically targeting Hispanics, in El Paso on August 3rd, 2019, in 
one of the deadliest mass shootings in modern U.S. history (Associated Press 
2020; Law/Bates 2019).
Associations between immigration enforcement and health 
outcomes: A summary of the scientific literature
Research prior to and since the current federal administration has revealed 
associations between strengthened U.S. immigration enforcement and ad-
verse health outcomes among immigrants and Latinx residents (see Figure 
2). To summarize broadly, studies have shown associations between stricter 
immigration enforcement policies at state level (for instance, Arizona’s Sen-
ate Bill 1070 of 2010, which authorizes state and local law enforcement to ask 
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about a person’s immigration status) and poorer self-rated health and men-
tal health among Hispanic adults (Anderson/Finch 2014; Hatzenbuehler et 
al. 2017). With respect to physical health effects, local immigration raids by 
ICE and the 2016 presidential election were found to be associated with low 
birth weight in infants of Hispanic mothers (Gemmill et al. 2019; Novak et 
al. 2017). A study by Torres and colleagues (2018) identified significant asso-
ciations between deportation concerns for participants themselves, family 
members, or friends and increased cardiovascular risks, including higher 
body mass index, waist circumference, and pulse pressure among Mexi-
can women in California (Torres et al. 2018). Moreover, studies have uncov-
ered adverse psychological and material effects of intensified immigration 
enforcement on children in particular, including U.S. citizen children. For 
instance, researchers found that the experience of parental deportation or 
threat thereof increased stress, fear, and confusion about their identity, but 
also corresponded to experiences of limited access to resources, poorer ac-
ademic performance, and discrimination in children (Gulbas/Zayas 2017; 
Dreby 2015). Notably, research also uncovered that mixed-status families 
commonly engage in shared risk management strategies, such as avoiding 
the outdoors, staying within confined geographic spaces to evade immigra-
tion checkpoints, and minimizing contact with health care or social service 
agencies to avoid questions about immigration status (Bailliard 2013; En-
riquez 2015; Núñez/Heyman 2007). Finally, studies have documented His-
panics’ decreased utilization of health care services, including for pediatric, 
mental health, and preventive health needs (White et al. 2014; Benif lah et al. 
2013; Fenton et al. 1997) as well as public assistance programs (Toomey et al. 
2014) in response to enactments of state immigration enforcement policies.
Studies since the beginning of the current federal administration also 
identified psychological and physical health effects related to immigration 
policies. For instance, Roche and colleagues (2018) examined concerns and 
behaviors among 213 Latino parents with different immigration statuses 
in Atlanta in response to immigration actions and news in 2017 (such as the 
DACA termination or targeting of undocumented immigrants without a 
criminal background in immigration enforcement). The authors found that 
worries about family separation, concerns about negative impacts on their 
children’s lives, and changes in daily routines were not only common ex-
periences among undocumented residents, but also temporary legal status 
holders, and, albeit to a lesser extent, legal permanent residents. In addi-
U.S. immigration enforcement policies and community health 73
tion, worries and behavioral modifications were associated with increased 
psychological distress, regardless of parents’ immigration status (Roche et 
al. 2018). Another study by Eskenazi and colleagues (2019) found significant 
associations between worries about immigration policies, higher anxiety, 
and poorer sleep quality following the 2016 presidential election among 397 
U.S.-citizen adolescents with Latino immigrant parents in California. Last-
ly, Krieger and colleagues (2018) discovered significantly higher preterm 
birth rates among infants of immigrant, Hispanic, and Muslim women in 
New York City in the post-presidential inauguration period (January to Au-
gust 2017) compared to the period prior to presidential candidate nomina-
tions (September 2015 to July 2016) (Krieger et al. 2018).
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework of associations between immigration 
enforcement policies, health care and public assistance utilization and physical 
and mental health—own image
Under an administration that continues to strengthen immigration enforce-
ment and minimize options to maintain or stabilize one’s immigration sta-
tus, it is important to consider the implications of these studies. Evidently, 
stricter immigration enforcement policies do not solely affect individuals 
who are directly targeted by these measures (i.e., undocumented immi-
grants) but extend to other community members, including mixed-status 
families, U.S. citizen children of Hispanic parents, and Latinx individuals 
who perceive anti-Hispanic sentiments or discriminatory practices (e.g., 
racial profiling in immigration enforcement) as a result of these measures 
(Ayón/Becerra 2013; Vargas et al. 2017). Thus, there is reason for concern 
about cumulative effects of increasingly restrictive immigration policies and 
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hardened enforcement on the physical health, mental health, and service uti-
lization among Latinx residents and communities in which they live.
The relationship between strengthened immigration enforcement and 
underutilization of health care and social services has additional implica-
tions, some of which are particularly concerning during this global pandem-
ic. First, individuals risk damage to their own health by forgoing preventive 
health screenings, delaying diagnosis and treatment for acute conditions, 
or avoiding regular monitoring of chronic health problems. Second, under- 
utilization of health care and social services has the potential to exacerbate 
existing health disparities, particularly in the U.S.-Mexico border region, 
including higher levels of obesity, diabetes, and poverty among Hispanics 
compared to non-Hispanic Whites (Healthy Paso del Norte, 2019). Third, the 
use of emergency services for conditions that could have been treated more 
economically and effectively at earlier stages poses greater costs for state 
and local health care systems (Behrman et al. 2019). Lastly, the underutiliza-
tion of care for infectious diseases poses health risks for entire communities, 
as highlighted by the current pandemic. According to the CDC, Hispanics 
account for 23.1 percent of COVID-19 cases as of April 22, 2020, thus, a higher 
rate than the 18 percent who make up the total population (CDC 2020). More-
over, Latinx residents disproportionally work in sectors that are less likely to 
provide paid sick leave and unemployment benefits (e.g., agriculture, ser-
vice, and hospitality), thus forcing workers to choose between loss of income 
or employment and working while they are sick, thereby increasing risks of 
disease transmission (Page et al. 2020; Scheltens 2020). In sum, the inter-
ference of deportation fears or future legal status concerns with health care 
and social service utilization in addition to gaps in employment protections 
poses a number of individual and community health risks.
Immigration enforcement impacts in the U.S.-Mexico border 
region: Observations from El Paso, Texas
El Paso County, Texas is located at the U.S.-Mexico border across from Ci-
udad Juárez in Mexico, with a population of 840,758 residents of whom 83 
percent identify as Hispanic, 25 percent are foreign-born, and an estimated 
8 percent are undocumented (Migration Policy Institute 2014; U.S. Census 
Bureau 2017). Since the beginning of the current federal administration, 
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there have been noticeable shifts in immigration laws, policies, and en-
forcement activities in the borderlands. For instance, Texas governor Abbott 
signed into law Texas Senate Bill (S.B.) 4 in May 2017, which as enacted as of 
March 2018, authorizes immigration status checks by local law enforcement 
and mandates compliance by local jails with ICE detainer requests, amongst 
other measures (Aguilar 2018a; Núñez 2018). In February 2017, an unprece-
dented arrest of an undocumented domestic violence victim by ICE at the El 
Paso courthouse reportedly contributed to local and nationwide fears among 
victims of domestic violence to engage with law enforcement (Blitzer 2017a; 
Lockhart 2017). In the same month, an ICE raid at a trailer park in Las Cru-
ces, New Mexico (a neighboring city of El Paso) was followed by a 60 percent 
increase in absences from public schools in the city the following day (Blitzer 
2017b).
My doctoral advisors Professor Lusk, Professor Heyman, and I conduct-
ed a study in the Spring of 2018 to explore perceptions among health care, 
social, and legal service providers regarding effects of strengthened immi-
gration enforcement measures on their patients and clients in El Paso and 
surrounding communities. Our structured telephone interviews with 20 
providers revealed perceptions of noticeable changes among almost all (18 
out of 20) respondents. On the one hand, participants reported a decrease in 
service utilization, largely due to fear-related service avoidance, in addition 
to uncertainties regarding impacts of policy changes on individuals’ service 
eligibility and immigration status. On the other hand, providers noticed an 
increased need for services, especially for information about the meaning of 
policy changes, service eligibility changes, and individuals’ civil rights (Latz 
et al. 2019).
Subsequent to this study, we developed a survey to assess the extent to 
which perceptions of and experiences with current immigration enforce-
ment policies affect health, mental health, and health care utilization among 
Hispanic residents with different immigration statuses in El Paso and 
neighboring communities. Participants were recruited via convenience and 
respondent-driven sampling at community health fairs, community organi-
zations, and public events throughout the region in the Spring of 2019. The 
items of this bilingual self-administered survey were predominantly based 
on existing surveys with Hispanic populations and their selection informed 
by an expert panel at the University of Texas at El Paso. The study sample of 211 
Latinx participants included U.S.-born citizens (49 %), foreign-born U.S. cit-
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izens (19 %), legal permanent (17 %), legal temporary (8 %), and undocument-
ed residents (8 %). Bivariate and multiple regression analyses were used to 
assess relationships between immigration status, immigration enforcement 
perceptions or experiences, and health outcomes. Over half of respondents 
reported fear of deportation for themselves, a close friend, or family member 
across all immigration statuses (the only group in which slightly less than 
half expressed this fear were U.S.-born citizens). The experience of deporta-
tion fears was significantly associated with increased psychological distress 
regardless of immigration status. In addition, experiences with immigration 
enforcement, such as having to proof one’s immigration status more than in 
the past or having more trouble getting or keeping a job due to immigration 
enforcement, were also associated with greater psychological distress as well 
as lower utilization of health care services (although the latter association 
was only marginally significant after adjustment for other factors) (Latz 
2019). This study was limited to a relatively small number of participants in 
more vulnerable immigration status groups, thus likely underestimating 
the nature of deportation fears, experiences with immigration enforcement, 
and corresponding associations with mental health and service use among 
more vulnerable legal status holders. Nonetheless, findings from this study 
indicate spillover effects of immigration enforcement measures on well- 
being among Hispanic residents with different immigration statuses.
Conclusion and recommendations
The final section of this chapter focuses on a number of broad recommen-
dations for further research on immigration policy health effects and for 
policies, especially during a global pandemic and in a climate of intensified 
concerns about migration inf luxes and nationalistic tendencies in countries 
around the world.
In line with previous research, the abovementioned El Paso-based stud-
ies highlight effects of strengthened immigration enforcement on communi-
ty members with different immigration statuses with respect to deportation 
fears, mental health, and service utilization. With the continued expansion 
of immigration restrictions and immigration enforcement measures under 
the current federal administration, there is a need to monitor and counter-
act corresponding adverse health effects on Latinx and immigrant com-
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munities. These efforts should involve further research on health impacts 
of recent policy changes, such as the new public charge rule and bination-
al assessments of migrant health and safety under the “Migrant Protection 
Protocol” policy. Community-based designs and sampling techniques that 
are inclusive of hidden community members would yield particularly mean-
ingful findings, as these are means to address local community concerns and 
give voice to traditionally underrepresented individuals in studies on topics 
that concern them. Furthermore, rising tendencies toward nationalism and 
xenophobia in countries around the globe highlight the need for internation-
al research on community health impacts (including physical, mental, social, 
and economic well-being) of corresponding policy choices.
With respect to policies, the evolving COVID-19 crisis calls for particular 
attention to the well-being of vulnerable groups, such as ICE detainees. Cur-
rently, individuals are being held in detention facilities despite confirmed 
COVID-19 cases and conditions that preclude following recommended social 
distancing and hygiene regimens, regardless of detainees’ increased vulner-
ability to the virus due to preexisting conditions or lack of criminal back-
ground (Flores/Aleaziz 2020). Another concerning practice which warrants 
scrutiny are current deportation f lights with COVID-19-positive passengers 
to Guatemala, Haiti, and other countries, thereby placing fellow passengers 
as well as residents in receiving countries at risk of contracting the disease 
(Johnston 2020). These examples highlight the need for increased transpar-
ency of decision making in immigration enforcement agencies and corre-
spondingly, mechanisms to hold officials accountable and address harmful 
practices.
The current global pandemic also underscores the importance of viewing 
policies related to immigration and employment from a public health and 
social justice perspective. As outlined above, everybody’s health is at greater 
risk when vulnerable legal status holders or their families do not feel safe 
to access health care or social services (or fear the use thereof may jeopar-
dize future legal status applications) and are unable to abstain from employ-
ment during sickness without the risk of losing their jobs. Therefore, a pol-
icy framework to decrease the social, economic, and human damage of the 
pandemic ought to include measures to expand paid sick leave and access to 
health care and social services regardless of immigration status.
The COVID-19 pandemic also exposes particular challenges and oppor-
tunities for border areas around the world. While there are wide variations 
Isabel K. Latz78
across borders, some lessons from the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez context may 
apply to borders elsewhere. Characteristic of this region is that many goods, 
services, and workers are able to cross the border regularly and with relative 
ease, while it constitutes a fixed barrier for others, including deportees from 
the U.S., migrant workers, or asylum seekers. Despite an overwhelming fo-
cus on border security in the media and political discourse, it is crucial to 
recognize how much is shared binationally within this space, including lan-
guages, culture, family ties, an economy, as well as environmental challeng-
es (e.g., water scarcity, heat waves). Thus, binational collaboration is critical 
to finding solutions to mutual challenges in this space.
Notably, as of March 2020, an order by the CDC to limit the spread of 
COVID-19 has justified a virtual halt of all new asylum seekers and an ex-
pulsion of over 11,000 migrants without access to a legal process to apply for 
residency in the U.S. (Misra 2020). As highlighted in a statement by leading 
public health experts, there are means to upholding individuals’ legal right to 
asylum while protecting the public health of migrants and border communi-
ties (Columbia Mailman School of Public Health 2020). Beyond this immedi-
ate challenge, a persistent undermining of the well-being, safety, and dignity 
of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border stresses the need for humane immi-
gration reform that recognizes the realities of family connections across 
borders, push and pull factors underlying migration, and the importance of 
global collaboration in safely managing future migratory f lows.
In sum, a discerning response to the COVID-19 pandemic ought to in-
clude serious consideration of systematic changes to policy structures that 
create avoidable harms to the well-being of increasingly diverse commu-
nities in the U.S. and elsewhere and instead recognize the connectedness 
between individuals across borders, immigrants’ valuable contributions to 
nations’ economies, and need for equitable access to essential health and so-
cial services to promote community well-being.
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Lessons learned between Ebola and COVID-19 
Border politics and securitization of migration flows in 
West Africa
Emina Osmandzikovic
Border politics in West Africa is a gravely misunderstood topic. Externally securi-
tized in a way that does not necessarily serve the local communities and the suste-
nance of cross-border f lows of people and goods, West Africa has persevered through 
the Ebola outbreak in a rather miraculous way. Given the acuteness of the West 
African socio-economic condition and healthcare security, this chapter attempts 
to explore migration patterns and contextualize viral outbreaks—from Ebola to 
COVID-19—in the f luid framework of border f lows within this Sub-Saharan re-
gion, thus invalidating extant prejudice against West African migration patterns.
Introduction
Given their overall socio-economic state and migration management, West 
African countries1 have been f looded with ominous predictions that the re-
gion’s healthcare systems would be overwhelmed as the novel coronavirus 
cases escalated. Given the overall underdevelopment and widespread socio- 
economic inequality across the region, West Africa had previously under-
1  The United Nations (UN) defines West Africa as the region encompassing the following 16 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, as 
well as the United Kingdom Overseas Territory of Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da 
Cunha (Masson/Pattillo 2001).
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gone one of the largest Ebola outbreaks in contemporary human history in 
2014. In Guinea alone, it took nearly three months for health officials and 
their international partners to identify the Ebola virus as the causative agent. 
By the time an official diagnosis was reached, the virus had already spread 
across multiple countries, migrating from rural areas to densely populated 
cities, and eventually expanding beyond the region. These factors undoubt-
edly contributed to the overall absence of preparedness against the spread of 
the COVID-19 virus across Sub-Saharan Africa, albeit with some exceptions.
Given that West Africa is a region with a deep, historical connection to 
migration, wherein porous borders and cross-border trade make the largest 
part of the region’s contemporary socio-economic habitus, its border com-
munities have managed to create and internalize a plethora of localized ap-
proaches to tackling the cross-border voyage of viral outbreaks.
Leaning on their historical underpinning and catalyzed by contempo-
rary waves of globalization, the regional migration f lows within West Africa 
have been conjoined with a global migration system. They are, hence, heavily 
inf luenced by international socio-economic and securitization policies that 
aim to control and curb f lows of people and goods. While a high number 
of cross-border businesses remain informal, the prominent involvement of 
women in trade between borders and the buy-in of local communities galva-
nized re-thinking of migration, especially in the post-Ebola period (UNCT-
AD 2019).
To that extent, this chapter seeks to explore migration patterns across 
West Africa’s porous borders, thus embedding the region’s experience with 
viral outbreaks in a greater context of its migration f lows and innovative 
approaches to tackling the local communities’ dependence on cross-border 
trade amidst viral outbreaks. In doing so, this chapter attempts to demon-
strate the need to view and analyze the problematics of migration in the re-
gion through a more comprehensive and intersectional approach, especially 
in the COVID-19 aftermath.
A brief history of contemporary migration flows in West Africa
In order to fully comprehend contemporary migration systems, and current 
migration policies, in the region, it is pertinent to set its migration configu-
ration in its proper historical context.
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Including refugees and migrants, West Africa is a region with a 
long-standing culture of migration, primarily characterized by intra- 
regional movements (IOM 2020). Due to its postcolonial geography, migrants 
regarded West Africa as an economic unit within which trade in goods and 
services f lowed and people moved freely (cf. Adepoju 2005: 1). Mobility with-
in and out of the region has taken place through temporary, circular and 
more permanent movements, principally for the purpose of labor and cross- 
border trade (IOM 2020). In the 1990s, conf lict and violence also led to inter-
nal and cross-border displacement. Being among the smallest and econom-
ically worse off countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea have been intertwined in civil wars throughout the 1990s, destabiliz-
ing the region in both political and economic terms.
Census-based estimates by the United Nations Population Division sug-
gest that West Africa has the largest absolute international immigrant stock, 
as based on place of birth data (cf. Yaro n.d.:1). It is also the only region of 
Sub-Saharan Africa where migration stocks relative to the total population 
have been increasing over the past couple of decades (cf. de Haas 2007: 1).
Therefore, the process of growth and development which West African 
countries have experienced in the post-colonial period has been character-
ized by the process of areal differentiation (cf. Riddell 1980). In a spatial 
sense, employment opportunities and developmental changes have been 
concentrated in a few areas, especially the cities; the rural areas, which dom-
inate both in terms of population numbers and areal extent, have either un-
dergone little growth or have felt the backwash effects of development else-
where (cf. Hirschman 1958; Myrdal 1957). Given the historical absence of rigid 
borders between the countries in the region and the relatively small market 
share of their f ledgling domestic economies, the local communities have re-
sponded to these socio-economic developments via utilizing border f luidity 
and scaling up cross-border trade.
A pertinent challenge to migration in the West African region is the pau-
city in the enforcement of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) protocol on entry, residence and settlement. As a trading union, 
ECOWAS was envisioned to create a single, large trading bloc through eco-
nomic cooperation (ECOWAS 1975). In comparative terms, ECOWAS is also 
meant to create a single, large trading bloc through economic cooperation, 
similar to the concept behind the European Union. The founding idea of the 
treaty was the creation of a borderless and integrated region where the pop-
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ulation has access to its abundant resources, enjoys free movement, has ac-
cess to efficient education and health systems, and engages in economic and 
commercial activities while living in peace and security.
Guided by the principles of solidarity and collective self-reliance, ECOW-
AS has had mixed success in codifying and monitoring informal migration 
f lows within the region; nevertheless, it has grown into the region’s socio- 
economic backbone in migration management, especially in times of crises.
In the wake of the Ebola crisis, land borders within West Africa closed, 
immediately ceasing trade and movement of people (Games/Vickers 2015). 
ECOWAS, however, was the first organization in the world to provide an 
institutionalized response to the Ebola outbreak (cf. Yaya 2015), eventually 
training healthcare professionals of the most affected states and providing 
financial support within the organization’s regional plan and solidarity fund 
against Ebola. Despite the cessation of cross-border trade and f lows of peo-
ple, ECOWAS ceased the global momentum and brought in well-coordinat-
ed, international assistance, thus paving the way forward.
Localized border solutions for marginalized communities
Since the early 2000s, West African countries have given birth to some local-
ized efforts to tackle the problematic aspects of movement of marginalized 
and prosecuted communities, including refugees and asylum-seekers. The 
regularization of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in Nigeria in 2007 
included 339 people, as based on ECOWAS. With the restoration of peace in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia after the two countries’ devastating civil wars, the 
governments of both countries and Nigeria, where a substantial number of 
Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees had found refuge, signed a multipar-
tite agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in order to integrate them in Nigeria. The agreement acknowl-
edged that the ECOWAS Protocols can be applied to refugees from Sierra 
Leone and Liberia in Nigeria. Moreover, the agreement promoted the explo-
ration of a legal migrant status by all parties as a solution for refugees upon 
cessation of their refugee status.
The agreement specified that the Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees: 
(i) have the possibility to opt for legal migrant status on the basis of the 
ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol, (ii) have the governments of Sierra Leone 
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and Liberia provide them with valid ID and travel documents, (iii) have the 
government of Nigeria provide them with residence permits for a period of 
two years, with the possibility of renewal, allowing them to work, reside and 
move freely within the country, and (iv) have the UNHCR cover the fees in-
curred for the issuance of passports and residence permits.
According to the UNHCR, out of 1,634 Sierra Leonean refugees registered 
in Nigeria, 339 opted for local integration, in addition to 185 Liberian refu-
gees. An estimated 61 percent of registered Liberian refugees and asylum- 
seekers have opted for local integration in Nigeria. Although the multipar-
tite agreement only applies to Nigeria, several other countries in West Afri-
ca have subsequently applied for the protocol to facilitate the integration of 
former Sierra Leonean refugees, resulting in a total of 6,012 applications for 
local integration, processed through ECOWAS.
Succored by f lexible ECOWAS provisions, the West African approach 
has successfully attempted to bridge the gap between asylum and economic 
aspects of migration, wherein the mandate of the treaty was expanded to 
incorporate asylum as a beneficiary category. The peculiarity of the program 
is two-fold; namely, vulnerable communities were scattered across several 
countries, rather than one, and the agreement was successful in formaliz-
ing the socio-economic lives of these communities. There is no evidence to 
suggest that these provisional status normalization and border solutions for 
marginalized communities changed amidst the Ebola outbreak, albeit with 
poor follow-up.
West African female entrepreneurs and the  
informal cross-border trade
In the case of West Africa, informal cross-border trade occurs between 
neighboring countries conducted by vulnerable, small, unregistered traders 
(UNCTAD 2019). Typically, it is proximity trade involving the move of pro-
duce between markets close to the border. Similar to the situation elsewhere 
in Africa, in major cross-border posts, women account for a high percentage 
of informal traders.
Across the board, this female-intensive sector has broad poverty reduc-
tion ramifications. It constitutes a vital source of sustenance and livelihood 
for low-income and low-skilled women in border areas. Small-scale border 
Emina Osmandzikovic92
trade can play a fundamental role in contributing to poverty reduction and 
food security, wherein women play a catalyzing role locally and regionally 
(cf. Brenton/Soprano 2018).
Women’s businesses are not necessarily registered as formal owners; 
however, they do not aim to circumvent existing laws and applicable taxes 
by default. In fact, cross-border traders typically pass through official cross-
ing points and even undergo formal clearance procedures, yet their con-
signments are often so small that they escape official records (cf. Brenton/
Soprano 2018).
As an important defining factor for these businesses that contribute to 
local and regional food security, infrastructural, policy, procedural, and 
behavioral constraints at the border hinder traders’ ability to grow and for-
malize. Nevertheless, revenues from cross-border trade are often the main 
source of income for the households of cross-border traders. For example, a 
2013 World Bank report, based on a survey of more than 600 traders in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, found that cross-border 
trading activities provide the main source of family income for three out of 
four traders (Brenton et al. 2013). The survey found that for measures such 
as quality of dwelling, access to electricity, type of cooking fuel used, and 
ownership of durable goods, the households of cross-border traders are as 
well off as the average urban household that is used as a comparative case.
The migratory dimension of women’s cross-border trade also deserves 
more cogitation. Cross-border trade is not only a trading activity but is also 
an act of migration, with traders crossing national and regional borders 
within economic communities as well as international borders outside the 
continent. More attention to the migratory aspects of cross-border trade and 
the specific characteristics of women’s migration can enhance the scope of 
female traders’ cross-border economic activity.
Women also play an important role in health-related awareness-raising, 
which is why Ebola put them at a heightened danger, especially compared to 
other demographic groups (cf. Wolfe 2014). Some research shows that more 
than two thirds of Ebola patients in DRC have been women (cf. Peyton 2019).
Moreover, increased use of water for handwashing and other preven-
tion activities has led women in border areas to commute more frequently 
traveling long distances to collect water, leading to increased risk of sexual 
violence (IRC 2019). The situation has significantly improved since, especially 
given the women’s role in awareness raising of their own communities who 
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remained being at a heightened risk of infection even after the Ebola out-
break subsided.
How Ebola crossed porous borders within West Africa
The scope of the 2014–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, both in terms of 
cases and geography, can be attributed to the unprecedented circulation of 
the virus into overcrowded urban areas and the capitals, increased mobili-
zation across borders, both formal and informal, and conf licts between key 
infection control practices and prevailing cultural and traditional practices 
in the region.
The Ebola virus was first discovered in 1976 near the Ebola River in today’s 
DRC. According to the American Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
WHO reported first Ebola cases in the rural region of southeastern Guinea in 
March of 2014. The identification of these early cases marked the beginning 
of the Ebola epidemic, the largest in the region’s history (CDC 2019).
A pertinent amount of circulation of goods and people has taken place 
between Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria; Togo and Cote d’Ivoire; Burkina Faso, 
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire since the early 1970s. Reinforced by historically 
open exchange, many borders between countries in the region remain po-
rous. Moreover, some research suggests that a number of people have been 
much more likely to cross into a neighboring country without even going 
through a formal border crossing (cf. Fallah 2019). On the ground, people 
cross geographical boundaries without physical boundaries in their minds, 
especially in search for socio-economic sustenance that they cannot find in 
their immediate vicinity. When migrants, refugees and cross-border traders 
find themselves in DRC and fall ill from a disease, they will do what anyone 
would: seek support from their relatives and friends, some of whom are in 
border towns (cf. Fallah 2019), making cross-border monitoring strenuous 
for local authorities.
While border f luidity has proven as a key advantage for regional trade 
and the economic market, weak surveillance systems and poor public health 
infrastructure contributed to the difficulty surrounding the containment of 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. By mid-2014, the outbreak spread to ur-
ban areas and the capitals of all three countries, eventually reaching several 
countries in Europe and the US.
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While it might have seemed counterintuitive, closing borders in the face 
of Ebola was the worst possible response, according to WHO experts at the 
time, including the Secretary-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (cf. 
Turse 2019). Met with border or travel restrictions, people who rely on cross-
ing borders to feed their families will always find a way to do so. Moreover, 
an independent investigation by The Intercept, an online news publication, 
found that Congolese and Rwandans regularly traversed the frontier be-
tween the two countries without safeguards and health screenings. Some 
actively bypassed public health efforts at formal borders as well (cf. Turse 
2019).
As one of the greatest examples of the porous border dynamics in West 
Africa, on-ground research has mapped out the DRC-Rwanda f luid asym-
metry. There are stark contrasts between the border districts in Rwanda and 
DRC in terms of their economic and political characteristics. In general, the 
Congolese side displays weak, locally contested state authority, insecurity, 
negotiable and inconsistent economic regulation, and greater opportunities 
for employment. The Rwanda side of the border is characterized by strong, 
centralized political authority, physical security, heavy regulation and ab-
sence of work opportunities. In the context of Ebola, preparedness interven-
tions, including cross-border surveillance, ought to be understood against a 
backdrop of pre-existing suspicions, political-economic exploitation, smug-
gling, and the ongoing security concerns of both countries (cf. Bedford 2019: 
3).
On the one hand, Ebola has been a very difficult disease to contain be-
cause of human social and behavioral factors. But it can be easily contained 
if 100 percent of the infected people’s contacts are identified and monitored 
and if cases are quickly removed into treatment units (cf. Fallah 2019).
On the other hand, a 2014 study in the Eurosurveillance journal found 
that travel bans could have only delayed, and not prevented, the internation-
al spread of the Ebola outbreak and only “at the risk of compromising con-
nectivity to the region, mobilization of resources to the affected area and 
sustained response operations, all actions of critical value for the immediate 
local control of [Ebola] and for preventing its further geographical spread” 
(Poletto et al. 2014: 5). In the concrete case of the Ebola outbreak, these re-
strictions effectively posed as a great logistical hindrance in managing its 
spread.
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Moreover, a 2016 retrospective epidemiological study found that “trav-
el restrictions were not effective enough to expect the prevention of global 
spread of Ebola virus disease.” The research, in PLOS One, found that it was 
“more efficient to control the spread of disease locally during an early phase 
of an epidemic” (Otsuki/Nishiura 2016). The incongruences on how localized 
the containment measures should be, especially in regions with ambiguously 
upheld borders has been left open-ended, despite some burgeoning efforts 
to reinforce greater health safety in border areas.
Moreover, according to a Harvard Medical School piece published in 
Quartz Africa in 2019, “some evidence suggests that there are a lot more in-
formal crossings than the formal ones across West Africa,” making de facto 
monitoring of borders virtually impossible for both the local and the nation-
al authorities. Herein, some research reveals that a number of people have 
taken antipyretic medications to avoid being detected at the formal border 
crossings. These drugs bring fevers down so that scanners don’t detect a high 
temperature (cf. Fallah 2019). While channeling the regional response to the 
Ebola outbreak, ECOWAS had taken a backseat with reinforcement of tough-
er border mechanisms.
Overall, more than 100 million Ebola screenings have occurred during 
the outbreak. Twenty-eight times, health checks have stopped people with 
the Ebola virus in transit. But many continued crossing borders without 
anyone taking their temperature or checking for symptoms. Two and a half 
years after the first case was discovered, the outbreak ended with more than 
28,600 cases and 11,325 deaths.
In the immediate aftermath of the Ebola outbreak, there were some be-
havioral on-ground shifts that might speak to the lasting impact cross-bor-
der contamination left on the region. Having many residents who cross the 
border for daily trade, local communities in border areas understand that 
screenings—which include registration, hand washing and temperature 
checks—came as a protective measure (cf. Enaka Kima 2016: 4). Herein, com-
munal self-regulation complemented poorly executed official efforts that are 
unable and incapable of penetrating the most vulnerable societies, at times.
In Guinea, for instance, volunteers were trained and mobilized to con-
duct door-to-door awareness raising and focus group discussions on hy-
giene education, especially in border areas, in addition to infection control 
through community event-based monitoring. The acceptance by local com-
munities of these initiatives, is primarily the result of the adoption of a com-
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munity-based approach in the aftermath of ebola (cf. Enaka Kima 2016: 2). 
On a broader communal level, religious and traditional leaders played a key 
role in dialogue to prevent any resurgence of the Ebola epidemic or other dis-
eases, ensuring that local communities that live and work between borders 
are more prepared for future outbreaks.
In the period leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak, information-sharing 
and awareness-raising, especially among the region’s border communities, 
has elevated its preparedness, indicating that border f luidity has had some 
positive effects. Herein, some research suggests that because the authorities 
who had previously been associated with the HIV epidemic have been pro-
viding information on Ebola, the information is taken more seriously on the 
ground and internalized by those who cross borders daily to engage in trade 
and business.
Bracing for the COVID-19 virus outbreak and  
its lasting repercussions
Originating in the Chinese Hubei province in late 2019, the COVID-19 out-
break spread to all continents by mid-March of 2020, when the World Health 
Organization officially updated its status to a pandemic (WHO 2020). In late 
February of 2020, the first case of COVID-19 in West Africa was recorded in 
Nigeria. Within one month, the virus had spread to all the countries in the 
region (OECD 2020).
The COVID-19 outbreak in West Africa was primarily covered with food 
security and public health discussions through the lens of socio-economic 
demise of regional trade. While the angles of food security and public health 
hold substantive merit (cf. Akinwotu 2020), West Africa’s response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic cannot be merely tossed as totally negative.
While many west African countries continued to have poorly resourced 
health systems in the post-Ebola period (Martinez-Alvarez et al. 2020), thus 
rendering them unable to quickly scale up an epidemic response with the 
COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, WHO made several statements that the region’s 
previous devastating experience with the Ebola outbreak had made it more 
resilient (cf. Akinwotu 2020).
Herein, research from other regions suggests that experience with viral 
outbreaks has made entire populations more disciplined, aware of virus- 
Lessons learned between Ebola and COVID-19 97
associated health risks, cautious in their social behaviors and more trusting 
of the pandemic health management efforts overall, thus quickening nation-
al responses amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 (cf. Walsh 2020). 
For instance, despite their proximity to China, Hong Kong and Singapore 
managed to keep COVID-19 infections and death extraordinarily low. While 
both are economically developed2, with strong public healthcare systems and 
a deep bench of infectious disease experts, the deeper reason lays not in their 
success with COVID-19, but in past failures with the Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 
earlier in the century, both of which managed to engineer socio-economic 
and health-related behaviors in order to follow official guidelines and cata-
lyze crisis management (cf. Walsh 2020).
Similarly, West Africa’s experience with the Ebola outbreak has galva-
nized public debates on health and preventative measures that local commu-
nities can undertake, especially regarding awareness raising. This, however, 
does not consider the socio-economic and developmental differences be-
tween West African countries and the two above-mentioned case examples.
In the case of West Africa, local businesswomen and female entrepre-
neurs in border areas have played a key role in conveying health-related mes-
sages to their respective communities, capitalizing on the religious and local 
leaders’ buy-in of official anti-Ebola measures among the populace of West 
Africa.
Although some West African countries have measures in place from the 
Ebola epidemic, the region includes some of the poorest countries in the 
world3. Despite having young populations, some West African countries have 
rates of other risk factors similar to European countries, wherein 27 percent 
of Gambians have hypertension and 6 percent have diabetes (Martinez-Alva-
rez et al. 2020).
While many West African countries have poorly resourced health sys-
tems, rendering them unable to quickly scale up an epidemic response, 
which had severely impeded the region’s response to Ebola, the region fared 
2  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ranks Singapore at 0.935 and Hong 
Kong (SAR China) at 0.939 within the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019. Measuring 
life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, the index ranges between 0 
and 1, wherein lower values correspond to zero and higher values correspond to one.
3  According to World Bank data, nine of the 25 poorest countries are in the region.
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better with the COVID-19 crisis. Public awareness and greater cross-border 
discipline, coupled with the region’s previous experience, had perhaps sti-
f led the virus’ devastating consequences.
Overall, many uncertainties of the long-term impact of COVID-19 on the 
region remain, given the persevering prevalence of some of its structural im-
pediments.
Continued border fluidity and preventative measures  
against viral diseases
Given that migration has been historically seen as a way of life in West Af-
rica (cf. Adepoju 2005: 4), ECOWAS aimed to officiate the total removal of 
obstacles to the free movements of goods, capital and people in the region, 
primarily responding to the on-ground realities of informal border cross-
ings, cross-border traders and local, unofficial entrepreneurs who have been 
sustaining regional economies. The wavering political support, political in-
stability and inter-state border disputes, including violent clashes and civil 
wars, have retarded any significant progress in ratification and implementa-
tion of the ECOWAS protocols (cf. Adepoju 2005: 5).
Filling the deep abyss, contemporary efforts to modernize borders and 
manage local migration f lows within West Africa have primarily been driv-
en by external forces. This is best exemplified with the EU’s expansive cam-
paign to manage borders outside of the old continent in almost two decades; 
a stance that has galvanized countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
West Africa, to manage historically f luid border f lows by focusing on securi-
tizing their territories. Securitization came in parallel with viral outbreaks, 
thus galvanizing external forces to even more involved in compartmental-
izing local f lows of goods and people, with some restrictive policies being 
naturally reinforced amidst the Ebola crisis.
Following the guidelines of the African Union and ECOWAS, both of 
which acted as guarantors of free movement with an active agenda of har-
monization of border policies, there has been a diversity of actors involved in 
determining policies and practices of border management across West Afri-
ca. Herein, border management led by an international agency, such as the 
IOM, has included training of local stakeholders (cf. Howden 2018).
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While some key principles of border management illustrated by best 
practices from similar contexts can improve the overall health of border 
f luidity, ultimately leading to a reduction in criminalization and harm for 
human security and life, the application of a more securitized approach to 
managing West African borders has remained primarily external with mini-
mal buy-in from regional governments. The gap between external inf luences 
and local border capabilities has been further exacerbated with the Ebola ep-
idemic and has not changed much since, given the lack of political will from 
within the region.
While it is exigent to prognosticate the long-term impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on border f luidity and cross-border movement of people and 
goods within West Africa, especially when it is coupled with the phenom-
enon of externally-fueled securitization of borders for purposes that might 
not be pertinent for the region’s immediate benefit, viral outbreaks have left 
their mark on the behaviors and practices of local communities in border ar-
eas, indicating a potential shift of the on-ground status quo.
Conclusion
Given the region’s complex indebtedness to migration as the most effective 
medium of socio-economic sustenance, diverging incentives around border 
management in West Africa persist, even in the context of viral outbreaks 
that make cross-border movement difficult to execute and safely monitor. 
All of this means that health authorities’ interventions within West Africa 
must be strategic.
The nightmare scenario for West Africa, according to health experts, is 
the COVID-19 virus loose in an urban and densely populated city with in-
sufficient public health resources (WHO 2020). The results could be cata-
strophic—worse than the West African Ebola outbreak earlier this decade 
that killed more than 11,000 people.
Many analysts argue that the region’s porous and poorly managed borders 
contribute to its intrinsic hazard factors when it comes to viral outbreaks, 
mislaying the fact that that West Africa has learned valuable socio-economic 
and healthcare-related lessons from the Ebola outbreak, some of which have 
been applied to the region’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled 
with locally-based approaches to curbing border f luidity when necessary. 
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Herein lies an important defining factor of cross-border businesses, often 
led by female traders, that contribute to local and regional food security and 
strengthened socio-economic infrastructure. As an official underpinning, 
ECOWAS has had laudable success in marshaling contained border f luidity 
amidst the region’s viral outbreaks; evolving into the socio-economic back-
bone in migration management, especially in times of crises. Coupled with 
West Africa’s previous experience with viral outbreaks and locally-under-
pinned exposure to mixed migration patterns within the region, it ought to 
be given more credit for surviving the worst case scenarios with a plethora 
of lessons learned that can be applied even in more developed regions of the 
world in the post-COVID-19 period.
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Particular to time and space 
Historical and life-world explorations on the Brenner 
border Austria–Italy
Hans Karl Peterlini
The border at the Brenner Pass crossing the Alps between Austria and Italy is polit-
ically and emotionally charged: Here, where for millennia there was an open tran-
sition between North and South and made possible the cross-border togetherness 
of the Tyrol region, an arbitrary boundary was drawn in 1918–1920 and Tyrol was 
divided. The article1 explores the historical developments and lifeworld potentials 
beyond an exclusively political definition of border. Exploration in the two border 
villages of Brenner and Franzensfeste reveals experiences of living together across 
ruptures and crises, especially with regard to migration.
Historical strip lights: How barriers create sites
“Perhaps a place”, as if that were not so certain, Siegfried Nitz (2004: 7) writes 
in a poem about the world of his childhood, the village Franzensfeste in 
South Tyrol/Alto Adige (Italy). It could be described as a non-place (cf. Auge 
1994), but this would mean to misjudge its particularity. Franzensfeste, with 
the hamlets of Mittewald and Grasstein, is better known for its imposing 
1  This article is a reworked version of a contribution to the project “Arbeitsmigration in Süd-
tirol” (University of Innsbruck), translated into English by the author himself: “Lebenswel-
ten im Zwischen. Ansichten der Migrationsgesellschaf t an Schnittstellen von Öf fnung und 
Schließung: Franzensfeste/Fortezza, Brenner/Brennero”, in: Eva Pfanzelter, Dirk Rupnow 
(eds.): einheimisch - zweiheimisch – mehrheimisch. Geschichte(n) der neuen Migration in 
Südtirol, Edition Raetia, Bozen, 2017, 283-304.
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fortress in the south than as residential area. The massive barrage of heavy 
stone quads, which rises at the end of a reservoir, closes the valley and hides 
the village behind it. Just as the fortress gives Franzensfeste its right to exist 
and its importance, so does the proximity to the Austrian border determine 
the conditions of life in the village of Brenner.
Both places, the one directly at the border crossing, the other 35 kilo-
metres to the south, were mostly places of transit rather than of stay, deter-
mined in their genesis and further development by the alternation of closing 
and opening, of increased permeability and tightened barriers. For exam-
ple, a narrow gorge in this area, called the Sack, plays a central role in the 
political myth of Tyrol, according to which this small country bravely defies 
enemies invading from outside. In 1809, when Europe was overrun by Na-
poleon’s troops, Tyrolean fighters were able to stop the overwhelming army 
in the sack with stone avalanches. This may also have inspired the Viennese 
government to build the fortress almost 30 years later (from 1833 to 1838), this 
time to protect the empire from troops from the south. Defence technology 
is often based on past wars and can hardly prevent future ones.
Paradoxically, the construction of the fortress, which was never dam-
aged during the war, opened up the valley to an arrival of over 4,000 work-
ers from Italy and Balkan countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, rather 
than blocking it off. Next, the construction of the railway, which arrived here 
around 1867 and led to Vienna, Ljubljana and Trieste, gave the place unex-
pected significance and caused a large inf lux of workers (cf. Facchinelli 1998). 
They came from different countries of the multinational Monarchy to a place 
that had not existed before and that only came into being through them. 
A place where strangers did not meet locals, but where everyone was new, 
immigrant and foreign. Franzensfeste is thus a prototype of the migration 
society in the sense that it more clearly expresses what otherwise remains 
hidden behind the construct of local and foreign: that migration is not a his-
torical emergency, but a human condition, the actual form of human existence 
(Hoffmann-Nowotny 1994: 388).
At the Brenner Pass it was the demarcation of the border that gave rise 
to the site. For centuries the pass was a crossing point for shepherds, trad-
ers and the German emperors on their way to the coronation by the Pope in 
Rome. Early settlers on both sides of the pass were involved in an intensive 
cultural exchange, as early archaeological finds demonstrate. Due to the 
partly skilful, partly brutal power politics of count Meinhard II, a political 
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unity on both sides of the Brenner Pass was created from 1248 onwards. Lat-
er on, the county Tyrol became a crown land of the Habsburg monarchy. The 
area between Kufstein (on the border with Bavaria) and Lake Garda com-
prised three language regions—German in today’s Tyrol and South Tyrol, 
Ladin in the Dolomite valleys and Italian in Trentino, the former Welschtirol. 
Belonging and togetherness were defined by the common dynasty. In 1809, 
Tyroleans of all language groups fought together against the Bavarians allies 
of Napoleon. It was not until the national movements from the middle of 
the 19th century onwards that a gulf began to open up between Deutschtirol 
and Welschtirol (cf. Peterlini 2008: 19–24). German-Tyrolean parties fought 
against attempts at autonomy in Trento, whilst the emerging young Italy laid 
claim to the Tyrolean territory up to the Brenner Pass, which was finally de-
cisive for Italy’s entry into the First World War against Austria in 1915. With 
the secret treaty of London, the Allies secured the areas of Tyrol, south of the 
Brenner Pass and the Trieste region for Italy in the event of a war win (cf. 
Peterlini 2016: 8–19).
With the hoisting of the tricolour in November 1918, the Brenner became 
a boundary for the first time. For Italy, this meant the completion of its idea 
of unification, for Tyrol the end of its political unity. The area south of the 
Brenner Pass became the Italian province of Alto Adige, in German called 
Südtirol (South Tyrol). Whereas the, over decades, oppressed and disadvan-
taged new province had to go through a painful but finally successful pro-
cess to become the autonomous model region of South Tyrol. The new state 
border also accelerated the growth of the settlement on the Brenner Pass. 
Around 1930, when Mussolini, out of mistrust of his ally Hitler, also had a 
ring of bunkers built here as the core of the planned Alpine Wall, 5,000 sol-
diers were stationed at the Brenner, some of them bringing their families 
with them. Merchants’ and workers’ families settled down.
At a distance of 35 kilometres, two non-places had thus become places, 
grown out of nothing in an attempt to control, regulate and, in case of emer-
gency, stop passage, which at the same time meant mobilising migration. 
In both places, which only owe their existence, more visibly than others, to 
migration in the first place (because which place does not?), the question of 
natives and foreigners becomes fragile. In a partly autobiographical exam-
ination of significant sites and incidents in the recent history of South Ty-
rol’s autonomy, I have described this neuralgic place of my earliest childhood 
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from my parents’ memories. The following short excerpt refers to the 1960s, 
the time of the most serious political conf licts and violent attacks:
»The Brenner people must be a particular breed. Many worked at cus-
toms, at the railway, at forwarding companies, almost nobody had relatives 
nearby, and nobody had roots. German and Italian families lived very closely 
together. [...] If you do not consider a border politically, it has its f lair. Austri-
an and Italian frontier guards met each other in their favourite taverns, bars 
and inns. We bought chocolate on the other side, coffee on this side of the 
border. The few German families stuck together. However, when my mother 
enumerates the people she liked, also the names of the Italian Brenner fami-
lies spontaneously cross her lips.« (Peterlini 2003: 10).
Migration in the interplay of economy and politics
The arrival of the railway and the large train station allowed the population 
of Franzensfeste to grow in rapid succession. In 1869, the municipality still 
had 314 inhabitants. Only twelve years later, the number had increased by 
more than a third. In 1900, the population reached 844 persons, by 1910 it was 
1,269 persons—a quadrupling in 40 years (Heiss 2012: 161). The population 
came from different areas of the Monarchy, but—surrounded by a German- 
speaking area—was predominantly oriented towards the German language. 
In 1881, one tenth of the population still declared itself Italian, which was 40 
people; in 1910 there were only three. The tendencies to ethnic homogeniza-
tion in the linguistic overlapping areas had also had its effect here.
Beyond linguistic assimilation, Franzensfeste preserved a special fea-
ture: the history of its origins from the immigration of families of workers 
and public servants promoted the formation of a self-confident “confession-
al mixed, church-free and ideologically deviant enclave” (Heiss 2012: 162). 
Franzensfeste was one of the few strongholds of social democracy in the op-
pressive conservative environment. The railway was a fertile humus for la-
bour and social consciousness. In addition to the book printers, who fought 
for their rights mainly in northern Tyrol but were few in number, the workers 
and officials for the railway were harbingers of an enlightened workforce. In 
Franzensfeste they were joined by one of the few peripheral industrial en-
terprises in Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass, a cardboard box factory in 1890, 
which “brought a touch of industrial spirit to the village and offered secure 
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jobs to immigrants from other valleys in South Tyrol and Upper Italy” (Heiss 
2012: 158).
From 1895 onwards there was a Social Democratic Party in Franzens-
feste as well as leisure clubs of the railway union, which was notorious for 
being left-wing. The suspicion of the Catholic Church was correspondingly 
deep: the railway station quarter was apostrophized as Jewish quarter (ibid.: 
162). Soon a Christian Social Workers’ Association was founded, and the 
construction of the new Church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus began (Kramer 
1957: 162), in order to counteract the loss of souls and inf luence. This example 
shows, on a small scale, how migration per se challenges power structures 
and social orders, which on the one hand is socio-politically and cultural-
ly productive and creative, and on the other hand leads to a rejection and 
defensive attitude towards migrant movements. Migration as a “significant 
motor of social change and modernisation” (Mecheril 2010: 8) irritates and 
provokes the resistance to change of more or less conservative societies.
Conversely, migration itself can be set in motion, accelerated, stopped or 
changed by economic, political, military or ecological upheavals—and often 
in a painful and traumatic way. The annexation of South Tyrol by Italy sim-
ply deprived a large part of the Austrian railway employees in the country 
of their right to be there. In the years before, most municipalities had never 
officially recognised the more socially democratic-minded railway employ-
ees from other parts of the Monarchy as citizens, in order to prevent social 
democratic growth in elections. Thus, 90 per cent of them left Italy (Peterlini 
2016: 37). South Tyrol lost a politically mature and critical section of the pop-
ulation, which would have been important not only for a pluralistic debate 
within the country, but also for its political representation under the upcom-
ing fascism. The country, almost completely robbed of its social-democratic 
component, under fascism withdrew into subterranean national persever-
ance, which created a fertile ground for the approaching Nazism.
In Franzensfeste 150 of 245 railway families left their home (Lechner 
2005: 20), to which they had given vitality and diversity. This triggered a rare 
solidarity across language groups. While in South Tyrol the usual dynamic 
prevailed that ethnic oppression drives the oppressed groups into self-eth-
nicization and displaces supra-ethnic interests, such as social, economic 
and even gender rights (cf. Butler/Spivak 2011: 24ff), the railway workers 
set an example of solidarity across language groups. This was not limited to 
Franzensfeste, but was particularly striking there: from 24 April to 21 May 
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1921, for a whole month, a strike in protest against the dismissal of a large 
part of the German-speaking railway workforce shut down all rail traffic on 
the Brenner route. Italian trade unions also participated massively in the 
strike. Adolf Berger junior, son of the then chief engineer, recalls: “We sat 
on the rails and sang the Internationale together, each in his own language.” 
(Tiroler Geschichtsverein 1989: 28)
With the forced emigration of the German-speaking railway workers, 
the demographic composition of the population in Franzensfeste abruptly 
changed once again. Italian workers filled the vacant positions, and addi-
tional workers were needed for the construction of the new Italian railway 
line. This trend was further forced by the 1939 resettlement agreement, the 
so-called Option, according to which Mussolini was to receive the land of 
South Tyrol and Hitler his people—a cynical barter between two dictators. 
Like in the whole country, 90 percent of the German population of Franzens-
feste decided to emigrate to the Reich. While in other parts of the country, 
however, emigration was partially stopped by the following war events, here 
real emigration was much higher due to the proximity of the border and the 
lack of economic prospects for the German language group (Heiss 2012: 164). 
In the interplay of emigration of the German population and continuing 
immigration from Italian provinces, the population was almost completely 
ethnically exchanged: while the German language group represented a nar-
row majority of 54 percent until 1939, it was only 26 percent in the year of the 
German invasion in 1943 (Kramer 1957: 153). The cardboard box factory, for 
example, had to hire new workers from other provinces almost overnight. 
(cf. Nitz 2004: 11).
Another industrial enterprise, promoted by fascism, provided for im-
migration from the 1930s onwards. The transport of perishable goods such 
as milk, fresh vegetables, fruit and meat led to the establishment of an ice 
factory, which specialised in the production of 22-kilo sticks of ice for refrig-
erated vehicles. Despite the high level of emigration due to the option, the 
population thus grew to over 1,362 inhabitants by 1943. Because of the many 
workers, around 3,000 people stayed in this pluralalistic microcosm during 
the day. Franzensfeste counted several grocery stores, two butcher shops, a 
dozen haulage companies and more than enough bars and restaurants (Del 
Piccolo 2008).
Franzensfeste was a village at the pulse of technology and progress, of 
traffic, industrialisation and the associated energy requirements: 1931 an 
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electric power station was built, 1940 the dam between village and fortress. 
An entire hamlet was f looded for the power plant, similar to the Reschenpass 
on the border to Switzerland. There, the parish tower of the f looded village 
still rises out of the artificial lake like a memorial. In Franzensfeste, nothing 
reminds us of the violent intervention against nature and man. This may also 
have something to do with the constant exchange of the population, which 
made breaks with the past, with the loved and the familiar, more bearable.
Somehow, things in Franzensfeste and Brenner have always been differ-
ent in comparison to the perceptions, moods and developments in the rest of 
South Tyrol. When the rest of the country resigned economically and polit-
ically in the 1950s, the two often shady and marginal places f lourished. For 
the Brenner village, the State Treaty for Austria in 1955 was a stimulating 
economic impulse. Austria’s acquired sovereignty had a particular effect on 
the border with Italy, and border trade came to life: “Whoever was able to 
offer something to eat on the road, at that time did good business. There was 
a queue in front of every ‘shop’, and some merchants from the shantytown 
could bring the money they had earned in a single day to the bank in an apple 
crate.” (Senoner 20013: 70). The gold-rush atmosphere also loosened up life 
on the Brenner, in stark contrast to the gloomy mood in South Tyrol in the 
1950s and 1960s, when a long uprising with dynamite attacks accompanied 
the political struggle for autonomy like a threatening echo. South Tyrol ex-
perienced decades of tension and violence due to the terrorist attacks. While 
the bombers were smuggling dynamite across the border in f lat cars, with 
blonde-haired women in the side seat and often with baby carriages, life at 
the Brenner Pass went on almost unencumbered. There were love affairs 
across the border, people married back and forth, and at the same time the 
presence of so many border guards ensured permanent vigilance in view of 
the f lourishing smaller and larger, legal and less legal border trade.
In Franzensfeste, the railway, along with the electric power station and 
the state presence, remained the generators of further prosperity. The staff 
of the Ferrovie dello Stato was constantly increased, the station was a cen-
tral reloading and customs clearance point on the Brenner route. Forward-
ing companies settled down, and since the 1950s, cattle transports had also 
increased enormously. This required a considerable logistical effort, as cus-
toms clearance and health checks (with a special veterinary service) had to be 
carried out as quickly as possible in combination with a wide range of oth-
er services. Often up to 150 livestock wagons arrived per week (Del Piccolo 
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2008). The Dopolavoro as a leisure-meeting place for railway workers became 
the social centre, just like the shooting range and the innkeeper once were in 
typical Tyrolean villages. In many parts of South Tyrol, young people from 
farming and working families had to look desperately for work in Germany, 
while in Franzensfeste the forwarding companies and service providers cre-
ated good job opportunities.
From the outside, Franzensfeste was perceived as an “ugly hole” (Kin-
igadner n. d.). The good wages, low housing prices and ideal transport con-
nections, made it a place of good life for the residents. Despite the immi-
gration from mostly poor Italian regions, which was steered by fascism and 
right wing post-war governments, the fascist successor party MSI remained 
in the minority among the Italian population. From 1952 to 1982 the school 
principal Oddo Bronzo was mayor. He was the only socialist mayor in the 
whole of South Tyrol and also one of the very few Italians who was perfectly 
bilingual, an integration figure and representative of a very special South 
Tyrolean, typical for the inhabitants of Franzensfeste, according to Thomas 
Klapfer, the mayor in office in 2016 (interview 8.8.2016)
From overcoming to reinforcing borders
In the 1970s and 1980s, about 1,600 inhabitants lived on the Brenner Pass. 
There were five schools, a kindergarten “and so many telephone connections 
that they filled five pages in the telephone book” (Mitterer 2013: 21). Immedi-
ately after the Schengen Agreement came into force in 1998, the population 
dropped to around 300 people. The security forces alone had previously ac-
counted for almost 250 people. After Schengen, only 30 state officials from 
the finance, police and carabinieri departments remained stationed at the 
Brenner Pass, says Mayor Franz Kompatscher (interview 8.8.2016). With the 
privatisation of the railways, further jobs were lost. When on the 1st of April 
1998 the then provincial governors of Tyrol and South Tyrol Wendelin Weing-
artner and Luis Durnwalder, triumphantly raised the border bar as a symbol 
of the division of Tyrol, it was a highly celebrated event. On the Brenner and 
in Franzensfeste however “it got dark overnight” (Klapfer, interview 2016). 
The legal, semi-legal and illegal business, from freight forwarding to foreign 
exchange speculation to smuggling, lost their most important basis. The bor-
der was freely passable, the currency was converted to the common euro, the 
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range of goods was globalized anyway—“today you can get anything any-
where, it makes no sense to cross the border to buy it here if you can get it in 
any shop over there” (Kompatscher, interview 2016). While the drawing of 
the border as a closure of space had allowed the place to grow and f lourish, 
the opening of the border now reduced it back to a space of transit. One af-
ter the other schools had to close, the village remained without a permanent 
priest, and one page in the telephone directory was enough for the names of 
the inhabitants. (Mitterer 2013: 22)
In Franzensfeste, partly due to a crisis in the industry and partly due to 
a delay in modernisation, the cardboard box factory had already closed in 
the 1980s and the ice factory had lost its technological justification. With EU 
integration and finally Austria’s accession to the EU, the withdrawal of cus-
toms and financial police also began. In the 2001 census, the population fell 
to 822 persons compared to 1,130 in 1981. The ethnic balance also shifted once 
again: 57.82 percent declared themselves German speaking in 2001, while the 
former Italian majority fell to 40.69 percent. The trend continued until 2011 
(the last census to date): now 59.63 percent were German-speaking, 38.51 per-
cent Italian-speaking. (Astat 2011: 91) Although the village thus followed the 
trend of the continuing nationwide strengthening of the German language 
group, it fell far behind the economic upswing of the German-speaking pe-
riphery of South Tyrol. Thus Brenner and Franzensfeste were, contrary to the 
pendulum swing in the surrounding area, once again on the way to becom-
ing a non-place. For Hans Heiss (2012: 155), the present Franzensfeste is an 
example of those temporary places “where something irrevocably comes to 
an end, turns beyond recognition or simply decays” (Raabe/Sznajdermann 
2006: 9).
The gloomy picture at the turn of the millennium has since become 
somewhat more colourful. In Franzensfeste, the empty apartments attract-
ed numerous migrant families. They found cheap housing and good public 
transport connections for their jobs in the surrounding villages and in the 
towns of Sterzing, Bruneck, Brixen and Bozen. The lower demands on living 
comfort made apartments in poor condition or without heating still attrac-
tive. Far away from being an idyll, the immigrant families at least met a local 
population, who largely know about the fragility of being locals themselves. 
In fact, sooner or later also the locals had immigrated or knew of stories told 
by their families. This allowed—despite all the uncertainty—a certain calm-
ness in dealing with migration.
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Thus Franzensfeste, in its temporary decay and change to unrecog-
nizability, ultimately remained true to itself. Migration is inscribed in the 
town’s chronicle: “Anyone who comes to Franzensfeste tries to get away im-
mediately, but after a while, when someone has lived here for a while, they 
will gladly come back or feel the longing to do so,” wrote the legendary mayor 
Oddo Bronzo in a letter to the Italian local newspaper Alto Adige. (Bronzo n. 
d.) “When I read this, I feel like I could write it all now”, says the later Mayor 
Klapfer (interview 2016).
The village that Bronzo describes in his letter is not a beautiful, but a 
liveable place. Here everybody is foreign or nobody, nobody is native or ev-
erybody. For the mayor of the good old days, the immigrant families of rail-
way workers, officials, financiers, workers and service providers gave their 
vitality to the village, whereas for the Post-Schengen-Mayor Klapfer these 
are the migrants from 27 nations. (Interview 2016). They make up 25 percent 
of the local population—with around 1,000 inhabitants in 2016. With those 
who continuously receive citizenship thanks to ten years of residency, there 
would be much more.
»For me, they are all Franzensfester, that’s how it used to be, whether Ger-
man or Italian, I grew up like that, we never made a dif ference. Why should 
we do that now? If someone says that these are not real Franzensfester be-
cause they have only recently arrived, I answer: Where do you want to draw 
the line? Your family has been here for 40 years, mine for 100 years—should I 
then say that I am a real Franzensfester and you are not?« (Klapfer, interview 
2016).
The question of who is native and who is not, is nevertheless difficult to 
avoid. It also became one of the dilemmas for the project “Intercultural en-
counter at the community level” (Profanter/Lintner 2011) of the Organisation 
for One World (OEW). How to define a “group of natives” (ibid.: 108) in a vil-
lage that owes its existence to migration and where there was multiple eth-
nic exchange. In the publication of the results, the authors found themselves 
reproducing the stereotypes of the native and the foreign, which were to be 
deconstructed by the project, simply through the selection of images—peo-
ple in colourful garments, with headscarves, dark-skinned children—in the 
“depiction of the foreigner” (ibid.: 77ff). Stranger and natives are categories of 
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deeply rooted systemic orders that are constantly being thwarted in the real 
world, but which are not abolished.
Usual orders are visibly relativized in Franzensfeste, but not suspend-
ed. The village never had a company of Schützen, the German-Patriotic As-
sociation of Tyrol par excellence in the tradition of homeland-defence from 
1809, and the only marching band during the fascist period was an Italian 
one (Del Piccolo 2008), while they are German-oriented everywhere else in 
South Tyrol. Nevertheless, Franzensfeste also ref lects in many ways the eth-
nic division structures of the South Tyrolean society. “We have many things 
twice, as everywhere else in South Tyro” says the mayor: “Italian workers’ 
association (Acli), German association of the working people (KVW), Italian 
club for the elderly, German club for senior citizens, the German fire brigade 
in Mittewald, the Italian fire brigade in Franzensfeste.” (Klapfer, interview 
2016) Even basically open institutions and associations, such as the youth 
centre or the choir, are usually dominated by one language group (Profan-
ter/Lintner 2011: 83, 110), while the respective others stay away: “If there is 
an association here, something is taken over strictly by the Italians or by 
the Germans.” (ibid.: 110) Social and public spaces in which encounter is not 
primarily dependent on the language are a prerequisite for integrative pro-
cesses. The usual offer in South Tyrolean villages with their inns and bars as 
meeting places is not easily accessible for migrants. The Muslim population 
in particular is afraid of them due to the predominant presence of alcoholic 
beverages.
An integrative link across divisions has always been sports. In Franzens-
feste this used to be, for example, table tennis in the parish hall and in the 
bar garden of the restaurant or billiards in the Dopolavoro (Kinigadner nod). 
The strongest integrative force, ethnically equal and social, is still football 
today. In Profanter/Lintner’s research project (2011), the football teams of 
Franzensfeste—from the U8 upwards clearly recognisable as integrating 
by name and skin colour—unfortunately did not come into evidence. Too 
few participated in the encounter project on which the research was based. 
Encouraging integration through encounter initiatives, no matter how pas-
sionate they may be, rarely goes beyond good intentions (cf. Chisholm/Peter-
lini 2012: 141), because it remains selective and artificial. Rather, integration 
requires concrete experiences of the other person, based on real needs and 
habits. For women, for example, the project has made visible the importance 
of the playground and thus of children as future Franzensfester, albeit limited 
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to very specific age groups (Profanter/Lintner 2011: 82f.). For people working 
outside it is partly the route in the train on the way to work (ibid.). Those who 
travel this route at commuting times can experience how people of different 
origins greet each other, sit together, exchange short words—they share a 
piece of mobile living space, often of course also without knowing or want-
ing more from each other. The origins of the 250 migrants from 27 countries 
make it difficult to form larger communities in favour of retreating into the 
private sphere, but also prevent ghettoization in parallel worlds.
Because of the refugee movements, the Brenner Pass became the focus 
of fierce polemics between Italy and Austria in 2014/2015, which attracted 
attention throughout Europe. The worry that refugees arriving in Italy via 
the Mediterranean Sea could continue their journey to Austria on a massive 
scale led Austria to consider closing the border. The historic conf lict seemed 
to be turning around: Whereas historically Italy had insisted on a sharply 
drawn line at the Brenner Pass in order to avoid any doubt about its claim to 
South Tyrol, Austria was now insisting on closing the boundary. The border, 
which South Tyrolean politicians still complain about as a separation from 
the fatherland and the protecting power Austria, has now been drawn more 
sharply by Austria for ‘protection’ against refugees
At the same time, the village of Brenner, which had almost died out, 
owes its demographic revival to migration. The reasons for settling in the 
border village are similar to those in Franzensfeste: apartments that are not 
always cheap, but in any case have become vacant, comfortable trains to the 
workplace, vacant structures that owe the migrants their continued exis-
tence, such as the Italian kindergarten. Unlike in Franzensfeste, immigrants 
from Pakistan form a remarkable community on the Brenner Pass, “by far 
the largest”, as Mayor Kompatscher estimates (interview 2016). The Pakistani 
youths thus form active peer groups and their mothers happily take part in 
sewing courses. However, the opportunities for community life that goes be-
yond ethnic group formation are meagre. The mayor also sees one of the few 
opportunities in sports: “We will have to do something about it” (ibid.).
The place, which in 2016 became the focal point for the refugee debate 
throughout Europe, is unspectacularly marked by the presence of migrant 
families: “The living together is fine, once there was trouble because the chil-
dren of a foreigner family were allowed to stay up late and were very loud, so 
I just talked to the people, then they understood.” (Kompatscher, interview 
2016). The association Volontarius took care of the refugees arriving daily in 
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small groups and individually in the middle of the village from 2016 on, with-
out any major difficulties. The border village is again dependent on how the 
larger politics operates around it. For now, Austria is shying from a border 
blockade, but the technical devices are ready in case of larger refugee move-
ments.
Probably the densest expression of how structural orders are able to 
share diversity is school. At the same time, the school, based on the duty to 
admit all children regardless of their origin, represents an open social space 
in which togetherness can be lived, even if only for the limited time of in-
struction and school age. The primary school in Franzensfeste is located in 
a small building, the German language school on the ground f loor and the 
Italian school on the first f loor above. In both schools, depending on the year 
of birth, up to 100 per cent or slightly less of the children come from migrant 
families, divided into a German and an Italian school.
Hardly anywhere else is South Tyrol’s school system, separated accord-
ing to language groups, as incisive as here. Both in Franzensfeste and on the 
Brenner Pass with a similar composition of schoolchildren, the mayors are in 
favour of joint kindergartens and joint schools, but the official school policy 
according to the Statute of Autonomy does not allow it. (Kompatscher and 
Klapfer, interviews 2016) The division of educational institutions according 
to language groups, which is intended to protect the ethnic minority, makes 
it more difficult than elsewhere to design learning spaces that are not limit-
ed to formal teaching, but that also include and make use of the diversity of 
the world we live in (Baur/Larcher 2011: 164ff).
Left to their own devices and divided into two school systems, the kin-
dergartens and schools on the Brenner Pass and in Franzensfeste threaten 
to become problem areas in which teachers are overtaxed and pupils are 
deprived of better opportunities. At the same time, there is a great deal of 
untapped potential here for breaking new ground. It is precisely the mul-
tilingual competence that is present in such heterogeneous class situations 
that is a resource that has been recognised by international multilingualism 
research (cf. Cummins 2006: 38), but which is still completely misunderstood 
in monolingual, nation-state societies with the idea of a single dominant 
language that should be perfectly mastered. This also applies to South Ty-
rol. The official and partly life-world bilingualism (related to the German and 
Italian language group, since the third language group of the Ladin stands 
in a different context) contrasts the monolingual habitus (Gogolin 1994), but 
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rather doubles it as a separate variant for each of the two groups instead of 
overcoming it. The protection of the minority language German makes it 
more difficult to open up to the actual language diversity in many school 
classes, because language policy and sometimes parents fear that their chil-
dren will not learn German properly. In addition, children of German or 
Italian-speaking parents bring their children to schools in the surrounding 
villages where the migration density is lower. On the other hand, multilin-
gualism competence means that children play on several language registers 
at the same time, get along with foreign words and codes, and communicate 
beyond linguistic norms and cultural imperatives of unity and purity.
Outlook
The communities Brenner and Franzensfeste both represent in a complex 
and different way that topos for which migration research is always look-
ing for new terms. As living worlds in between, they are presumably the 
third space from which Homi Bhabha (2000: 5) hopes for the emergence of 
something new between strangeness and adaptation, between rejection and 
assimilation. It is true that host cultures have a high assimilation effect on 
those who come, but their adaptations also change what the migrants adapt 
to (ibid.: 136). Both communities can also be described as transnational social 
spaces (Pries 1996) or as transtopias (Yildiz 2013: 9). As global places (Heiss 
2012), they transcend and irritate structural orders. This makes them prov-
ing grounds for exploring how integration can be imagined, what tasks it 
places on all population groups, what conceptual changes are necessary. As 
a pure adaptation achievement of migrants, integration as a political strat-
egy falls short: “We need new models”, is the simple insight of the mayor of 
Brenner, “the way people used to think, it is no longer possible, even if one 
wanted to”. (Kompatscher, interview 2016). In his youth, the fire brigade did 
not accept the so-called “mixed-language” children, not even when the pre-
dominant family language was German. Even if only one parent belonged 
to the Italian language group, this was sufficient reason to thwart the ad-
mission of a linguistically German socialized youth—an undisguised, but 
hardly conscious racism that had crept into the long justified struggle of the 
German-speaking South Tyrolean minority.
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The search for perspectives of the two places beyond the language walls 
common in South Tyrol ties in with their strengths in the past. For the Bren-
ner Pass, the mayor sees the greatest hope in the next stage of expansion for 
the new outlet-centre. The aim is to transform the border town from a transit 
point back to a place of rest. The mayor hopes that the town will then be able 
to resurrect, also thanks to the migrant population (Kompatscher, interview 
2016).
In Franzensfeste, the hope lies in the migration of labour, which histori-
cally founded the town, in the favourable traffic situation and in the fortress, 
which was the original crystallisation point for the settlement. The need 
for survival creates visions: An accessibility of the fortress from the village, 
preferably spectacularly on a kilometre-long footbridge over the reservoir, 
and in the village a meeting place that is accessible to everyone and offers 
something for everyone, from PC stations to card games, because inns alone 
do not meet all needs. A former house of the hated fascist administration, 
which Mussolini had built, would be a suitable location. “Yes, and why not 
a multicultural kitchen in the Dopolavoro,” muses the mayor (Klapfer, inter-
view 2016). The idea is not only to use the nearby state border for crossing 
and exchange, but also to overcome internal social, linguistic and cultural 
boundaries. Migration, which makes the place a non-place in conventional 
ideas, is its real future resource.
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Imaginaries of sovereignty 
Visualizing the loss of control
Alexandra Schwell
“The night that Germany lost control.” This headline on the cover of the German 
weekly DIE ZEIT was published in fall 2016 on the 2015 border opening anniversary 
when German chancellor Angela Merkel had decided to allow Syrian and other ref-
ugees into the country. DIE ZEIT situates its visual and linguistic narrative within 
a discursive framework that echoes far-right and right-wing populist discourses in 
the way it instrumentalizes images, metaphors, and visual imaginaries of Others 
and relates them to imaginations of control and sovereignty. Drawing upon a closed 
reading of DIE ZEIT’s title page, the article seeks to elaborate on the broader rela-
tion of images, imaginaries, and emotional practices of border transgression and 
the invocation of the border in media and political discourse on refugees in Germa-
ny. It explores how the cover epitomizes, alludes to, and at the same time fosters a 
growing unease of large parts of the German liberal middle-class concerning the 
“refugee crisis”.
Introduction
“The night that Germany lost control.” This headline on the cover of the Ger-
man weekly DIE ZEIT was published in fall 2016 on the anniversary of the 
so-called “border  opening” in September 2015. One year earlier, German 
chancellor Angela Merkel had decided to allow Syrian and other  refugees 
into the country. They had been camping for days under unfortunate circum-
stances at Keleti train station in Budapest before they decided to march over 
the highway towards Austria. Merkel had negotiated with Austrian chan-
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cellor Faymann that Austria would allow refugees to cross Austria towards 
the German border. Merkel had said her famous words, “Wir schaffen das/ 
we can do this” already on 31 August 2015.
Figure 1: Title page DIE ZEIT Nr. 35/2016
Germany and Austria saw unprecedented waves of solidarity towards the 
refugees at the Vienna and Munich train stations and locally in small towns, 
cities, and villages in many European countries (Sandberg 2020). The initial 
wave of solidarity and sympathy towards the refugees was paralleled by an 
upsurge in populism, violence, and attacks on refugee shelters and asylum- 
seekers’ homes. Germany is not an exception as many other European coun-
tries experienced an increase in right-wing populist and far-right parties 
and movements. In the aftermath of the “summer of migration”, right-wing 
populists argued that Merkel’s decision to suspend the Dublin agreement 
led to an uncontrolled inf lux of undocumented migrants, that Viktor Orbán 
had blackmailed the country, that Merkel had made the country vulnerable 
to terrorists, that German bureaucracies were not ready or equipped to deal 
with such high numbers, and finally, that there was the problem of culture. 
Their Islamic belief and traditions would make the refugees incompatible 
with German Christian mainstream society; they would pose both a phys-
ical and cultural threat to their host society, particularly for “our” women 
and girls. The night of New Year’s Eve in Cologne (Arendt/Brosius/Hauck 
2017) exacerbated the refugee Other’s framing as an object of fear. In this 
increasingly heated atmosphere of 2016, DIE ZEIT takes a look back at the 
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suspension of the Dublin agreement, commonly termed “border opening,” 
and Merkel’s famous words, “We can do this!” Many, DIE ZEIT claims in its 
cover article, say that in this very moment “Germany lost control” and that it 
only regained this control in December 2015, as allegedly was secretly admit-
ted by informants from within the Merkel administration.
In this article1, I provide a close reading of DIE ZEIT’s front page to elab-
orate on the broader relation of imagery, imaginaries, and emotional prac-
tices of border transgression and the invocation of the border in media and 
political discourse on refugees. Since these late summer days of 2015, both 
the German-Austrian and the Austrian-Hungarian border had become focal 
points of social imagination. At the same time, they became “empty signi-
fiers” (Laclau/Mouffe 1985)—temporarily fixed but permanently contested 
and ready to be filled with the most diverse and contrasting meanings under 
conditions of continuous power struggle.
Borders play a pivotal role in the imaginary of control that is at stake 
here. Shortly after the first arrivals, Germany introduced border controls 
on 13 September 2015 at the internal Schengen border to Austria. European 
internal Schengen borders had almost disappeared from public attention; 
their practical relevance had become more and more insignificant due to in-
creased cross-border activities and networks, unobstructed by border con-
trols and checks. Borderwork (Cooper/Rumford 2012) was mainly directed 
not towards exclusion and bulkheading of the neighbor but towards coop-
eration and networking, aiming at making the border almost invisible, even 
imperceptible, for legal border-crossers.
In fall 2015, those taken-for-granted certainties changed abruptly with 
the reinstatement of border controls. They conveyed a clear message: first, 
that the nation-state was (still) powerful and protective, and second, that it 
was under threat. The national border, this was meant to signal, returns at a 
time of crisis. It stages a performance of power, control, and sovereignty be-
yond its actual relevance as a barrier for cross-border crime. When DIE ZEIT 
reports “The night that Germany lost control”, it establishes a direct seman-
1  An early draf t of this article was presented at the workshop “Kulturwissenschaf tliche Per-
spektiven auf Devianz, Kriminalität und Sicherheit” at ISGV Dresden in September 2018. 
I am indebted to the workshop participants, and Katharina Eisch-Angus in particular, for 
valuable comments and advice. Also, I wish to thank Guido Tiemann for his comments and 
help in streamlining the article. Finally, I want to thank the anonymous reviewer whose 
advice significantly improved the article’s argument.
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tic link between the “opened” national border, migration, and control over a 
state territory. This narrative inextricably links imaginaries of control and 
state sovereignty to borders and the border function’s invocation. Simulta-
neously, it reinforces the boundary between the national Self and the refugee 
or migrant Other, whose intrusion signals a violation of the border and an 
attack on the sovereign nation-state. I argue that DIE ZEIT situates its nar-
rative within a discursive framework that echoes far-right and right-wing 
populist discourses (Wodak 2015) in the way it instrumentalizes images, 
metaphors, and visual imaginaries of Others and relates them to imagina- 
tions of control and sovereignty.
The article proceeds as follows: First, I take the border-control-nexus as 
a point of departure to analyze how both are linked to the social imaginary 
of sovereignty, how this imaginary is produced and perpetuated, and how it 
contributes to the “doing” of national identity and the nation state’s perfor-
mativity as a “home” and a trusted “safe haven” whose borders hold a security 
promise. I provide a close reading of the visual narrative on DIE ZEIT’s cover 
in the next step. I explore how  the front page emphasizes an alleged “loss 
of control” threatening this “home” linked to affective bordering practices. 
Thereby, I wish to attend to the subtle and subliminal emotional practices 
that impact actors’ feelings towards the location of Self and Other and how 
they practice national belonging and externalizing the Other.
I argue that it is arranged in a security meta-frame, which epitomizes 
an imaginary loss of control and an imminent threat to national safety and 
security. This framing overrides the cover image’s situatedness in Christian 
iconography, which would otherwise establish a moral obligation towards 
the refugees. The article concludes with an exploration of how the cover epit-
omizes, alludes to, and at the same time fosters a growing unease of large 
parts of the German liberal middle-class concerning the “refugee crisis”.
Control and borders
To desire security and safety is an anthropological constant. Insecurity and 
uncertainty can be destructive for human beings; security and safety are 
pivotal for personal, psychological, and social development. The first and 
primary security community on a micro-scale is the core family who enjoys 
specific legal protection, often at the expense of the security/safety of its 
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most vulnerable members. On the societal and political level, it is the state’s 
responsibility to keep its members safe. This is both a social contract and a 
promise2. In fact, the security promise is a crucial element of the social con-
tract in which citizens cede power to the state. As such, it is also an essential 
pillar of state sovereignty. Following Max Weber’s famous definition, state 
sovereignty means that a state has the monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force, maintains the social order within a given territory over a given popula-
tion, and guards its borders (Weber 2005 [1921]: 1043). Thus, borders are inte-
gral to the security/safety promise. Likewise, national sovereignty conveys a 
sense of security and reinforces the nation-state’s affective dimension.
National identity and national belonging happen on the symbolic level 
of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) but are also practiced, em-
bodied, and emotionally rooted. Nation-states represent “homes” to “their” 
people who can claim their membership, e.g., through citizenship. Walters 
coined the concept of “domopolitics,” i.e., governmental practices that make 
the nation-state appear like a home. Domopolitics are defined as “the gover-
nance and construction of the nation as a domestic or ‘homely’ space to be 
secured through practices of filtering, classification, and surveillance” (Dar-
ling 2013: 1786; Walters 2004). As such, these practices are inextricably linked 
to borders. Imaginaries of the state as a “home” or a “safe haven” are, howev-
er, in practice misleading and highly ambivalent, as safety for the privileged 
majority often entails insecurity and exclusion of those at the margins of 
society (Balibar 2015).
Borders, boundaries, and bordering practices are integral to and consti-
tutive for the perception and imagination of the nation-state as a home and 
the definition and exclusion of the Other. My perspective on borders is based 
on the following assumptions: First, Borders do something; they have agen-
cy. They make a difference, and they create social spaces, obstacles, clas-
sifications, and opportunities. The border function and infrastructure are 
potent devices. Second, borders are also objects of agency; they are invoked, 
imagined, and have symbolic meaning. They are an essential part of social 
imaginaries and processes of selfing and othering. The imagination of the 
border function and infrastructure is powerful. As Bendixsen argues, “bor-
ders are constructed, reproduced and contested by a variety of actors, using 
2  On the concept of promise, see Färber 2019.
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techniques, institutions, laws, policies and social interactions at different 
scales” (Bendixsen 2016: 536).
The national border is pivotal for the imagination of the sovereign na-
tion-state because it promises security. National borders and border con-
trols provide an idea of stability and reliability. They mediate trust not only 
in state institutions but in an idea of national belonging and national power 
in a world of neatly divided Westphalian nation-states. Ironically, as Wendy 
Brown states, national borders are increasingly hyperbolically emphasized 
in a world where national sovereignty and the practical importance of bor-
ders are waning:
“This theatricalized and spectacularized performance of sovereign power 
at aspirational or actual national borders brings into relief nation-state sov-
ereignty’s theological remainder. If walls do not actually accomplish the in-
terdiction fueling and legitimating them, if they perversely institutionalize 
the contested and degraded status of the boundaries they limn, they nev-
ertheless stage both sovereign jurisdiction and an aura of sovereign power 
and awe. Walls thus bear the irony of being mute, material, and prosaic, yet 
potentially generative of theological awe largely unrelated to their quotidian 
functions or failures.” (Brown 2010: 26)
My contribution takes the link between borders and control and the symbol-
ic, even theological dimension of the border as a point of departure to ana-
lyze the subtle and affective ways of “doing” the sovereign nation and exclud-
ing the Other through discursive and visual means.
The loss of control
“The night that Germany lost control.” Below this headline is a subheadline: 
“What happened on the 4th of September 2015? Which intentions, mishaps, 
and misunderstandings lead to hundreds of thousands of refugees entering 
the country? A protocol.” In these lines, DIE ZEIT insinuates that a suspen-
sion of the Dublin agreement and the inf lux of refugees are equivalent to a 
loss of sovereignty over the German national territory and state. Moreover, 
the “border opening” happened under tremendous pressure and somewhat 
accidentally; it did not occur intentionally and in a rational and controlled 
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way. Therefore, the argument goes, it is a sign of bad government. DIE ZEIT 
joins the ranks of those who claim that the so-called “border-opening” led to 
an uncontrolled inf lux of unknown, i.e., not classified/classifiable and po-
tentially harmful people into the country.
The cover sparked my interest because it is marked by internal tension 
and epitomizes societal and political frictions, which since 2015 worked their 
way from the margins of right-wing extremism to the center of the German 
middle-class. DIE ZEIT addresses the liberal upper-middle-class and prides 
itself on its intellectual stance. Therefore, the article was received with sur-
prise and anger, as it ran counter to the coverage of many left-wing main-
stream media in 2015/2016. Funke and Nakschbandi (2017) report that the 
title “The night that Germany lost control” was also fiercely contested by 
DIE ZEIT’s editorial staff, as it was considered an ingratiation with right-
wing populists by evoking a myth of defeat, even the abandonment of the 
magazine’s own identity. The front page is both symptom of and actanct in 
a broader context where the German upper-middle-class struggles to define 
its relation to the political (far-)right-wing.
Numerous scholars have analyzed discursive constructions and repre-
sentations of refugees and migrants as unwanted Others in different settings 
(for a wide range of contexts, see Fürsich 2010; Khosravinik 2010; Powell 2011; 
Friese 2017). Language is a powerful instrument, and imagery exerts an ad-
ditional affective effect beyond the rational and the rationalizable. The con-
sequences of narratives and imagery do not remain in the linguistic domain 
but have very practical repercussions. The visual representation of refugees 
is an integral component of how the refugee Other is created and perpetuat-
ed. In this contribution, I focus on the front page’s affective dimension by in-
cluding the headlines, the cover image, and the cover’s overall composition. 
I argue that to uncover securitizing processes’ affective dimension, scholarly 
analysis needs to attend to the subtle and less obvious inf luences such as 
those provided through visualizations and visual imageries.
To a certain degree, reading an image is idiosyncratic yet at the same 
time informed by and situated in a broader historical context and what might 
be termed ‘seeing rules’ and viewing habits. We interpret images against the 
background of our socialization, upbringing, and the discourses that sur-
round us. A photograph in a newspaper is not neutral or documentary, but it 
is itself a “message” (Barthes 1977: 15). Photographers arrange and compose 
their image and provide an interpretation of reality, a representation, a sym-
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bol that represents something else. Neither they nor news magazines such 
as DIE ZEIT who use these images can determine a specific and exclusive 
reading of the picture; they can suggest a dominant preferred reading for 
the viewer/reader to evaluate. The following section looks at how DIE ZEIT 
arranges image and text on its front page to elicit a preferred reading.
First, the front page is dominated by a strong visual imaginary. The cover 
image interacts with the headline “The night…”; both reciprocally constitute 
each other. It is evident that the message of the text and the content of the 
image belong together. At first glance, the cover image stands in stark con-
trast to the text’s message. There is no noticeable loss of control in the pic-
ture, no raging masses.
Second, the protagonists and the setting. The photograph itself shows a 
group of five, presumably a family: two women wearing headscarves and a 
bearded man pushing a baby buggy with two toddlers. The picture shows 
the family in a delocalized border zone, neither here nor there. They are on 
a highway, walking on the emergency lane. A large truck drives by; it is an 
inhospitable and surreal environment. We know nothing about them, but we 
can guess that they are on their way to the German border. It is dark; the 
scenery is bathed in dim red light.
Third, interaction. The adults do not look at the camera. We cannot see 
their faces; they do not look us in the eye. Their lack of interaction with the 
viewer is irritating. They move before us as by-standers and observers; they 
are in a hurry, they walk quickly. The look in their eyes is directed straight 
ahead, with their eyes firmly fixed on the goal. However, they do not seem 
happy and hopeful but exhausted and demoralized. In their socio-psycho-
logical analysis of images of refugees in Australian media outlets, Bleiker et 
al. (2013) argue that portrait pictures showing only one person who looks di-
rectly into the camera elicit the most compassion in the observer. Photos of 
groups, on the contrary, create an emotional distance between the observer 
and the subject. This empathy effect decreases with every additional person 
in the picture and the persons’ direction of view (see Bleiker et al. 2013: 404). 
The pattern is even effective when children are part of the image (cf. Schober 
2021). As a result, DIE ZEIT’s cover image is unlikely to engender compas-
sion or sympathy in the observer, as it features five persons in the picture, 
and none of them looks at the camera. By making their lives, personalities, 
and fates exchangeable through media representation, they are deprived of 
their subjectivities and rendered almost invisible. In her book Precarious Life, 
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Judith Butler discusses the kinds of lives that are visible in public life, the 
“publicly acknowledged field of appearance.” She claims: “Those who remain 
faceless or whose faces are presented to us as so many symbols of evil, autho-
rize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated, and whose 
grievability is indefinitely postponed” (Butler 2004: XVIII).
Four, the colors. The image has been visibly post-edited; colors have been 
enhanced or altered, and contrast increased to achieve a striking effect. The 
family is bathed in a red, dim light; the children’s faces remain dark; they are 
not recognizable. The women wear headscarves, the archetypical marker of 
difference and focal point of “culture clashes” in Germany and “the West” 
more generally (Özcan 2013). The headscarves appear dark red as well. Psy-
chological effects and cultural-historical symbolism of the red color lie be-
yond this article’s scope, yet suffice to say that the color red is also associated 
with imaginaries of power, violence, seduction, and danger. The family em-
bodies a looming threat and should not be trusted.
There are other colors in the image: The woman’s jacket on the left forms 
a bright yellow spot of color. It is not a cheerful yellow, yet it stands out in 
the specific way the title page is assembled. The jacket’s yellow is ref lected in 
two other instances. First, part of the subheadline is written in yellow: “What 
happened on 4 September 2015?” An apparent link between the female refu-
gee with the yellow jacket and the big question mark is thus established—
what happened, and how could it come that far? Second, there is a yellow box 
on the right side of the title page with a police cap on top. It informs about an 
article in DIE ZEIT’s dossier: “Attention, attention, this is the police! Officials 
talk about their everyday life: emergency calls, burglaries—and suddenly 
also terror”. This box and the article it features are not related to the title sto-
ry about refugees and Germany’s “loss of control.” However, it establishes a 
visual connection via the yellow color and the picture’s framing by the police 
cap. Together with the phrase “and suddenly also terror,” these features sug-
gest a specific and biased reading of the title page. The yellow elements on the 
front page interact, creating a direct link between otherwise independent 
stories: the everyday life of policing terror and other crime, and the refugees 
who irregularly cross the border.
Put in a broader context, this image differs considerably from the mainly 
positive visual narrative which dominated German liberal mainstream me-
dia in the immediate aftermath of the “summer of migration.” Until then, 
pictures of refugees prevailed who arrived at daylight and sunshine at Ger-
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man and Austrian train stations. They were shown as being relieved, hap-
py, thankful, often filled with incredulous amazement, and overwhelmed 
by the enthusiastic welcome and helpfulness which was bestowed on them. 
The family on the cover of DIE ZEIT does not come at daylight, but it is a 
dark night, and it is chilly; one of the women has a blanket wrapped around 
her shoulders against the cold. They are tired, exhausted, desperate yet de-
termined. While the image thwarts DIE ZEIT readers’ viewing habits by 
deviating from “welcome culture” iconography, it also differs significantly 
from negative depictions of refugees. As mentioned before, the image does 
not show an actual loss of control or anarchy at the border. The family itself 
represents no obvious security threat to “Us”, but it symbolizes a what-if, a 
looming potentiality.
To summarize: Judging from its composition and its location on the title 
page, the cover image is not intended to elicit empathy among DIE ZEIT’s 
readers. It serves to amplify the message of the article it accompanies: the 
temporary loss of control and sovereignty due to the “border opening” and 
the inf lux of refugees. While a press image underlining an article’s message 
is not news in itself, the next section broadens the scope to consider the im-
age’s ambiguity within a fragile and contingent context.
The holy family effect
Images are polyvalent and ambiguous; they can be filled with different 
meanings, but their range of preferred interpretations is also contingent 
upon historically transmitted ideas and imaginations. Like any image, visu-
al representations of refugees are not neutral, depicting an objective truth. 
Our reading and interpretation of images build upon existing knowledge. 
Centuries of art and cultural history have shaped our viewing habits and 
have taught us, even subconsciously, how to recognize the stranger, the ref-
ugee, the migrant as cultural figurations. Contemporary media draw upon 
this world of images and use it for their storylines or their political agenda. 
The depiction of refugees, thus, follows specific iconographic rules: “photo- 
graphic portrayals of refugees are, in our day, extremely abundant. Most 
readers have probably seen such photographs, and most of us have a strong 
visual sense of what ‘a refugee’ looks like” (Malkki 1995: 9, quoted in Wright 
2002).
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The refugee and the forced migrant have many precedents in Western 
art history. Terence Wright argues that, Christian iconography is an essen-
tial source of contemporary media representations of refugees. He claims 
“that refugee images not only have their roots in Christian iconography, but 
that images perpetuating this visual tradition are reproduced and broadcast 
instinctively—possibly having a subliminal effect on the viewer” (Wright 
2002: 54). Wright distinguishes four categories of images with biblical ori-
gins, among them the Holy Family’s f light into Egypt, where the link to the 
visual representation of the refugee is often made explicit (Wright 2002: 
57). The Holy Family is a prominent motif of political art protesting migra-
tion policies. In 2005, street artist Banksy famously (and allegedly) paint-
ed a “Christmas Card” where Joseph’s and the pregnant Mary’s journey is 
strangely interrupted by the wall separating Israel and the West Bank. The 
“Christmas Card” uses explicit biblical references which anyone with a ba-
sic knowledge of Christianity can recognize and classify, as Fischer claims: 
“The anti-barrier message is clear, but it can function only by way of cultural 
memory: Without knowledge of the Nativity story, the image means nothing 
[…]” (Fischer 2014: 149).
The biblical meta-story elevates mundane activities to the level of grand 
narratives. Thereby, it also posits them within a moral and ethical frame-
work. Wright suggests that “we may consider the iconography of the visual 
image in the West as belonging to a wider set of moral codes and conven-
tions” (Wright 2002: 54), including a moral obligation to feel and to react. 
Consequently, a refugee family walking on the highway in 2015 recalls the 
biblical story of the Holy Family that seeks refuge but is refused and sent 
away, finally ending up in a stable. We know how the biblical story contin-
ues, and we also recognize the moral obligation that arises from it. The Holy 
Family tale teaches us a lesson about charity, solidarity, about helping and 
protecting the weak and the poor. It is an outstanding example for the as-
sumption that “an image has the potential to induce the viewer to relate it 
to a visual tradition of much greater length than the immediate news set-
ting” (Wright 2002: 59). But why are we as readers less likely to be inclined, 
or even prevented, from interpreting the image as a visual metaphor of the 
Holy Family—and to draw the appropriate conclusions?
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The unease oft the middle classes
Readers of DIE ZEIT are educated; they are expected to recognize the biblical 
metaphor. Yet, the front page does not convey a message of charity and sol-
idarity, but the opposite. To get the article’s message across, DIE ZEIT must 
ensure that the family is not interpreted as a metaphor of the Holy Family 
seeking refuge. DIE ZEIT is not a sensation-seeking tabloid that would bomb 
its readers with stereotypical images of threatening intruders or faceless 
mass migration moving in on “us,” of “dehumanizing visual patterns [which] 
directly feed into the politics of fear […]” (Bleiker et al. 2013: 399). Readers 
of DIE ZEIT would be somewhat repulsed by blunt tabloid-like imagery. As 
outlined the image is polyvalent and ambivalent. In conclusion, I identify 
elements that account for the image’s “security” reading epitomizing the 
border-control nexus.
First, the link between refugees and a loss of control and sovereignty is 
rendered quasi-natural through the way it is embedded into an overarching 
interpretative framework. I argue with Vida Bajc (2011) that the cover im-
age is placed within a “security meta-frame”. For Bajc, a security meta-frame 
provides a framework for interpretation as a security threat that dominates 
all other possible frames. Alternative readings are ruled out or become less 
likely. If the image itself can be subjected to ambivalent readings, the secu-
rity meta frame provided by both the police cap in the yellow box and the 
headline “The night that Germany lost control” establishes a dominant read-
ing: This group of refugees calls upon the reader to interpret it in terms of an 
irregular border-crossing; their intrusion results from political failure. The 
image of the moving family foreshadows Germany’s imminent loss of con-
trol. They are both harbingers and actors of this loss of control.
Second, the image’s inherent ambivalence makes the family a “public 
icon” epitomizing what Mitchell (2015) terms the “historical uncanny”. By 
adapting the literary and aesthetic concept of the uncanny as “the genre of 
ambiguity par excellence” (Mitchell 2015: 195) to factual historical events, he 
seeks to understand the ambiguity, insecurity, and uncertainty that accom-
pany “an event that is collectively understood to mark a turning point or sig-
nificant moment in a historical period” (Mitchell 2015: 196). The picture of the 
family, published one year after the “border opening”, echoes its ambivalent 
reading in the aftermath of the historical event of 2015. It embodies uncer-
tainty regarding questions of trust in leadership, (lack of) good governance, 
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hospitality, and hostility, and an uncanny feeling that “we” should have seen 
this (literally) coming towards “us”.
Third, images are intended to produce an affective effect. The cover 
image’s appellative function urges us to react and to feel in a certain way, 
which is linked to its status as an icon of the uncanny. It is in this affective 
effect where the bordering practice of externalizing the refugee Other be-
comes salient. When refugees appear as a source of insecurity, as potential 
risks threatening “our home”, it becomes almost impossible to empathize 
with them. Flam and Doerr claim that “those who generate specific visuals 
or texts expect their viewers to feel or at least be already familiar with or, 
alternatively, wish to impose specific feeling rules or an emotional regime on 
their viewers” (Flam/Doerr 2015: 229; cf. Hochschild 1979). On the front page, 
such an emotional regime is established. It marks the family as an object of 
fear. Yet, it is not a fear of the Other itself, but the emotional regime moves 
the focus from “them” to “us” and on what their intrusion might bring for 
“us”.
The family is not threatening in itself, but as a messenger of the loss of 
control, they “remind us, irritatingly, infuriatingly and horrifyingly, of the 
(incurable?) vulnerability of our own position and of the endemic fragili-
ty of our hard-won well-being” (Bauman 2016: 16). Instead of reproducing 
the Christian narrative of charity and humanitarianism, DIE ZEIT’s cover 
foreshadows a very different ending for the family that differs diametrically 
from the biblical narration. Moreover, the focus moves to “us”, to “our home”; 
it is not on their plight. DIE ZEIT releases the observer from any moral obli-
gation to empathize and to help. This reminds of Gerrard’s argument about 
the imagery of refugees that is intended to appall the observer: “Thus, any 
humanitarian ethic evoked through shocking imagery (…) is superseded by 
security and safety threats and fear for oneself and one’s community through 
the explicit narration of the evil ‘Other’” (Gerrard 2017: 884).
In conclusion, I suggest that the cover eloquently captures the unease of 
the liberal middle-classes and their struggle of defining their political stance 
in times of the “refugee crisis”. A homology exists in the link between the 
visualization of the loss of control and the middle-class’s unease. The front 
page represents a figuration that appeals precisely to a German middle- 
class’ ambiguity that oscillates between the two poles of moral obligation 
towards the deserving and their subjective feeling of insecurity. In fact, it 
assists in sharpening the blurry boundary between the deserving and the 
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undeserving. Readers of DIE ZEIT are middle-class liberals whose self-im-
age tends to be marked by a general empathy for and a humanitarian stance 
towards refugees and forced migrants. Since the night of New Year’s Eve in 
Cologne and the upsurge in right-wing extremism all over Western Europe, 
their empathy has increasingly turned to indifference at best or xenophobia 
at worst (Arendt/Brosius/Hauck 2017; Borneman/Ghassem-Fachandi 2017). 
Right-wing populism and far-right thoughts appeared to be gradually seep-
ing into mainstream discourses and have become increasingly socially ac-
ceptable.
This fear is directed at the uncanny that may turn against “us” anytime. 
Thus, the cover page functions as a catalyst for a moral panic that calls for the 
border in order to regain a subjective feeling of security. Gerrard suggests 
that “there is the potentiality to border the ‘pain of Others’ through a recog-
nition of their pain, if the narration rests upon fear and territorial imagined 
communities of nationhood” (Gerrard 2017: 887). The refugee family’s fear, 
suffering, and desperation are overridden by a politicized framing that helps 
create and reproduce a politics of fear of the refugee Other and the threat-
ened Self. The national border’s security promise is restored at the refugees’ 
expense by establishing distance towards the undeserving and redirecting 
the focus to the own threatened existence.
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A Border on the move 
The Ukrainian-Russian frontier from the  
Soviet collapse to the conflict in Donbas
Tatiana Zhurzhenko
The border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is the longest in Europe. 
It runs across densely populated territories and is crossed by millions of people for 
private visits, business and tourism. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the 
military conf lict in Donbas resulted in new dividing lines, caused f lows of refugees 
and internally displaced persons, af fected labour migration and disrupted the 
cross-border cooperation between the two countries. This development has signif-
icant impact on border crossing regimes, transport routes and routines of cross- 
border movement.
Introduction
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the administrative bound-
ary between Ukraine and the Russian Federation became an international 
frontier. The longest land border in Europe (almost 2,000 km), it runs across 
densely populated territories and is crossed by millions of people for private 
visits, business and tourism. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the 
military conf lict in Donbas have created new dividing lines between the 
Ukraine-controlled territory and the territories controlled by Russia and by 
the separatist “republics”. The ongoing conf lict between Ukraine and Rus-
sia resulted in massive f lows of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
affected labour migration and disrupted the cross-border cooperation be-
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tween the two countries. It caused significant changes in the border crossing 
regime, transport routes and routines of cross-border movement.
This article offers an analysis of the current situation against the his-
torical backdrop of the Ukrainian-Russian relations since 1991. The first 
section provides an overview of the institutionalization processes of the 
Ukrainian-Russian border from 1991 to 2014. The second section discusses 
the impact of the current conf lict on the border regime between Ukraine 
and Russia. The third section addresses the situation at the de facto borders 
with Crimea and the uncontrolled territories of Donbas. Finally, the fourth 
section deals with the migration crisis which resulted from the Ukrainian- 
Russian conf lict.
Historical background
For Ukraine, as for other post-Soviet countries, national borders and the 
ability to control them have been an important attribute of state sovereign-
ty and one of the key elements of national security. With the collapse of the 
USSR, the new Ukrainian state faced rather different challenges at its “old” 
and “new” frontiers. Having a common border with the countries of the “so-
cialist camp” (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania), Ukrainians be-
fore 1991 could hardly profit from this neighbourhood: the Soviet external 
border was well protected and hardly permeable while cross-border contacts 
were strictly controlled by Moscow. On the contrary, Ukraine’s borders with 
the neighbouring Soviet republics (Russia, Belarus, Moldova) were merely 
administrative lines, which were neither controlled nor demarcated; they 
hardly mattered in terms of labour market, social provisions or education 
system (Zhurzhenko 2010: 126). After 1991, the infrastructure of Ukraine’s 
western border thus needed to be modernized to answer the needs of grow-
ing cross-border traffic, to facilitate contacts between the populations of the 
near-border regions and to develop tourism. At the “new” borders of Ukraine 
with the former Soviet republics, the delimitation and the demarcation had 
to be accomplished and the infrastructure of border and custom controls had 
to be built practically from zero. Additional challenges emerged in the case 
of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, where the frozen conf lict in Transnistria 
has become a source of instability and economic crime. Ukraine’s border 
with Belarus, though thinly populated and not very busy in terms of traffic, 
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runs through territories which were heavily polluted as a result of the Cher-
nobyl nuclear accident in 1986.
As a border with a former “imperial power”, Ukraine’s border with Russia 
has acquired a special symbolic status in post-Soviet Ukraine being associ-
ated to such issues as the power imbalance in bilateral relations, unfinished 
nation-building and the alleged weakness of Ukrainian national identity in 
the east. During the first post-Soviet decade, the Communist opposition and 
Russian nationalists in both countries presented the Ukrainian-Russian bor-
der as a “wound” cutting through the single collective body of East Slavic 
civilization and as an artificial dividing line imposed on the “brotherly peo-
ples” by the “corrupted pro-Western elites” (Zhurzhenko 2010: 163). Major 
issues between the two countries were settled in the Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation 
(1997), and in 2003 presidents Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma signed the 
Agreement on the State Border between Ukraine and Russia.
Nevertheless, the common border remained, to use Friedrich Ratzel’s 
metaphor, a “power barometer” in the relations of the two countries. For 
many politicians in Kyiv, the border with Russia represented economic de-
pendence, vulnerability to Moscow’s political and informational inf luences, 
and the general weakness of the Ukrainian state. For the Kremlin, especially 
after the Orange Revolution in 2004, the border with Ukraine embodied the 
danger of a further EU and NATO enlargement to the East and the perceived 
threat of being encircled by a geopolitical adversary and cut off from the rest 
of Europe.
Like other frontiers in the post-Cold War Eastern Europe, the 
Ukrainian-Russian border became a laboratory where processes of nation- 
and state-building overlapped with the effects of globalization. Moreover, it 
has been the main site of competition (and later conf lict) between two am-
bitious projects: the EU integration and enlargement, on the one hand, and 
the Russia-led Eurasian integration, on the other. Although Ukraine was not 
considered an official candidate for accession, the perspective of an EU inte-
gration motivated Kyiv to proceed with the delimitation and demarcation of 
its borders with the post-Soviet neighbours. This corresponded to the grow-
ing concern in Brussels that Ukraine—a new neighbour of the EU after its en-
largement to the East—posed a number of soft security threats, of which the 
issue of illegal migration seemed most urgent. Indeed, from the mid-2000s 
and till the Arab Spring Ukraine was considered one of the main transit 
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countries for migrants from the Middle East, China and the CIS to Europe. 
By investing in the infrastructure of Ukraine’s borders, including the border 
with Russia, and providing training for the local border and custom services, 
the EU sought to prevent illegal migration, human trafficking and contra-
band in its neighbourhood but also to contribute to political stability and se-
curity in the region (Zhurzhenko 2005).
Russia, which during the 1990s favoured “transparent borders” inside 
the CIS, has never considered the demarcation of the border with Ukraine 
a priority. The agreement on demarcation between the two countries was 
signed only in 2010, and until 2014, only 372 km of the border with Russia 
in the Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts were demarcated (Chervonenko 2014). 
While investing in the technical infrastructure of its border with Ukraine, 
Russia emphasised the importance of cross-border cooperation and regional 
integration, including such projects as the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC), the Single Economic Area (SEA) and lately, the Customs Union. 
Instruments like the “Euroregions” established in the Ukrainian-Russian 
borderlands, a consortium of near-border universities and a “green corri-
dor” facilitating the small cross-border movement were largely borrowed 
from the arsenal of EU politics. This integration “from below” served as a 
show window for the business projects of the regional elites and was largely 
welcomed by the local population in eastern Ukraine profiting from cross- 
border trade, contraband and seasonal jobs in Russia.
These attitudes were ref lected in a sociological survey conducted by the 
Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine in 2001. It showed 
significant differences between the attitudes of Ukrainian experts and ordi-
nary citizens towards the status of Ukraine’s border with Russia. The over-
whelming majority of Ukrainian experts (87.5  %) assessed the transparent 
and non-demarcated border with Russia “negatively, as a proof of Ukraine’s 
exposure to potential risks.” More than a half of the experts (56.2 %) opted 
for a “Ukrainian border equally protected along its entire perimeter” while 
another 25 % were for “the western border being more open than the eastern 
one.” In contrast, the results of the general opinion poll demonstrated that 
the majority of the Ukrainians (59.8 %) saw the transparent and non-demar-
cated eastern border “positively, as a proof of a special relationship between 
Ukraine and Russia,” and only 22 % considered this situation negatively, as 
bearing potential risks. Almost half of the respondents (46.7 %) wanted to see 
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the eastern border “more open than the western one” (Sushko/Parkhomenko 
2001).
The conflict with Russia and the securitization of the  
Ukrainian-Russian border
With the annexation of Crimea in spring 2014, the outbreak of the military 
conf lict in Donbas and Russia’s intervention (on the legal aspects, see Tsybu-
lenko/Sayapin 2018), Ukraine lost 7 % of its territory; about 13,000 Ukrainian 
citizens have been killed and more than 28,000  wounded in the conf lict 
(United Nations 2019).
In spring 2014, the porous border with Russia was blamed for the smug-
gling of paid “pro-Russian protesters” and paramilitary groups into eastern 
Ukraine (cf. OSCE 2014). In summer of the same year, Russia’s hybrid aggres-
sion turned into a full-f ledged military intervention. As a result, Ukraine lost 
control over 400 km (20 %) of its land border with Russia (Interfax-Ukraine 
2016). With the deployment of additional military units and the development 
of the military infrastructure, the Ukrainian-Russian border has been heav-
ily militarized (cf. UNIAN 2017).
These dramatic developments affected the attitudes of Ukrainians to the 
border with Russia. According to an opinion poll carried out in June–July 
2014, more than a half of the respondents (58 %) wanted Ukraine to close the 
border with Russia, while 34  % were negative about such a measure. Half 
of the respondents (49  %) supported the idea of introducing a visa regime 
with Russia, while 41 % were against it. Such restrictive measures were, how- 
ever, less popular in the east and south (Rating Group 2014). The widespread 
perception of Russia as a source of instability and military threat resulted 
in various grass roots initiatives which emerged during summer 2014 with 
the aim of improving the infrastructure of the border and supporting the 
Ukrainian border guards. In Kharkiv, an eastern Ukrainian city forty kilo-
metres from the border with Russia, groups of volunteers helped digging 
trenches and building bunkers, fixing equipment and decorating buildings 
with Ukrainian symbols (Kumkova 2014). By the same token, the idea of a 
“security fence” similar to the one at the Israeli-Palestinian border was pro-
posed by Ihor Kolomoiskyi, a pro-Ukrainian oligarch and at that time the 
head of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Critics of the project pointed out that 
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such a wall, even if helpful against illegal crossing and smuggling of weap-
ons, would not be able to stop a military invasion and denounced it as a PR 
stunt meant to consolidate Kolomoiskyi’s image as a Ukrainian patriot. The 
idea was supported by President Petro Poroshenko and especially by Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk, who embraced the project of a “European ram-
part” which, he argued, would be part of the future eastern border of the 
EU (Kyiv Post 2014). The government also announced that the demarcation 
of the border with Russia would be continued unilaterally as the Ukrainian- 
Russian commission on demarcation failed to continue its work after the 
outbreak of the conf lict. Years after the launch of the “European rampart” 
project, however, only some elements of it have been implemented, while the 
rest stumbled over financial difficulties and corruption allegations (Miller 
2018).
The regime of crossing the border has been strengthened since the out-
break of the conf lict, especially from the Ukrainian side. In spring 2014, 
afraid of Russia’s hybrid aggression, the Ukrainian government temporarily 
limited the entry of adult Russian male citizens into the country. These re-
strictions were soon partly lifted, but at the same time new requirements 
were introduced for Russian citizens visiting Ukraine: travel passports in-
stead of internal ID cards, official invitations and preliminary online regis-
tration. The new system of biometric control, which Ukraine implemented at 
its borders in 2018 as part of the preparations for the visa free regime with 
the EU, has also affected citizens of Russia, which Kyiv authorities added 
to the list of “migration risk countries”. From March 2020, Ukrainian citi-
zens, too, can enter Russia only with travel passports and not with internal 
ID cards and birth certificates.
In addition to these changes, Ukraine terminated the agreement with 
Russia on local border traffic: since March 2015, only international border 
crossings have been open, while small local ones previously used mainly by 
near border residents remain closed (UNIAN 2015). In October 2015, Ukraine 
and Russia suspended direct f lights between the two countries; in the fol-
lowing years, Minsk, the capital of Belarus, has become the main regional 
transit hub. Other transport connections were adjusted to the conf lict as 
well: Russia rushed to build a new railway from Moscow to Rostov bypassing 
Ukrainian territory. For Russian tourists, the popular transit route to Crimea 
through the territory of Ukraine was replaced by direct f lights to Simfero-
pol; since 2018, the new Kerch Bridge connects Crimea with the Krasnodar 
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region. The number of train connections between Ukraine and Russia de-
creased, although there are still some trains run by Ukrainian Railways con-
necting main Ukrainian cities with Moscow. Cancelling them would mean 
a significant financial loss as the Moscow destination remains most profit-
able for the Ukrainian state railway company (Proskuriakov 2019). Moreover, 
this would be also a rather unpopular measure as these trains are used pre-
dominantly by Ukrainian labour migrants working in Russia (more on this 
topic in the last section). The situation has been used by various private bus 
companies which offer alternative and rather cheap possibilities for people 
commuting between the two countries. Very often, a minibus brings people 
to the border which they cross by foot and then at the other side are picked 
up by another minibus which de facto belongs to the same owner (cf. Kolosov 
et al. 2018: 461).
The deep crisis in Ukrainian-Russian relations resulted in cross-border 
cooperation projects being put on ice. This concerns, for example, the 
Ukrainian-Russian Euroregion “Slobozhanshchyna” established in 2003 by 
the Kharkiv and Belgorod oblasts. In 2016, the trade turnout of the Belgorod 
oblast with Ukraine dropped 74  % in comparison with 2013 (Kolosov et al. 
2018: 462). Kharkiv local business, especially retail, services and entertain-
ment, has been suffering from a significant drop in the number of visitors 
from Belgorod whose inhabitants also feel a certain nostalgia for pre-war 
times when Kharkiv was a frequently visited friendly territory offering cul-
tural pleasures, entertainment and affordable shopping. Cross-border pro-
fessional and personal contacts obviously have suffered from the conf lict, 
especially from restrictions on travel and from hostile TV propaganda. In 
the interviews I conducted in Kharkiv in summer 2017, representatives of 
the Kharkiv academic community confirmed broken or frozen contacts with 
Russian colleagues1. Common projects with Russian institutions were put 
on ice and inviting Russian citizens to conferences in Ukraine became tricky. 
Travelling to Russia for Ukrainians (and vice versa) has become politicized 
and thus—especially for academics, journalists and public figures—limited 
to exceptional reasons of illness or death in the family. Public servants and 
1  Research was conducted together with Daria Skibo in Kharkiv and Belgorod in summer 
2017 and supported by the program “Transcultural contact zones in Ukraine” of the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen.
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especially law enforcement officers in both countries are strongly discour-
aged to cross the Ukrainian-Russian border.
Crossing precarious de facto borders
In 2014, Crimea and its harbour city Sevastopol became two new federal 
subjects of Russia, while parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are now 
controlled by the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” backed by Moscow. 
According to Ukrainian legislation, in both cases these territories are con-
sidered “temporarily occupied”; in 2016, a special governmental body, the 
Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs, was established 
by Kyiv. The new “temporary administrative lines” separating Crimea and 
the “people’s republics” in Donbas from the rest of Ukraine have become de 
facto new borders; for Ukrainian and Russian citizens as well as foreigners 
crossing them is in many ways more complicated and stressful than crossing 
the “normal” Ukrainian-Russian border. The politics of bordering in the two 
cases of Crimea and Donbas and the regime of crossing on the ground are, 
however, rather different.
Ukraine’s border with Crimea is de facto Russia’s new external frontier, 
even if illegitimate and not recognized by the international community. As a 
new subject of the Russian Federation, Crimea has been integrated in its ad-
ministrative, political and economic system. For patriotic or pragmatic rea-
sons, most of the Crimean population accepted Russian citizenship (which 
was granted automatically to all residents of the peninsula; an exception was 
made for persons who, within one month after the annexation, rejected Rus-
sian citizenship in writing). Quite a few of Crimean residents, however, did 
not give up their Ukrainian passports (which allow more freedom of move-
ment for inhabitants of a territory under international sanctions). From 
the Ukrainian perspective, Crimea is an occupied territory temporarily out 
of control; its residents remain Ukrainian citizens. According to Ukrainian 
law, entering the territory of Crimea from Russia without permission of the 
Ukrainian authorities is a criminal offence, and a number of Russian pub-
lic personalities have been banned from entering Ukraine for this reason 
(Zhurzhenko 2019). While the fundamental disagreement between Ukraine 
and Russia on the issue of Crimea is unlikely to be settled soon, the adminis-
trative boundary between Crimea and continental Ukraine is de facto a new 
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border between two countries. It is controlled by border guard and custom 
services of Ukraine and Russia, and apart from long waiting hours the re-
gime of crossing is quite stable. Most of those who cross this de facto bor-
der are Ukrainian citizens and Crimean residents who kept their Ukrainian 
passports. Since autumn 2014, there is no direct public transport connection 
between continental Ukraine and Crimea—the border can be crossed only by 
foot or by private car—but private minibus services on both sides bring peo-
ple to the crossing point and pick them up there. As Crimea used to be a very 
popular holiday destination for Ukrainians, it is hardly surprising that, de-
spite a dramatic drop in the number of tourists, the cross-border movement 
has seasonal character: in 2019, the number of crossings (both entry and exit) 
at three crossing points in February was 121,000 while in August 408,000. In 
sum, during 2019, 2,582,000 persons crossed the border with Crimea in both 
directions (State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 2020).
At the other new boundary separating the so-called DNR and LNR from 
(the rest of) Ukraine the situation is far more ambivalent and not settled at 
all. To start with, the region suffered enormously during the hot phase of 
the military conf lict which resulted in f lows of refugees and a ruined in-
frastructure. The front line has been stabilized but shelling and sniper fire 
continues, with casualties on both sides reported regularly; after six years 
there is still no sign of progress in solving the conf lict. The new “border”—
which is actually a frozen front line—is seen by both sides as provisional and 
movable, worth investing in fortification but not in civic infrastructure. It 
runs through two densely populated Ukrainian regions—the Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts—leaving the regional capitals with their educational and 
health care facilities in separatist-controlled territories. While the “repub-
lics” issue their own documents (which Ukraine does not recognize) and 
many local residents made use of the new opportunity to apply for a Rus-
sian passport (more on this in the next section), the local population is still 
dependent on Ukrainian social provisions and thus Ukrainian citizenship. 
Many families are divided, with young people leaving for Ukraine for work 
and study and elderly staying in the uncontrolled territories bound to their 
Soviet era apartments or houses—the only assets they have. This explains 
the intense movement across the dividing line where five control points from 
the Ukrainian side have been established (one in the Luhansk oblast and four 
in the Donetsk oblast). According to the statistics of the Ukrainian Border 
Service, the total number of crossings (both entries and exits) during 2019 
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reached 13,933,000, a number more than five times higher than at the admin-
istrative line with Crimea during the same period (State Border Guard Ser-
vice of Ukraine 2020). Here, seasonal f luctuations are not so pronounced.
The fact that Ukrainian citizens living in the so-called DNR and LNR can 
receive their pensions and social benefits only on the Ukraine-controlled ter-
ritory creates additional incentives for regularly crossing the dividing line. 
According to the Eastern Ukraine Survey Checkpoint Monitoring (UNHCR 
2020) 63  % of those crossing the temporary dividing line are 60 years and 
older, 65 % of them are women. Apart from receiving pension, other popular 
reasons for crossing are issues with documents, visiting relatives and, to a 
lesser extent, shopping (food, clothes and many other categories of goods are 
more expensive in the “uncontrolled territories”). As in Crimea, the border 
can be crossed by foot or by car (many local residents have both Ukrainian 
and “separatist” car plates). But unlike in Crimea, the border crossing regime 
is regulated by a “Temporary Order” established by the Headquarters of the 
Anti-Terrorist Operation (since May 2018 the Joint Forces Operation). It can 
be changed (e.g. in case of escalation) by decision of the United Center for 
Civic-Military Cooperation which includes representatives of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian Security Ser-
vice and local authorities. In the last years, it often happened that crossing 
points were temporarily closed because of shelling threat. But even in ab-
sence of immediate danger, the general uncertainty, long waiting lines and 
the absence of a basic infrastructure and services make crossing the dividing 
line quite a challenging experience. In 2018 alone, 60 Ukrainian citizens—
most of them elderly people with chronical health issues—died during 
crossing the dividing line (Myrnyi 2020). Illegal crossing outside the official 
checkpoints can cost a trespasser her/his life—strips of land adjacent to the 
dividing line are heavily covered with mines.
The humanitarian situation at the temporary crossing points in Crimea 
and especially in Donbas has been often criticized by human rights activ-
ists and international observers, and little progress in terms of improving 
the infrastructure has been made until recently. It seems that apart from 
a lack of political will, corruption and weak administrative capacities, the 
Ukrainian authorities have been caught in a dilemma: while the lack of im-
provement imposes high human costs on the local residents of the conf lict 
zone and undermines their trust into the Ukrainian state, building a proper 
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infrastructure for temporary crossing points would implicitly mean a de fac-
to acceptance of the status quo as a permanent arrangement.
In summer 2019, the Ukrainian government announced its plans to mod-
ernize the infrastructure of the two crossing points in Crimea, Chongar and 
Kalanchak. These plans envisaged the construction of parking areas, sanitary 
facilities, offices providing administrative services, and medical emergency 
rooms. In November of the same year the first round of modernization was 
completed. In February 2020, Ukrainian president Zelenskyy announced 
plans to build a new town in the Kherson oblast for refugees from Crimea, 
especially for the families of Crimean Tatars. He promised it to become a 
“garden city”, a show window of the new Ukraine demonstrating its ad-
vantages to visitors from Crimea (President of Ukraine 2020). In October 
2019, Zelenskyy ordered to restore the bridge (destroyed since 2014) over the 
Siverskyi Donets river in Stanytsia Luhanska, the only crossing point in the 
Luhansk oblast (Kyiv Post 2019). The same presidential decree listed a num-
ber of other urgent measures aimed at improving the infrastructure and 
simplifying the regime of crossing the temporary dividing line. The COVID 
pandemic has unfortunately suspended these plans; moreover, in March 
2019 crossing points in Crimea and Donbas were closed for both entrance 
and exit—a decision strongly criticized from the humanitarian point of view.
Migration crisis and passportization politics
The annexation of Crimea and especially the outbreak of the military conf lict 
in Donbas, resulted in a migration crisis, which, in Ukraine’s modern his-
tory, can be compared only to World War II. Half of the Donbas population 
has been forced to f lee. Of those who have f led, around one million and a 
half went to other parts of Ukraine. On May 12, 2020, 1,446,651 persons were 
registered in Ukraine as IDPs (internally displaced persons) (Ministry of So-
cial Policy of Ukraine 2020). The official statistics, however, is incomplete. 
Many of those who went to other parts of Ukraine did not register official-
ly as IDPs while some of those with IDP registration returned back to the 
uncontrolled territories in 2015–2016, after the relative stabilization of the 
situation. During the peak of the displacement crisis in 2014–2015, an un-
precedented number of people was on the move, forced to leave their homes 
in haste, often being already traumatized by the armed conf lict, families 
Tatiana Zhurzhenko150
being divided by front lines and state borders. The majority were women with 
children and elderly people with rather limited financial resources. Some 
could count on relatives and friends in other regions of Ukraine, but the ma-
jority needed at least a temporary shelter. The capacities of the Ukrainian 
state, weakened by the political crisis and the external aggression, were in 
no way sufficient, and spontaneous civil society initiatives were decisive in 
providing immediate help during the first months. For example, the “Stan-
tsiia Kharkiv”, an around-the-clock info point, organized by local volunteers 
at the Kharkiv railway station, one of the main destinations for the displaced 
from Donbas, did not only offer initial orientation and basic information 
but helped people to find temporary accommodation, provided them with 
food, necessary medicine, children’s clothes and diapers etc. The majority of 
the displaced have been staying in Kyiv, Kharkiv and the Ukraine-controlled 
parts of Donbas, still in hope to return home. Very often, they face margin-
alisation, social exclusion and feel like second class citizens (Bulakh 2020). 
But there are also many who, due to their education, financial resources and 
social capital, have been able to start their life anew and even succeed. This 
especially concerns displaced persons from Crimea, whose number accounts 
for less than 7 % of Ukraine’s entire IDP population (Charron 2020). Crimean 
IDPs did not f lee from the military conf lict; most of them left because they 
refused to accept the annexation or/and saw their future in Ukraine. Having 
left for “political” reasons, this group enjoys a different symbolic status in 
today’s Ukraine.
In addition to Ukrainian IDPs, over one million Ukrainians went to Rus-
sia (Kuznetsova 2020). This number is even more contested and politicized, 
and the picture is extremely complicated. To start with, there are of course 
some “political refugees”—people with pro-Russian views, those who were 
active in the pro-Russian rallies in spring 2014 and thus came under pressure 
of Ukrainian security services as well as those afraid of criminal prosecu-
tion in Ukraine. But there are also people with pro-Ukrainian views who f led 
from the military conf lict to Russia because they have relatives or friends 
there. The majority of Ukrainian refugees in Russia has been, however, driv-
en by security concerns and hope for a better life: after all, the level of wages 
and social provision in Russia is higher than in Ukraine and the former was 
until recently the primary destination for Ukrainian labour migrants.
Like in Ukraine, civil society in Russia responded to the f low of refugees 
from the conf lict zone by a number of humanitarian initiatives. Russian 
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regional authorities in the near border regions and the Ministry of Emer-
gency joined in organizing temporary accommodation and basic provision 
for refugees. The Russian state was, however, not motivated by pure altru-
ism: as noted by Kuznetsova (2020), the issue of the Donbas refugees was 
instrumentalized by the Kremlin to blame Kyiv for “genocide” of the Russian 
speaking population in Ukraine. She also pointed to the fact that Ukrainians 
who left for Russia to escape the conf lict do not constitute a single group 
from the legal point of view: their statuses differ from refugee or temporary 
asylum to regular labour or irregular migrant. Russia is, however, notorious-
ly restrictive with granting refugee status, while temporary asylum, which 
is not easy to obtain, limits freedom of movement for its holder. Therefore, 
“the most attractive and, in some cases, the only way to stay in Russia for 
some of the displaced, was as an economic or irregular migrant” (Kuznetso-
va 2020: 517). The way from economic migrant to Russian citizenship was, 
however, long and complicated. Essentially, the only way to apply for Russian 
citizenship immediately was the State Programme for Voluntary Emigration 
of Compatriots Living Abroad to Russia (cf. Kuznetsova 2020) which, howev-
er, limited the choice of the place of residence and did not provide additional 
social benefits.
Responding to the shortcomings of this policy, in May 2019 Vladimir 
Putin issued a decree simplifying the procedure for granting citizenship 
to Ukrainian citizens from the non-government-controlled areas of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Two months later, Putin’s second decree ex-
tended the simplified rules for granting citizenship to the inhabitants of the 
government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ac-
cording to the new procedure, Donbas residents are not requested to pro-
vide a proof of their Ukrainian citizenship being renounced. Subsequent 
amendments simplified the rules for granting citizenship to other categories 
of Ukrainian citizens (including e.g. former residents of Crimea who had left 
the peninsula before March 2014). Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens were 
officially recognized as “Russian speakers” and thus spared from the Rus-
sian language exam. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
during 2019 more than 196,000 Donbas residents received Russian citizen-
ship, 136,000 from the Donetsk and Luhansk “republics” and the rest from 
the Kyiv-controlled territories (TASS 2020).
These steps can be seen as motivated by pragmatic economic consid-
erations. In the last decades, Russia has been facing demographic decline, 
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while some regions suffer from depopulation and its social and economic 
consequences. Another concern of the Kremlin is that labour migration from 
the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, while filling certain deficits of 
non-qualified labour in big cities, causes ethnic tensions and nurtures grass-
roots nationalist sentiments. Against this backdrop, Ukrainians—culturally 
close to Russians and easily assimilated—have come to be regarded as a wel-
come resource for Russian economy. The growing demand for Ukrainian la-
bour migrants in the countries of East Central Europe might have addition-
ally pushed Moscow into this direction. But not less important, of course, is 
the political motivation: passportization has long been used by the Kremlin 
as an instrument of geopolitical inf luence-seeking. This has already been 
Russia’s policy in other breakaway territories of former Soviet republics, 
such as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (cf. Grigas 2016). Granting 
Russian citizenship to Donbas residents, gives Moscow additional leverage 
in the ongoing conf lict. No wonder that both the Ukrainian government and 
the EU denounce this policy.
Responding to Putin’s decrees from May and July 2019, the newly elected 
Ukrainian president Zelenskyy ordered the government to simplify natu-
ralisation procedures for foreigners and stateless people who have “defend-
ed Ukraine” and for Russians facing “political persecution” at home (The 
Ukrainian Weekly 2019). Indeed, Ukraine has been a destination for some 
Russian political emigrants—journalists, bloggers, academics—attracted by 
the relative freedom of media and political pluralism in Ukraine in compar-
ison to the increasingly authoritarian Russia. While Ukraine cannot provide 
a level of security and well-being comparable to EU countries, opportunities 
for professional career are definitely better in Ukraine, due to the wide-
spread Russian language and the f lexible boundaries between the two East 
Slavic cultures. Apart from this, the attractiveness of the Ukrainian passport 
significantly increased in the last years due to the visa-free agreement be-
tween Ukraine and the EU, which came into force in 2017. For the Crimean 
residents, this is an additional incentive to keep Ukrainian citizenship de-
spite their new Russian passports: according to the State Migration Service 
of Ukraine, since March 2014 Crimean residents received 166,000 Ukrainian 
passports for travelling abroad. “Passport tours” have become a f lourishing 
business on the peninsula—private buses bring Crimeans across the de fac-
to border to the nearest Ukrainian city Kherson, where they can apply for a 
Ukrainian biometric passport (Evchin et al. 2019).
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The migration crisis caused by the Russian-Ukrainian conf lict should 
be discussed in a broader historical and geo-economic context. Since 2014, 
an increase of labour migration from Ukraine can be observed. One of the 
factors is the growing demand for labour force in Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as in other new EU member states which 
themselves suffer from an outf low of their labour force to the West. Many 
of these states liberalised migration legislation to attract labour force from 
Ukraine. The growing attractiveness of the labour markets of these countries 
led to a significant reorientation of labour migration f lows from Ukraine. 
Russia, which for decades had been the most popular destination, lost its 
place as number one to Poland. In 2017, the main recipients of the Ukrainian 
labour force were Poland (38.9 %), Russia (26.3 %) and Italy (11.3 %) (Pyrozhkov 
et al. 2018: 83). According to Ukrainian statistical data, the decrease of labour 
migration to Russia started some years before the events of 2014 in Ukraine. 
Despite the advantage of the common cultural background and the family 
ties between the two countries, Russia as a labour market has never been as 
attractive as the labour markets of Ukraine’s western neighbours. The new 
EU members, which now have liberalised their labour migration rules for 
Ukrainian citizens, offer better working conditions, higher wages and better 
social protection.2 No wonder, that the young and more educated risk new 
opportunities while the older generation and low qualified prefer the old 
routes. The same tendency—reorientation from Russia to the EU—can be 
observed in the education migration. One of the reasons is that a European 
academic degree gives access to the Western labour market.
Conclusion
In his seminal study of the US-Mexican border, Oscar Martinez (1994) sug-
gested a useful classification of borderlands according to the criteria of 
the intensity of cross-border contacts and the mode of relations between 
neighbouring countries. He differentiated between alienated, co-existent, 
interdependent and integrated borderlands. Applied to our case and slight-
ly modified to include the dynamic aspect, Martinez’s scheme allows us to 
2  Of course, Ukrainian labourers working illegally do not necessarily benefit from these 
changes.
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see the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands evolving from integrated (during the 
Soviet era) to interdependent and in some regards co-existent (until 2014). 
The annexation of Crimea and the Russian intervention in the east as well 
as the resulting conf lict of Russia with the West dramatically changed the 
geopolitical context of the Ukrainian-Russian border. The current situation 
thus bears some features of alienated borderlands, especially concerning the 
official contacts, business and education. The border has been militarised, 
the regime of crossing has been strengthened and cross-border cooperation 
projects were put on ice. Moreover, the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands ex-
perienced a proliferation of new “temporary dividing lines” and “de facto 
borders” thus having turned into a patchwork of unrecognized “quasi states”, 
annexed territories under international sanctions and “grey zones” where 
normal life is suspended due to the ongoing military conf lict. Despite all 
these developments, or as a result of them, mass migration and cross-border 
movement remain important features of the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands 
which in this regard cannot be considered alienated.
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